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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the problem of providing secure collaborative workflow across 
different organisations with an architectural solution. This involves addressing such issues 
as collaborative workflow and business processing, Grid Computing, service-oriented 
architecture and role-based access control. 
Grid Computing has been developed to provide middleware for collaborative access 
to distributed processing services and distributed data sources, supporting distributed users 
that form Virtual Organisations. Some distributed services and data are commercially 
sensitive, and need to be protected by controlling access to them, ensuring access is only for 
permitted users in the collaborative team. The collaboration is controlled in a workflow 
management system and links role-based workflow with role-based access control. 
Workflow management in Grid Computing provides the capability to integrate and 
coordinate distributed users, stateful Grid Services, Information systems and Grid Compute 
Resources. 
The research is supported by the UK e-Science Project, DAME (Distributed Aircraft 
Maintenance Environment), a collaborative project that demonstrates the use Grid 
Computing for collaborative problem solving across organisations. DAME uses the domain 
of aircraft engine diagnostics and maintenance in a global context, requiring the support of 
workflow management to coordinate the sharing of globally distributed users, processing 
services and data. 
This research extends the understanding of access control to Grid Services, by 
producing an architecture for the definition and control of dynamic access control policies 
for collaborative service-based workflows. In particular, the research addresses 
collaborative access to stateful Grid Service instances across organisations. 
The proposed solution for secure collaborative service-based workflows is called 
"Workflow-Team Policy Architecture". An implemented web-based portal and workflow 
management system controlling Grid Services instances across the White Rose Grid is 
evaluated using the business example of aircraft engine diagnostics. 
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Glossary 
The following glossary is an index of commonly used terms within this work: 
Business Process is the sequences of tasks that are initiated by a business event with the 
intent to achieve a business goal. 
Business Requirements are the functional and non-functional requirements to achieve a 
business goal. 
Engine Performance Data is the recorded data from the on-wing system that monitors 
engine performance parameters, such as fuel consumption and throttle position. 
Engine Vibration Data is the recorded data from the on-wing system that monitors the 
vibration of the aircraft engine, the frequencies of which shows the speeds of the propeller 
shafts and their harmonics. 
Feature is defined in the DAME project to characterise a signal trace found in the engine 
vibration data. 
On-demand is the notion by which Grid Computing resources can be dynamically allocated 
at the latest time to execute a task. 
Grid Service Instance is a stateful service. An example implementation would be Grid 
Services in Globus Toolkit 3 (GT3, (The Globus Alliance, 2005)) that executes a long-term 
process. 
Grid Service Type is the definition of a class of service. In Web Services, this could be the 
name of the interface defined in WSDL, without being bound to a specific URI (Uniform 
Resource Identifier), allowing for a loosely coupled implementation. 
Virtual Organisation is defined by Foster, et al. in (Foster and Kesselman, 2004). In this 
thesis, a Virtual Organisation (VO) is defined as a semi-permanent collaboration by 
different organisations or departments from different administrative bodies to achieve a 
business goal. 
Workflow Definition is the flow of tasks to achieve the business goal. It may be described 
diagrammatically (UML activity diagram (Aalst et al., 2003)), or in high-level model terms 
 xii 
(BPML (BPMI, 2002), Petri-nets (Aalst and Hee, 2004)) or in an execution language such 
as BPEL (Andrews et al., 2003). 
Workflow Instance is the active workflow executing the description from the Workflow 
Definition. It contains the state of the workflow. 
Workflow is the automated execution of a process on computers (or information 
technology), usually as part of a business process. 
Workflow-Team Policy Definition is the access control policy for the Workflow 
Definition. It describes the actions a Role can perform on Service Types and is formed as a 
template policy that creates the Workflow-Team Policy Instance. 
Workflow-Team Policy Instance is the access control policy for the Workflow Instance. It 
executes the policy described in the Workflow-Team Policy Definition. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This research is aimed at the need for organisations to respond to globalisation. The Internet 
has allowed new approaches to collaboration between people and organisations. It is easier 
for geographically distributed people to collaborate on tasks by sharing the same 
applications and data resources with the support of distributed computing. The open access 
of the Internet promotes computer-supported collaborations and processes across 
organisational borders. However, exposing computing applications to the Internet requires 
security restrictions to protect the applications being accessed by malicious and 
unauthorised users, inside or outside the organisation. 
This research investigates the problem of secure collaborative use of computer 
resources in business processing across organisations. 
1.1 Research Context 
The research presented in this thesis investigates the use of distributed computing and 
business processing with access control. There is an increasing use of computers to support 
business processing and business process management (Henderson, 2000, Henderson, 2002, 
Sayal et al., 2002, Smith and Fingar, 2003, Stanoevska-Slabeva et al., 2001). Business 
process management is concerned with the definition and enactment of collaborative 
processes to achieve business objectives. Automation of business processes is achieved 
through workflow management systems (Aalst and Hee, 2004). 
Service oriented architecture makes collaborations possible by dividing the functions 
within an organisation to form services. A service is a function that is well defined, self-
contained and does not depend on the context or state of other services. The service 
description is an abstraction of the operations provided by the service. The integration of 
appropriate services by means of executing workflows allows business applications to be 
built, integrating operations from different organisations. The integration of services by 
using workflows to meet business requirements is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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The diagram in Figure 1.1 starts with the business requirements of an organisation, 
which are used to define the workflows that automate business processing. The workflows 
call services, which contribute to the tasks in a workflow. The resources consumed by 
services are required implemented platforms, such as compute processors, databases and 
data storage. The users consume the services by playing the roles in the workflow. 
The creation of a collaborative environment means people can share knowledge while 
workflow management provides a controlled platform for sharing services and data from 
different organisations in a consistent manner, reducing errors and tracking progress. 
Collaborative workflows are executed to support the automation of people sharing a process 
and the services and data used. 
A new form of business has emerged where different organisations can collaborate on 
achieving business goals by using distributed services, gaining benefit by combining 
resources, services and data. These distributed services are integrated in collaborative 
workflows that cross organisational boundaries, where the people, services and data come 
from different organisations with the support of computing systems that create virtual 
collaborations, forming Virtual Organisations (VO). To achieve cross-organisational 
workflow, internal services and data are exposed to external access. At the same time this 
increases the requirement to protect access to commercially sensitive information and 
services. 
Service oriented computing, an information technology implementation of service-
oriented architecture, uses a distributed middleware that supports common standards of 
inter-operation. Service oriented computing achieves loose coupling between services by 
using abstract descriptions of services. By abstracting the description of a service from its 
implementation, integration can be achieved using the service descriptions making is 
independent of the service implementation. This enables services to be platform and 
language independent, composing applications by service description, allowing services to 
 
Figure 1.1 Business requirements define workflows and the use of services and 
resources by users enacting roles 
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be interchangeable, evolvable and inter-organisational. For business processing, workflows 
can be composed from service descriptions creating dynamic aggregation of services in 
workflow engines. 
Grid Computing uses abstract descriptions of computing resources, facilitating the 
virtualisation of compute processing, storage and networking in a loosely coupled manner. 
Similar to service oriented architecture, compute resources can be discovered and used to 
fulfil dynamic requirements to processing. Grid Computing introduces the notion of service 
instances, created when a service implementation requires long term stateful processing. 
This could be created during a workflow process for collaborative use. 
Of significance is the business model of supplying services to create workflows for 
business processing. Grid Computing enhances the business model by creating service 
instances that can be consumed in the context of a workflow instance. Service instances link 
state to a service interface, creating a stateful service. This research investigates the specific 
area of collaborative business processing when users are from different organisations and 
services are supplied by different organisations, with the impact of restricting user access to 
service instances, where groups of individual users requires collaborative access to a service 
instance. The solution must be aligned with business objectives for protecting competition 
and administration across many users, consuming many service instances, across 
organisational boundaries. 
For global operations to respond to changes in demand, 24 hours a day, computing 
resources must be dynamically available. Grid Computing aims to make computing 
resources (processing, storage and networking) available by virtualisation. Access to 
resources is made transparent of location, administration domain, architecture and 
capability. Virtualisation is achieved with a decentralised middleware, providing a 
standardised interface to the compute resources, allowing for interchange of resources in the 
same operation. The cross-organisational integration of users, computing services and 
compute resources to meet business objectives is called a VO. The VO is been made 
possible by the virtualisation of resources from Grid Computing and by virtualising the 
functions within an organisation. 
The collaboration of people, processing and data requires access management to 
ensure commercial operating conditions for all parties are protected for unauthorised entry. 
Current workflow technologies have little support for security requirements, however 
security work on access control does approach collaboration and workflow (Bussler and 
Jablonski, 1995, Chandramouli, 2001). Work in the areas of workflow and access control 
does not currently address how to control collaborative access to stateful services across 
organisations. This research uses business requirements to capture access requirements to 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
4 
assets created and shared in collaborative service-based workflows, such that business level 
access control can specify fine-grained access control to temporary service instances created 
in distributed systems across organisations. The current grid technologies investigated in 
this research (Globus Toolkit version 3 and version 4) do not provide dynamic authorisation 
mechanisms for collaborative access to service instances. With a combination of current 
technologies in Service Oriented Architecture, Grid Computing, business processing and 
workflow, and access control there still exists a gap in capabilities to control access to 
service instances for collaborative use across organisational boundaries. 
1.2 Motivation 
DAME (Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment) was a £3m project funded by 
EPSRC as part of the UK e-Science program, running from December 2002 to January 
2006. It involved the universities of Leeds, Oxford, Sheffield and York and the industrial 
partners Rolls-Royce, subsidiary Data Systems and Solutions (DS&S) and Cybula Ltd. The 
investigation aims of the project included the use of Grid Computing in a commercial 
setting across organisations. The business context for DAME is to support the leasing of 
aircraft engine to airline companies. 
Leasing aircraft engines is a business model used by Rolls-Royce, along with a 
subsidiary Data Systems & Solutions, to provide the through-life leasing support service. 
The aircraft engine diagnostics support is to be enhanced with an on-wing engine data 
recorder, storing vibration and performance data during flight. The data is downloaded and 
processed by available Grid Computing services and resources. Grid Computing was chosen 
due to the amount of engine data and processing required. The processed results are 
available to collaborative teams made up of people at the operating airline, DS&S and 
Rolls-Royce, who share data and services from different organisations. The collaborative 
diagnostics team only exists with the support of distributed computing and forms a VO. The 
services, data and results can be commercially sensitive, especially to competing airlines. 
Therefore securing the services, data and collaborative processes is essential for the 
distributed diagnostics environment to be a credible business opportunity. 
The DAME environment requires workflow management to maintain accuracy of 
work and timeliness of diagnoses, and control the processing across distributed services. 
People in the collaborative team who access the executing workflows in DAME 
environment require access from global locations. To support this DAME uses a web-based 
portal into which the VO members login to collaborate securely. This research uses the 
DAME business requirements for workflow and security on collaboration of aircraft engine 
diagnostics to investigate securing Grid Service instances in collaborative workflows across 
organisations. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The aim of this research is to investigate the application of workflow, access control and 
Grid Computing for sharing service instances across organisational boundaries. The 
following are the research objectives: 
• Design and build an experiment to study a workflow management system to execute 
and control long-running Grid Services across a multi-organisational grid, allowing 
shared access by users from different organisations. 
• Investigate issues of access control in a virtual organisation for collaborative access to 
services and data, where some services and data are commercially sensitive and could 
reveal proprietary information to competing members within the virtual organisation. 
• Derive a general model for the provision of dynamic fine-grained access control to 
stateful Grid Service instances used in collaborative teams of users, services and data 
from different organisations. 
• Evaluate the access control for secure service-based collaborative workflows using the 
business example from the UK e-Science DAME project. 
1.4 Major Contributions 
The major contributions of this work include: 
C1. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture, an architectural conceptual model for 
collaborative access to grid services across organisations, where users, services and 
compute resources form a Virtual Organisation. 
C2. The definition of static and dynamic Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
components to support C1. The static components define the workflow and policy 
and are created for simplified administration by linking a role-based process and role-
based access control. The dynamic components contain the state of a collaborative 
team whose members include the users and service instances. The dynamic policy 
component is linked to the dynamic workflow component in controlling access to the 
service instances in the context of each workflow. 
C3. A general model of secure collaborative workflow to support C2. The model, derived 
from a business case study, shows that business requirements can be used to generate 
the static definitions in C2, which in turn create and control the dynamic definitions 
in the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
C4. Implementation of a Workflow Management System and Web-based Portal to 
illustrate and evaluate the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. This demonstrates 
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collaborative access to grid services, by users and service providers across 
organisations. 
C5. Presentation of the DAME business case, detailing the diagnosis process in a Virtual 
Organisation. The diagnosis process is a collaborative workflow requiring users from 
different organisations to combine expertise and share access to grid services in the 
domain of aircraft engine maintenance. 
C6. Analysis of the DAME diagnosis process detailing the business requirements for 
secure access to the grid services consumed during collaboration. This security 
analysis includes requirements for controlling use and exposure of competitor’s 
services and data. The analysis also includes protection of access to valuable process 
information, such as preventing discovery of workflow process definitions. 
C7. Evaluation of Workflow-Team Policy Architecture and the DAME demonstrator, 
from C1-4, using semi-structured interviews of industrial experts and analysis against 
similar and complementary solutions. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology is a cyclic approach to defining the research problem and testing 
and evaluating a software implementation of the secure collaborative workflow architecture 
implementation. The research cycle, Figure 1.2, is started with collect information, 
collecting information about the context of the problem and its areas of concern. The 
collecting activity can include requirements gathered from the motivational problem to 
ascertain new issues to address. On the technical side, a literature review provides 
information on the background topics, which can be augmented by attending conferences 
and reading forums and newsgroups to obtain opinions, and gaining practical experience by 
experimenting with technologies in the topic area. 
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The collected background information and the requirements will show issues not 
addressed by the current state of the art. From these issues the topic or topics for research 
are decided. Formulating the hypothesis focuses the topic into manageable research 
objectives. To support the hypothesis, the design and plan research phase becomes a build 
and test exercise to create a software system or environment. The testing exercise is the 
experiment under which the hypothesis is tested, and this provides the data to be collected. 
The data collected can be quantitative or qualitative. This research concentrated on 
qualitative collection by gaining expert opinion measured against the motivation scenario. 
The approach used in this research was the analysis and interpretation of expert opinion, 
comparing the built system against the outcome required to successfully achieve the 
motivating scenario. The outcome of the analysis and interpretation is used to refine the 
hypothesis, which can be tested in another experiment. 
The research cycle described in this thesis starts by gathering requirements from the 
motivational scenario for the collaborative problem solving diagnosis of aircraft engine in 
the DAME project. This builds a view of the business problem. This information was 
augmented by a literature review across the areas of business processing, workflow 
management and Grid Computing. Additionally, works about Grid Computing were 
substantiated with practical experience by experiments on Grid Computing installations. 
 
Figure 1.2 A model of the research cycle, (Hutchinson, 2004) 
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Practical experience has been gained by using middleware from Globus Alliance1, and 
deploying services across the White Rose Grid2 (WRG). Other experience with issues of 
Grid Computing was gained from White Rose Grid user group meetings, and Globus 
Alliance and GGF3 email forums. 
The hypothesis was formulated by identifying issues within the motivational scenario 
and resulted in the generic architecture presented previously in Figure 1.1. Details of the 
issues and identification of the problem can be found in section 4.3. To address the research 
objective a secure workflow management system was implemented in the DAME 
demonstrator, an enabled the integration of contributions across the DAME consortium. 
The built system was demonstrated, along with presentations of the architecture, 
during DAME project meetings and at external conferences. Qualitative opinion was 
collected by semi-structured interview of two experts from the industrial partners at 
Rolls-Royce and DS&S. Further qualitative data was collected from the discussions at 
DAME meetings and external conferences. Analysis of the results from the demos and 
interviews, along with recent developments in the areas for workflow, Grid Computing and 
access control, was used to feed into updating the hypothesis, refining the model and 
architecture for secure collaborative access control in workflows. The model was evaluated 
against published comparative solutions. The results of this analysis are reported along with 
areas for future research in Chapter 7. 
1.6 Outline of Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides the background to different the topics areas that are combined in this 
research. Firstly, it introduces collaboration in business processing and workflow modelling 
in workflow management. Next introduced is the facilitating concept of service oriented 
architecture, which promotes loose coupling of components and how this allows 
composable systems from distributed services to support collaboration, including Web 
Services, Web Service workflows, and loosely coupled resources using Grid Computing. 
Chapter 2 completes with an outline of security architecture and solutions to access control, 
applicable to secure collaborative workflows. 
                                                      
1 Globus Alliance, http://www.globus.org 
2 The White Rose Grid, e-Science Centre of Excellence, is part of the consortium of 
Universities Leeds, Sheffield and York. See http://www.wrgrid.org.uk 
3 GGF, Global Grid Forum, http://www.ggf.org 
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Chapter 3 explains the motivating business scenario from the DAME project, with 
examples of workflows and VOs. Chapter 4 identifies the requirements for collaborative 
workflow, security and collaborative access to commercially sensitive services from the 
DAME scenario. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the requirements from the DAME scenario, to produce a 
generalised model for secure collaborative workflow. The considered analysis yields the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture, which is presented as a model for controlling dynamic 
teams sharing Grid Service instances across organisations. 
Chapter 6 presents an experiment to test the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture in 
the DAME demonstrator. The secure collaborative workflow system is implemented to 
control Grid Services that are deployed by the DAME partners and execute across the White 
Rose Grid 
Chapter 7 presents the evaluation of the system including expert interview results and 
compares the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture with developments in security, Grid 
Computing and workflow, analysing with reference to the experience of building the 
workflow to execute Grid Services across organisations. Recommendations for future 
research in this area and complementary work are presented in 7.7. 
The thesis and findings are summarised in Chapter 8. After Chapter 8 is the 
Bibliography and Appendices, which contains the overview model of the constructed 
DAME workflow management system architecture and detailed interview results and 
questionnaire. 
 10 
Chapter 2  
Background 
In this chapter, the background topics to the research are covered. To address the problem of 
secure collaborative workflow, several areas need to be addressed. Firstly, the chapter 
covers collaboration and collaborative working with computer support. This leads into a 
definition of workflow and workflow management systems, including the definitions of 
collaborative workflow aimed at computers supporting collaboration across organisations. 
Section 2.5 covers the topic of service oriented architectures (SOA), detailing its 
characteristics, its component architecture for service discovery and how that combines with 
a business supply chain. To elaborate on SOA, technology solution Web Services is 
described and linked to workflow solutions that can provide applications by aggregating 
services across organisations. In section 2.5.5, business processing across organisations is 
described as the VO and linked to Grid Computing. Grid Computing is defined in section 
2.5.6, relating the discovery and use of compute resources to the SOA, Web Service 
technologies and Grid Computing workflow solutions. 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 provide descriptions of security requirements for computing 
systems, especially addressing access control for collaborative use of workflow and 
services, including solutions used in Web Services and for cross-organisational use of Grid 
Computing resources. 
2.1 Collaborative Working 
Collaborative working is the task when more than one person is involved in achieving a 
goal or objective in a piece of work. Collaboration requires communication between people 
in a collaborative team, such as speech, facial expressions, passing a paper document. 
Additionally computer supported collaboration involves passing information electronically, 
such as a document, status of a process or video conferencing. Human communication is 
information exchange in context and the collaborations can be expressed as a process, 
capturing the context of the communication. 
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There are three different styles of collaboration (Jackson, 1999): 
• Fixed, where the participants and their actions are predefined; 
• Ad-hoc, which is peer-to-peer communication which adjust themselves to the 
organisation where they exist; and 
• Semi-fixed, where the participants have some flexibility in there actions to achieve an 
objective. 
Collaborative models of the processes can be defined using roles. Roles categorise the 
types of actions a person can perform within an organisation. This allows the process to be 
defined without specifying people’s names. 
2.1.1 Collaborative Virtual Working & CSCW 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) is characterised by a group of users 
interacting and collaborating using shared objects towards some common objectives 
supported by a computing system (Ellis et al., 1991, Papazoglou and Schlageter, 1998, 
Simon and Marion, 1996). Using a distributed computing system, the collaboration is 
considered virtual because the users do not need to be face to face to collaborate (Jackson, 
1999). CSCW systems are mostly visual interfaces that extend text based collaboration and 
support different methods for groups to collaborate. These are synchronous communication, 
such as video conferencing (Churchill et al., 2001, Access Grid, 2006), and asynchronous 
communication, such as email or online forums, and combinations of both. Synchronous 
and asynchronous communications can be defined within a collaborative process, in the 
styles fixed, ad-hoc or semi-fixed. The following section concentrates on fixed and semi-
fixed processes that are expressed as workflows. 
2.2 Workflow 
Workflow is based upon office processes where lists of jobs are assigned and carried out. 
These processes could be issuing an invoice, routing a document or processing an order. 
With an automatic workflow management system the processes are managed by a computer 
program that assigns the work, passes it on and tracks its progress. The advantages of 
reduced errors, not misplacing work and parallel processing can yield a more effective and 
economic work place (Simon and Marion, 1996). 
Workflow is the sequence of a process through which work passes to completion. It is 
the computerised facilitation or automation of a business process, in whole or part 
(Hollingsworth, 1995). Business processing can be fully or partly automated, such that 
workflows may be included within a business process and executed using a workflow 
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management system (Aalst and Hee, 2004, Smith and Fingar, 2003). Workflow as a 
technology can be used to support a number of different areas that include: 
• Image Processing 
• Document Management 
• Electronic Mail & Directories 
• Groupware Applications 
• Transaction-based Applications 
• Project Support Software 
Business processes describe the core activities of a business, and workflow is the 
automated component that is managed on an IT system. A business process can be 
described and modelled, then controlled in a management system to monitor progress. The 
advantages of capturing a business process and automating workflows include the ability to 
control and monitor several executing processes in various states, in a repeatable manner, on 
large scale or scalable systems to accommodate growth or peak activity periods. It also has 
the ability to define points where work is allocated to appropriate resources, which may be 
computers or people depending on process definition or task requirements. 
Alonso et al. (2004) states that workflow is about defining processes and facilitating 
the definition and maintenance of business logic. Workflow process models normally have 
two levels of representation. The first level defines the process of the flow of work through 
the system. The second level represents the state of execution of a particular process, 
usually described as an "enactment". As the first level defines the process, we can use the 
term Process Definition. This representation of a process is usually captured graphically and 
can be stated using mathematical rules, such as Petri-nets (Aalst and Hee, 2004), pi-calculus 
(Milner, 1993) and UML activity diagrams (Object Management Group, 2003). In 
particular, Eriksson and Penker (2000), illustrate the use of UML for business process 
modelling, showing the use of UML at a higher level of abstraction from traditional 
software system modelling. The field of business process modelling has specialised these 
generic process languages (Petri-nets and pi-calculus) with incarnations such as Business 
Process Modelling Language (BPML) (BPMI, 2002) and Business Process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN) (Object Management Group (OMG) / Business Process Management 
Initiative (BPMI), 2006). Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) (Andrews et al., 
2003) uses a subset of BPMN and a means to execute a process on implemented systems 
(BPEL). BPMN contains a rich syntax to describe process flow, participants and 
collaboration and is independent of implementation on IT platforms. BPEL is exclusively 
tied to implementations for Web Services containing descriptions of control flows for a 
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workflow manager and message flows to and from Web Services. BPEL scripts describe 
processes using interface descriptions of Web Services and can optionally be bound to 
specific deployed Web Services, by providing URLs (Uniform Resource Locator) in the 
process script. 
Aalst, et al (2002b) categorised the control-flow constructs in workflows. Examples 
are basic sequence, parallel split and multiple choice split. Each construct has been used to 
compare different workflow languages by classifying the degree of support each language 
provides (Wohed et al., 2002). No single workflow language implements all the constructs 
and opinion is divided on the ‘best’ workflow language. 
Business processing is the execution of business logic in the integration of business 
components. In the Business /Integration Tier, Figure 2.1, workflow is the aggregation of IT 
components; often distributed, components can be modelled as services. Web Services and 
service-oriented architecture are introduced later in this section, 2.5. The second level of 
representing workflow is the enactment, which contains the state of a particular process, is 
covered later in this section, in 2.3 Workflow Management. 
During the workflow, assets may be created for just the duration of the workflow. In a 
service based workflow it is possible to initiate a service in one task to be accessed later in 
another task in the workflow, possibly by a different user. In the Grid Computing model this 
is represented as a Grid Service instance (from Grid Services in the OGSA standard (Foster 
et al., 2002)). This becomes the temporal business asset for the duration of the workflow, 
similar to temporal user relationships as described by Chandramouli (2000). 
 
Figure 2.1 Service-oriented architecture tiers 
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2.3 Workflow Management 
A workflow management system is defined by the Workflow Management Coalition 
(WfMC) as: 
A system that completely defines, manages and executes “workflows” 
through the execution of software whose order of execution is driven by a 
computer representation of the workflow logic, from (Hollingsworth, 1995). 
Figure 2.2 shows the main components of workflow management (Hollingsworth, 
1995). The central component is the Workflow Enactment Service. This is the interface 
point to the execution of workflows by the Workflow Engines. The Enactment Service 
directs the communication to the Workflow Engines from some of the external interfaces 2, 
3 and 4. Each Workflow Engine executes an instance of a defined workflow sequence. The 
workflow sequences are defined in the Process Definition Tools, which would create 
workflow scripts in a language such as BPEL, passing them into the Workflow Enactment 
Service via Interface 1. 
The Workflow Client Applications provide user input and output to executing 
workflows via Interface 2. This is the user point of collaboration in active workflows. The 
Workflow Engines execute sequences of work instructions, passing invocation and control 
messages to and from the Invoked Applications, via Interface 3. The Invoked Applications 
 
Figure 2.2 Workflow reference model – components & interfaces, (Hollingsworth, 
1995) 
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do the processing work, such as query information from a customer database or perform 
algorithmic signal processing. 
In the Workflow Reference Model, the interface definitions specify methods to 
connect these components. Interface 4 is the definition on how Workflow Enactment 
Services can invoke other Workflow Enactment Services. In Web Service workflow 
engines, this is implemented as another Web Service interface. Interface 5 defines the 
protocol for workflow management tools to control and monitor Enactment Services. This 
provides a view of which workflows are executing and methods to manage the Enactment 
Service component. 
A number of interoperability scenarios can be created from this architecture, including 
the execution and control of services and workflow management systems outside the 
traditional organisational boundary. By implementing the components as distributed 
services, a service-oriented architecture (SOA) can provide loose coupling between business 
process definition and workflow implementation. Distributed services can be replaced or 
modified without the need to change the business process. This allows the workflow 
implementation to change more often than the business process definition. It enables 
services to be outsourced if required. Outsourcing services leads to a business model that 
includes service suppliers and even commodity computing from compute resource 
suppliers. The combination of these creates the model for Grid Computing and VOs (Foster 
and Kesselman, 2004). In a situation where users and services collaborate across 
organisations, secure methods of access control are important. 
2.4 Collaborative Workflow 
In a collaborative workflow, people act in roles given in the workflow definition. 
Since roles group together the job functions a person has within an organisation, a role will 
have defined permissions within the organisation. People have assignment to roles, which 
provides them with the permissions of the role (Ferraiolo et al., 2001). In the case of 
workflows, the role has a responsibility for completing tasks in the business process. As 
users enact roles in the workflow, they can combine their skills forming a team to bring the 
workflow to completion. An example of the importance of roles is given in section 2.7.2. 
John Yunker (2002) presents a high level view of the ebXML4 suite that allows one to 
express a process that is implemented as instances. This definition is concerned with the 
interfaces between the business that contribute to shared assets and business goals, in Figure 
2.3. Yunker explicitly avoids defining a collaborative process. Within the definition the 
                                                      
4 ebXML Electronic Business using eXtensible Markup Language, http://www.ebxml.org/ 
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supply chain is modelled, along with the business partners who contribute to a shared 
partnership specification and allows the definition of types of shared assets, and 
subsequently what controls are required on shared instances. This shows that during 
instantiation roles are realised as people and processes have state and can create assets, that 
may be shared and have a lifecycle that may or may not extend beyond the lifetime of the 
workflow. 
A business process explicitly defines tasks that a role can perform; yet, it does not link 
process definitions to access permissions for the role, either during process definition or 
execution. Chandramouli (2000) discusses how role based permission can be linked to 
process definitions, but does not illustrate the how to map from one to the other. Mendling 
et al. (2004) does propose a method to extract role based access control from BPEL using 
XSLT (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations). The later section 2.7.2 goes into 
further detail of role based access control and links to business processing. 
2.5 Service Oriented Architecture 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) offers flexible approaches to distributed systems 
engineering with quality of service and evolution. A service is a function that is well 
 
Figure 2.3 Elaboration methodology from business process to collaborative workflow, 
(Yunker, 2002) 
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defined, self-contained and does not depend on the context or state of other services. The 
following section describes the characteristics of SOA, without directly linking to 
technologies. Later sub-sections outline the implementations of Grid Computing and Web 
Services using SOA. It should be noted that some capabilities of Web Services fall outside 
the scope of SOA, and not all SOA characteristics are implemented in Web Services 
(Papazoglou and Dubray, 2004). 
2.5.1 Main Characteristics 
The main part of SOA is its decentralised middleware (Alonso et al., 2004). By ensuring the 
middleware is not implemented in a single place, it allows individual services to be 
independent of other components within the system. A centralised middleware 
implementation would provide a single point of failure and tend to force vendor specific tie-
in. However, a decentralised middleware requires replication of functionality at every 
location a service is deployed. This overhead is justified due to flexibility provided by the 
following characteristics: 
• Loose Coupling is an architectural property exhibited by services that makes them 
independent from the state and context of other components in the system. Loose 
coupling is defined by the following characteristics: 
• Defining services by interface, including data exchange and behaviour (pre/post 
conditions). 
• Platform/Language independence. By separating the interface from the 
implementation, this promotes language and platform independence. This also 
prevents the dependence on a particular vendor.  
• Discovery by abstract descriptions. The interface definition provides the means to 
locate services, irrespective of deployment environment, therefore independent of 
implementation platform or language. 
• Evolvable systems independent of implementation/platform. Services can evolve by 
adding functionality, improving operation or moving deployment environment. 
Loose coupling and interface definition allows this to happen independent of other 
system components. 
• Interchangeable by interface definition. An interface definition allows different 
service providers to offer the same or similar services. Differentiators may be 
defined by cost, response time, accuracy, security or other quality of service 
measures. 
• Autonomous services. Loose coupling is achieved by removing dependence across 
the implemented system. In a distributed system, independence allows services to 
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be reused in different contexts, without repercussions on the original use, also 
evolution of individual services without affecting other services or the entire 
system. 
• Reusable services. Loose coupling promotes the reuse of services in new contexts 
not previously envisaged. Rich definitions of interfaces and behaviour contracts 
would enhance the validation of processes employing services in new contexts. 
Contracts of interface and behaviour are part of SOA, but tend to be weakly defined 
in implementation technologies such as Web Services. 
• Inter-organisational, by using a loosely coupled system, an application or process is 
able to use services developed outside of the organisational bounds. Interface 
contracts play a major part in this, and where inter-organisational use of services 
currently exists in Web Services. Business contracts tend to specify acceptable use. 
Specifying these contracts in the implementation domain and policing them is 
currently limited, with current research into this area (Padgett et al., 2005). 
• Encapsulation. There is an implicit level of granularity for services. Most literature 
attempts to puts this in terms of previous software technologies, so that objects are the 
smallest units built, then components are made of objects, finally services are the 
integration of components. Services should encapsulate a useful business component 
that can be offered in different contexts. 
• Discoverable, mechanisms in SOA allow a service to be discovered. This could be by 
service name, interface type, context, behaviour, performance/Quality of Service (QoS), 
or organisation. 
• Message Based – platform and language independent. A service uses a message-based 
asynchronous data exchange (Papazoglou and Dubray, 2004). This is different from 
synchronous remote method invocation, and ensures independence from the execution 
environment. Asynchronous messaging is useful when the client requesting a service 
does not require an immediate response and can continue with other tasks. Examples are 
sending a purchase order, and waiting for confirmation of goods despatch. New 
approaches extend this to document exchange, which proposes methods to pass a 
document in a peer-to-peer manner (Schoder et al., 2005), with mechanisms to protect 
sections from unauthorised access. 
• Well-defined interfaces. The strength of SOA lies in defining services by interface, not 
by implementation. The interface allows independence of implementation. Interface 
definition can include data exchange formats, policies of use, service behaviour 
(pre/post conditions) and QoS. 
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• Service Level Agreements, as mentioned in interfaces service level agreements (SLA) 
may be used in the interface definition to specify QoS (Padgett et al., 2005). 
• Cross-organisational integration (by processes). Services can be provided for use by 
other organisations. Usage policies and access control mechanisms are required in most 
situations to protect the service from misuse. 
2.5.2 SOA Components 
The main components of SOA (Endrei et al., 2004) are summarised below and illustrated in 
Figure 2.4 showing the basic communication between the components for locating and 
invoking service requests: 
• Service: Logical service execution entities. The contracts are defined by one or more 
published interfaces. 
• Service provider: The execution entity that implements a service specification. 
• Service consumer (or requestor): The software entity that calls a service provider. 
Traditionally, this is termed a “client”. A service consumer can be an end-user 
application or another service. The act of finding a type of service from a service 
registry or using a service broker requires that the request be required to “bind” to the 
implementation. The service consumer can be bound to the service implementation 
during the design/creation of the service consumer, or using late binding during runtime, 
when the service consumer and implementation are bound before the service is 
requested.  
• Service registry: A specific kind of service provider that acts as a registry and allows 
for the lookup of service provider interfaces and service locations. 
• Service broker: A specific kind of service provider that can pass on service requests to 
one or more additional service providers. 
The architecture in Figure 2.4 illustrates how loose coupling is achieved. A service 
consumer that wants a kind of functionality can first locate the ‘service type’ that performs 
the desired function. The service type will describe the properties of the service interface. 
The service consumer will then need to locate a deployed implementation of the service 
type. The location address is used to bind the service consumer to the service from the 
service provider. Discovery of the service type and deployed service can use a form of 
registry, at design time, system configuration (i.e. by the system operator, before execution) 
or during runtime (W3C, 2006). 
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Looking back at Figure 2.1, the SOA components are intended to reside in the Service 
Tier. They provide an interface for Resources, such as computing, printing and processing, 
to be used within the Integration Tier. Service integration can be performed in a workflow 
engine or within another service, since the integration or aggregation of services can be 
consumed as another type of service. Therefore, system components within the Integration 
Tier can be the implementation of service interfaces. For example, a workflow engine 
would be both service consumer and service provider, for a given interface to a define 
workflow sequence. 
2.5.3 Supply Chain 
SOA supports traditional inter organisation supply chains by enhancing a traditional service 
business approach, such as Banking (Rust and Kannan, 2003). SOA itself promotes inter-
organisational trading, however, current implementation such as Web Services lack the 
mechanisms for accounting and payment. Work in Grid Computing for economic modelling 
(Buyya, 2002) is aimed at marketing grid resources for traditional supply chains and VOs. 
Buyya (2002) addresses different marketing models for trading compute power as a service, 
that can be dynamically consumed from different suppliers on demand. 
 
Figure 2.4 Service-oriented architecture main components 
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2.5.4 Web Services 
Web Services provide internet-based, machine-to-machine communication. Not to be 
confused with web sites, which are human-to-machine communication. Web Services are an 
implementation of service-oriented architecture. Although it is possible to use Web Services 
to create a system that is not service oriented, the following describes how Web Services do 
relate to SOA. According to Papazoglou and Dubray (2004), Web Services follow the 
model of software-as-a-service provided by ASP (Applications Service Provider) allows the 
consumer to ‘rent’ software applications per use from a remote hosting system. Web 
Services provide connection of components, so the consumer can create their own 
application or consume a component which itself may be an aggregation of Web Services. 
Papazoglou and Dubray (2004) state: 
Web Services constitute a distributed computer infrastructure made up of 
many different modules trying to communicate over the network to virtually 
form a single logical system. Web Services are modular, self-describing, self-
contained applications that are accessible over the Internet. (Papazoglou and 
Dubray, 2004 p.2) 
They enable developers to construct applications across the Internet, and across 
organisational boundaries using any platform or language required. Once a Web Service is 
deployed, other applications and Web Services can discover and invoke that service. 
2.5.4.1 Web Service Communication 
The structure of Web Service communication uses messages of XML (extensible Meta-
Language) sent using SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) sent over HTTP (Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol). At the base level of Web Services, HTTP is chosen to allow messages to 
pass through firewalls, especially corporate firewalls, which were not the case with other 
distributed object communications, such as CORBA (Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture). SOAP is used as the message container, providing addressing and message 
structure formatted in XML. Residing on HTTP its request/response method operates 
similar to HTTP. 
The SOAP structure is briefly described below: 
• Envelope, which describes where to send the message and states the format for the rest 
of the message (header and body) and how to process it; 
• Header, which states where the message came from, the policies required to understand 
the body and possibly digital signature for the message body; 
• Body, this is the content of the message defining the method to be invoked and its 
arguments. 
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WSDL (Web Service Description Language) contains a description of the Web 
Service, specifying the messages passed in and out and the where to find the service to 
execute. Service type descriptions may be defined in a separate document from the binding 
of the service implementation, such that there may be multiple implementations of the same 
service type, possibly on the same or different servers or from the same or different 
organisations. Figure 2.5 shows a simplified view of the WSDL structure. The Service is 
described as a service type that has a port of port type. The port type describes the input 
messages that must be sent to the service and the output messages that are received. The 
URL of a deployed service binds the service implementation to the service type.  
UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration) is a registry intended to list 
businesses similar to Yellow Pages™. In Web Services, it is used to list the Web Services 
provided by businesses, with a description in human readable text (for example English) and 
a location to the WSDL document. The WSDL can be retrieved, usually from the remote 
server hosting the Web Service, and interpreted for selection and binding for use in Web 
Service workflows. 
2.5.4.2 Web Service Workflow 
Aggregation of Web Service to form applications can be specified using workflows. That is 
the orchestration of sequences required to perform actions within an application can be 
defined using a process language such as BPEL. Other processing languages for Web 
Services have been proposed, however BPEL is the most commonly used and supported in 
workflow tools. BPEL is the result of joining two previous workflow languages. One from 
IBM WSFL  (Web Services Flow Language) (Leymann, 2001) which included support for 
service lifecycles and used constructs relating to WSDL making composition from service 
 
Figure 2.5 WSDL structure overview 
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descriptions logical and one from Microsoft XLANG that included support for exception 
handling (Thatte, 2001). 
An illustration of the constructs in BPEL from (Michelson, 2005) is shown in Figure 
2.6. This illustration shows the basic language elements of BPEL and how it relates to the 
definition of a process and the execution of services. Two statements back up the diagram: 
“A BPEL process is a service orchestration, used to describe/execute a 
business process (or large grained service), which is implemented as a stateful 
service” 
“A process is comprised of steps, steps have activities AND activities are 
BPEL language elements, and the basic activity elements are the ones used to 
interact with the collaborating services <partnerLinks>”, from (Michelson, 
2005). 
Other important workflow languages include WSCL (Web Services Conversation 
Language (Banerji et al., 2002) proposed by Hewlett-Packard is concerned more with 
extending the description of a Web Service to detail how the service interface is used within 
a process. Another is WSCI (Web Services Choreography Interface) (W3C, 2002), proposed 
by Sun Microsystems, Intalio, SAP and BEA, it provides another method of describing 
workflow. However, it concentrates on controlling the sequence of operations required for a 
single service to operate. Whilst it does describe workflow, it is intended to sit between 
BPEL and WSDL in describing “choreographed message exchange” (Aalst et al., 2002a). 
 
Figure 2.6 BPEL Illustration, from (Michelson, 2005) 
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Examples of workflow engines from major workflow tools vendors are IBM 
Websphere, Microsoft BizTalk and BEA Weblogic. There are many other smaller 
companies providing workflow solutions due to Web Services open standards. Lists of 
current vendors are available from the BPMG5 and WARIA6. 
2.5.5 Virtual Organisations in Grid Computing 
Grid Computing is a solution to the growing number of IT platforms used within a business 
or scientific research environment that require connectivity to integrate applications and 
better utilise unused compute processing power and data storage. As a technical solution, it 
is a middleware of connectivity standards, specifying data protocols and behaviour across 
heterogeneous platforms. For the problem domain, it aims to achieve greater utilisation of 
existing resources and scalability of resources to achieve new high power applications, that 
are not constrained by geographical location and provide new opportunities for integrating 
processing across traditional organisational boundaries. 
This last point is the basis of the Virtual Organisation (VO), from Foster et al. (2001), 
who define a VO as: 
The real and specific problem that under lies the Grid concept is 
coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-
institutional virtual organizations. The sharing that we are concerned with is 
not primarily file exchange but rather direct access to computers, software, 
data, and other resources, as is required by a range of collaborative problem-
solving and resource-brokering strategies emerging in industry, science, and 
engineering. This sharing is, necessarily, highly controlled, with resource 
providers and consumers defining clearly and carefully just what is shared, 
who is allowed to share, and the conditions under which sharing occurs. A set 
of individuals and/or institutions defined by such sharing rules form what we 
call a virtual organisation (VO), from (Foster et al., 2001) 
                                                      
5 Business Process Management Group, lists current workflow tools at 
http://www.bpmg.org/chl_bpmg_solution_providers.php 
6 Workflow and Reengineering International Association lists current workflow tools at 
http://www.waria.com/databases/wfvendors-A-L.htm 
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The VO is a business enabler to create business teams across organisational boundaries. An 
illustration of this can be seen in Figure 2.7. This shows business activities that use 
resources to achieve business goals. Traditional organisations are shown as shaded 
rectangular boxes that encompass the required resources (squares) and business activities 
(circles) to achieve the business goals (triangles) for that organisation, within its own 
administrative bounds. VOs are shown as with the dotted line around an irregular area. The 
VO is the collaboration between organisations to achieve new business goals, consuming 
resources and activities across organisational boundaries. The business goals and some 
activities only exist within the VO. However, the resources have one owning organisation 
each. Management of shared resources and activities across organisational boundaries is key 
to defining VOs. The following text summarises the ideas behind Grid Computing and VOs, 
defined by Foster et al and used across many Grid Computing projects in academia (e-
Science) and commercial, such as IBM On-Demand. 
2.5.5.1 The need for the Grid 
Grid technologies are needed to support the sharing and coordinated use of diverse 
resources in dynamic VOs. A dynamic VO is one that can change its boundary during the 
 
Figure 2.7 Virtual organisations create new business goals across organisations 
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lifetime of the VO. This allows temporary use of resources or services offered by another 
organisation in a collaborative manner. As shown in Figure 2.7, this differs from a 
traditional supply chain, highlighted by new business goals attributed to the VO and sharing 
of resources between organisations. An example of a VO applied to a business case can be 
found in (Russell et al., 2005), and is shown in the next chapter. 
2.5.6 Grid Computing 
During this research, the dominant Grid Computing standard came from The Globus 
Alliance (The Globus Alliance, 2005), with implementations distributed as Globus Toolkit 
released as version 2, version 3 and the current version 4. The Globus Toolkit 2 (GT2) (The 
Globus Alliance, 2002) was aimed at sharing computing resources; this is defined as 
compute processing, data storage and networking. Due to the high cost of large high-
performance computing (HPC), Grid Computing was aimed predominantly at providing 
access to HPCs within and across organisations. GT2 implements a resource management 
middleware that includes resource discovery, monitoring, secure transport, basic access 
control and an interface for sending processing tasks to compute resources. 
Globus Toolkit 3 (GT3) (Foster and Kesselman, 2004) improved the connectivity of 
Grid Computing by using Web Service interfaces to access the new concept Grid Services. 
Grid Services extend the Web Service interface by providing access to the grid management 
interface, such as resource management and security. It also provides a method to create 
stateful services, by using the factory pattern (Gamma et al., 1995) to create a service 
instantiated with its own URL, using a defined service interface. A stateful service is a 
service in which its internal state is reflected in the interactions with its clients. The creation 
of a stateful service creates an executing service instance, which has its own address that is 
returned by the service factory on creation. 
The model of connectivity changed in GT4 (Globus, 2004) in favour of WS-
Addressing (W3C, 2004), where the location of the service instance, now known as a WS-
Resource, is passed in the SOAP envelope using a static URL. This is more compatible with 
Web Service workflow standards and tools, such as BPEL and IBM Websphere (IBM 
Websphere, 2003).  
Another Grid Computing standard is UNICORE, (UNICORE Forum e.V., 2006) 
which stands for Uniform Interface for Computing Resources. Comparing GT4 with 
Unicore, Unicore provides a more complete and secure method to access computing 
resources. However, since making resources commonly accessible is the objective and GT4 
uses open Web Service standards, and has been adopted by more organisations, it is 
therefore, more commonly used. 
Chapter 2 Background 
27 
This section expands on the main characteristics and reasons behind the development 
of Grid Computing. 
2.5.6.1 Grid Resource Management 
To achieve resource sharing there needs to be a mediation layer, a resource management 
layer. In grid technologies, this is manifested as middleware using common interoperability 
protocols between service to resource, resource to resource and service to service 
communications. The middleware offers this commonality in both message exchange and 
behaviour. The main difficulty is the middleware’s connection to the resource. The grid 
solution has found that most middleware services are best implemented at each resource in a 
peer-to-peer type manner, with very few centralised services. Such central services would 
be information look-up services, such as identity servers for authentication. 
The following sections describe the services provided by the middleware to 
coordinate resource sharing. 
2.5.6.2 Grid Connectivity Security 
When connecting to a service or resource these security issues apply: 
• Identity assurance – a means of authenticating a user, service or resource as the source 
of a message/request. The authentication is bi-directional as both parties in the request 
need to be sure of each other’s identity. 
• Private, confidential data exchange – a means to protect message contents from being 
read by anyone who intercepts it. A message usually has three parts, the address 
(including the senders address for response), the request and the message content. The 
privacy needs may require any or all of these parts to be kept private. It should be noted 
that it is usually only possible to protect the message contents. 
• Integrity, assurance of content – a means to ‘sign’ the message to ensure the contents 
are what the sender intended. Usually achieved by digitally signing with a checksum 
that will only match the message originally sent. It assures the authenticity of the 
sender. 
• Delegation of access rights – a means to allow the requester’s identity to be used by the 
service to initiate requests to other services on behalf of the user of the service. The user 
delegates permission to the service and the service can request actions from other 
services using the user’s identity. In this case permission for delegated requests are 
decided from the rights of the original user. 
• Access Policies – a means to specify actions that can be performed. These can be 
restricted by identity, role, organisation, context, message content, request type, 
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date/time, etc. Permission can be specified as: ‘deny all rights except those allowed in 
the policy’; or ‘permit all rights except those denied in the policy’. 
• Local security (resource sharing) – is a means to protect the integrity of the computing 
system executing a task. It is a means by which actions executed on a resource may not 
compromise the resource, and that those actions are not compromised by the resource or 
any other actions/requests executing on that resource. 
2.5.6.3 Resource 
The Grid Resource Allocation and Management (GRAM) service provides a uniform 
interface to job scheduling systems on different compute platform implementations for the 
remote execution and management of jobs. As part of resource management, the resource 
provides monitor and control services: 
• Monitor – this provides state information about a resource, it can also provide static 
information about a resources configuration/attributes. 
• Control – the management of resource, protocols that control a resources management 
such as enabling, updating, reconfiguration or modifying a policy. This is separate from 
protocols to use a resource. 
2.5.6.4 Coordination 
The coordination of resources, services and users are summarised by these actions: 
• Discovery – the ability to find a resource or service by searching on descriptions of 
service properties. Such as, finding a service by name or function, or a resource by 
capacity or level of security. 
• Allocation, scheduling, brokering – managing the time on a resource or service is 
achieved by these functions in the middleware. These can also be used to discover 
appropriate resources for execution of tasks before sending information to deploy the 
task on the resource. 
• Usage policies – these policies would typically control access to resources/job queues 
dependent on how much a resource is used or what functionality is used. Reasons for 
controlling use can include economic and security. Usage policies can be linked to 
charging mechanisms (see Grid Economy). 
• Access to HPC, Storage – Grid Computing is means to share expensive large-scale 
resources in different organisations, such as HPCs and very large databases. 
• Fault tolerance – the following fault tolerance mechanisms can be applied to improve 
reliability and sustainability of resources: 
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• Monitor failures (inc intrusion detection) – awareness of failures in a resource. 
• Data replication – services to address data independent of location, allow data to be 
replicated. Data availability is improved and data replication services transparently 
provide data from appropriate/available sources. 
• Job migration, check pointing – if a resource fails, then check pointing marks useful 
points of completion, such that the job can be restarted from the last check point, on 
the same or a different resource. 
• Task pool management – similar to job migration, a central service records 
scheduled jobs that a removed from the job queue on completion. If a resource or 
job fails it can automatically be restarted. 
2.5.6.5 Services 
The services in Grid Computing take the form of Web Services. In GT3 (Foster et al., 
2002), a service factory creates service instances that provide an interface to the instance of 
a grid process. In GT4 (Globus, 2004), the service interface uses a static URL, providing 
access to the resource factory, which creates processing instances called resources. A 
resource is addressed via the Grid Service URL using WS-Addressing. Both of the GT3 and 
GT4 methods achieve stateful services. Further detail of services have been given in section 
2.5 Service Oriented Architecture. 
2.5.6.6 Grid Economy 
Grid economy is an area of research that uses economic modelling for the marketing and 
trading of grid resources in VOs. Buyya (2002) addresses different marketing models for 
trading compute power as a service, that can be dynamically consumed from different 
suppliers on demand. The following points are required capabilities of the architecture to 
enable an economic model for the trade of grid resources as a service: 
• Accounting, charging, payment services – a means to record usage of a service/resource 
and charge for it. Similar services will be required by the consumer to record usage and 
pay for it. 
• Negotiation – a means to negotiate payment for the use of a service/resource. This 
would be written into a contract including quality of service parameters. 
• Service Level Agreements – a contractual agreement on the requested/deliverable 
quality of service (QoS) that a service/resource must perform to. These qualities may 
include: response time, security, accuracy and/or availability. 
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• Economic models – different economic models have been investigated for market based 
trading of services and resource in the grid community. These include trading models 
based on auctions and share trading 
2.5.6.7 Grid Workflow 
Krishnan et al. (Krishnan et al., 2002) proposed GSFL (Grid Services Flow Language) as an 
extension to WSFL to incorporate the developments of GT3 Grid Services into workflow 
description. The main proposal was to make provision for peer-to-peer style connections 
between processing services. In traditional workflow engines, all the control and messaging 
is centralised in the workflow management system. When the workflow is a pipeline of data 
processing then large amounts of data are passed back and forth to the workflow engine, 
which can be costly in a distributed environment. Krishnan et al. propose that data is 
pipelined between services and that workflow engines control and monitor the process 
without handling all the data, illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
Although there is no evidence that GSFL has been implemented it raised some 
important issues of workflow in grid systems that still need to be tackled. Such as how to 
separate control flow from data flow in systems where the data is large (>100MB) and it is 
not necessary to route the data through the workflow engine. 
There are many projects concerned with providing workflow tools and engines for 
large-scale data processing for scientific grid workflows. These include myGrid (Dept. of 
Comp.Sci., 2004) which has a Web Services based workflow engine Taverna that uses a 
proprietary workflow language; Gridbus (Gridbus Workflow Engine (GWFE), 2006), which 
has a workflow engine using an XML-based workflow language that supports GT4 
middleware; and GRACE (GRACE - Grid Search and Categorization Engine, 2003), 
coordinating searches across distributed data. 
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2.6 Security 
The topic of security becomes increasingly important as more business critical applications 
and services are exposed to access outside the physical protection of an organisation, such 
as using the Internet (Agarwal et al., 2002, King et al., 2001, Atkinson et al., 2002). In a 
distributed environment, each point of entry requires protecting. In this case, the control of 
access to a service may use a gateway. The gateway would allow legitimate access and deny 
illegitimate access. This type of protection aims to ensure internal components and 
information can only be used or seen by those that are trusted to use them fairly. In addition 
to access control, the identity and type of access can be recorded to audit trails and non-
repudiable logging. Access can also be encrypted to prevent others being able to view the 
messages (privacy), and the access can be digitally signed which prevents others from 
tampering with the messages (integrity). These are typically associated with ‘man-in-the-
middle’ attacks (Burr et al., 2006). 
The technical security solutions are only parts of the overall security solutions related 
to the respective security policies and must be coordinated with the solutions regarding 
methods, organisation and competence. Technical solutions are used to fulfil security 
objectives such as identification and authentication, authorisation and access control, 
protection against intrusion and attacks, maintaining confidentiality, privacy and integrity of 
information, non-repudiation, and auditing. 
Confidentiality is concerned with keeping the action performed with the service 
private. This ensures that other parties cannot determine who made the request to a service, 
the details of the request (the action requested and the contents of any message sent) and the 
 
Figure 2.8 Grid Services workflow model, (Krishnan et al., 2002) 
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details of the reply. The content of the messages can be protected by encryption, but full 
privacy is very difficult since messages contain details of the sender, receiver and the action. 
Another security concern is denial of service, where the service is attacked, typically by 
overloading an operation with data, to prevent processing of legitimate accesses. 
Integrity is the means to prove that a message is complete and unchanged. It is an 
important part of any security mechanism to prove that any message has not been tampered 
with and contains the information originally intended. 
Auditing is the recording of actions. This may be used as part of security to track 
users’ actions on a system, both at the system boundary and within the system. Non-
repudiation is an important part of auditing; it is the assurance of the integrity of the audit. A 
non-repudiable log of a user’s actions cannot be refuted, and can be used by either the user 
or supplier of a service or system to prove that an activity took place (Zhou, 1997). 
The two main components in security are authentication and authorisation. 
Authentication is the verification of the identity of a person or a process. For distributed 
systems, authentication verifies that a message has come from its stated source. The source 
can be identified as a person, or a process or service, or a computer system or server. The 
method of verification in computer messages involves a signed message. This message may 
be as simple as stating the name of the person, and it will be signed by a trusted third party, 
similar to using a passport to identify someone. Identity certificates such as X.509 (Tuecke 
et al., 2003) contain the name and organisation of the entity being identified, and will be 
digitally signed by a certificate authority. Digital signing, using public key cryptography 
(IEEE, 2000), creates a hash-code from the message data, which is then encrypted using the 
signer’s private key. In addition to verifying identity, the contents of messages can be 
verified as originating from the sender by digitally signing with their private key, which can 
be recovered using their public key. 
Authorisation is the act of granting permission. In computing, this is granting 
permission to access files (read, write, delete, etc.) and perform operations on the operating 
system or remote services. 
A policy is an explicit representation of constraints and rules that govern the 
behaviour of an agent or a system. Policies define the actions that may be performed on the 
target by a subject. The target or subject can be specified by identity or as an abstraction 
from identity such as role or organisation. Additionally policies may include other 
constraints that restrict the action such as context, message content, request type or 
date/time. Permission can be specified as deny all rights except those allowed in the policy 
or permit all rights except those denied in the policy. Resolution of policies may result in 
binary decisions of permit or deny. Additionally some policies may result in decisions of 
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“don’t care” when an action is not critical, or even “don’t know” when there is not enough 
information about the subject, action or target to form a certain decision. 
2.7 Access Control 
Access control is the limiting of rights or capabilities of a subject to communicate with 
other subjects, or to use functions or services in a system or network (Department of 
Defence, 1987). Simple access control definitions are in the form of access control lists, that 
list subjects authorised for specific access to an object, the specific access is sometimes 
called an action. This simple list is inflexible in the face of a large number of users or 
objects, or frequent changes in subject, object or action. 
The following section 2.7.1 describes different approaches to access control for 
computer systems. These different approaches are required to address issues of 
administration of large numbers of users, or dynamic policies for changing access rights due 
to properties of the subject, object or context, including environmental changes such as time 
of day, or access control approaches to cope with changes in objects to be accessed. 
2.7.1 Access Control Architecture 
To control access to an object there has to be a gateway where two functions are performed. 
There has to be a decision made on whether access is permitted or not. This is performed at 
the Policy Decision Point (PDP). On the result of this decision, if it is permitted, then there 
is the enactment of the action. If it is denied, then the action is blocked. This happens at the 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP is also responsible for passing the details of the 
action to the PDP to obtain the resultant decision. This is based on policy framework 
definitions used in the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) (Yavatkar et al., 2000) and 
illustrated in Figure 2.9. 
Chapter 2 Background 
34 
2.7.2 Access Control Solutions 
Access control solutions provide methods to specify which users can perform specific 
actions on specific objects. Fine-grained specification of authorisation is when a policy 
specifies the actions that each subject can perform on an object, for a policy where the base 
rule is deny all actions unless specified as permitted. Alternatively, a policy could permit all 
actions unless denied by constraints in the policy document. A fine-grained policy becomes 
difficult to maintain as the number of subjects, objects or actions increase or when any of 
those change frequently (Ferraiolo et al., 2003b), where as access control policies tend to be 
at a higher level (coarse-grained), specifying types of users and types of resources, such as 
only personnel staff and managers may view an employees details (King et al., 2001). 
Role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2003b) provides a coarse-grained 
description for access permissions, using an intermediary entity (the role) to separate the 
access permissions of users to target objects. RBAC allows the subject in an access control 
rule to be specified as a role. Users are mapped to roles. Roles, in RBAC, can be specified 
in a hierarchy, where a role in a high hierarchical position adopts the permissions of the 
roles lower down. In some collaborative processes, roles may not be sufficient in defining 
the permissions for users. One such case is separation of duty, where a task requires two 
different people to complete two separate actions. An example would be the authorisation of 
a purchase order that requires two signatures. The roles required to complete the two actions 
may be available to one person, or the two actions may be performed by the same role, 
however the separation of duty rule would prevent one person performing both actions. 
Another restriction is conflict of interest; this is usually a legal restriction against unfair 
competition, where a person has gained some knowledge from one action that can be used 
to gain an unfair advantage in another. An example would be insider dealing in share 
trading, or a solicitor representing both parties in a divorce. 
 
Figure 2.9 Access control architecture 
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During a process, a collaboration is formed. This collaboration can involve users, 
services and resources, that would be defined respectively as roles, service and resource 
types in a workflow definition. The following background summarises work on access 
control in the area of users accessing services and resources during a collaborative process. 
The NIST standard for RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) defines a session as the period 
of interactions during which the user can act in a given role, Figure 2.10. This provides an 
example of how the user to role mapping can be defined for a process. However, the NIST 
standard does not explicitly support processes or workflow. 
Chandramouli (2000) describes a method for defining control constraints by analysing 
business process, identifying roles in the process and assigned target rules for the roles, 
where the targets are methods of classes. Mendling et al. (2004) shows an approach where 
RBAC rules are generated from a business process definition in BPEL. As BPEL does not 
include security aspects, Mendling at al. use the Partner Role definitions in the BPEL script 
to automate the creation of xoRBAC, XML Role-Based Access Control policies. 
Liu and Chen (2004) describe in WS-RBAC (Web Service RBAC) a ‘session’ that 
can be used to map users to roles when accessing Web Services across enterprises in a 
business process described in BPEL. The paper does not however demonstrate a link 
between the illustrated BPEL script and a WS-RBAC policy, which would be useful in 
extending the previously mentioned work by Mendling et al.. 
Other examples relating access control with processes include, the Task-Based 
Authorisation Controls (TBAC) (Thomas and Sandhu, 1998) which shows how access 
control can be automated to define fine-grained associations of subject to object. The TBAC 
model demonstrates how to apply roles (i.e. RBAC) to dynamic policies, but does not define 
this in the context of a workflow. 
 
Figure 2.10 Core RBAC, (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) 
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Similarly, Team-based Access Control (TMAC) (Thomas, 1997) uses roles in teams 
for access control in collaborative environments. This presents a link between role-based 
permissions across object types, and provides fine-grained, identity-based control on 
individual users to individual object instances. The team here is defined as a project team 
(Thomas, 1997), with generalised policy for defined users acting in roles for a given 
context. Georgiadis et al. (2001) extend the TMAC model with contextual information, 
which ensures team members only access when their context is true. In this example, the 
context is time and location. This makes for a finer-grained access control than forming 
teams with user-to-role mapping, but does not show dynamic resources. 
 In TMAC 2004 (Alotaiby and Chen, 2004), the team definition is an instance of a 
collaboration of users, the permissions are derived from access control predicates using 
business requirements. However, the permissions are attached to the context of the 
collaboration. Therefore, Alotaiby and Chen propose a different approach to provide access 
control for teams than those that involve workflow enactment. 
2.7.3 Access Control Solutions for SOA, Grid Computing 
There is notable work from the Web Service and grid community that is aimed at tackling 
authentication and authorisation problems for distributed SOA. The collaborative workflow 
described in this thesis requires authentication of users from different organisations. For 
grid systems, the Globus Toolkit 2.4 and 3.2 (The Globus Alliance, 2005) employ X.509 for 
user identity and additionally use centralised user attribute management systems from the 
Community Authorisation Service (CAS) (Foster et al., 2003) and the Virtual Organisation 
Management System (VOMS) (Alfieri et al., 2003). CAS releases fine-grained permissions 
to users by attaching access assertions to the users grid certificate. The user passes the grid 
certificate containing their identity and access permissions the requests to the service. The 
fine-grained access permissions to resources are stated for the duration of the certificate. 
VOMS, also uses certificate attachments, in this case the attachments specify group 
membership and other user attributes, such as role. When connecting to the desired service, 
the VOMS certificate is passed with the request. The service then uses a local access control 
policy to makes a decision on access permissions based on membership to the group and 
other user attributes. Both of these schemes issue the user with attributes that are passed to 
the service, this is a ‘push’ model. Both of these employ the notion of a VO policy, where a 
user has permissions to use services because they have membership to the VO. This makes 
it difficult to restrict user permissions to specific collaborative workflows and service 
instances within the VO, where service instances are dynamically created and shared. 
Adding and removing members to access a service instance in a workflow would be 
difficult unless the user requested a new certificate for each service request (also used in 
previous work by the author (Russell et al., 2004b)). 
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Policy decision engines such as Akenti (Thompson et al., 2003) and PERMIS 
(Chadwick and Otenko, 2002) can retrieve policy documents on each service request, and 
given a dynamic policy these schemes would be useful to interpret a dynamic fine-grained 
policy attached to a workflow, although neither system would relate access decisions to the 
workflow context. Typically, Akenti and PERMIS provide policy decisions at the service 
request, requiring users to be authenticated by every service supplier. The policy engines 
can use either the push model of sending permissions and user attributes with the request, or 
the pull model, which locates attributes from remote locations for the user when a request is 
made. 
Park and Hwang (2003) discuss peer-to-peer sharing of Web Service based assets and 
resources. It uses RBAC to restrict access, with central ‘enterprise’ polices mapping users to 
roles and resource owners creating peer level policies defining role access to the resources. 
The resource model is static, however since the distributed policies are checked on each 
access it would be possible to link temporal resources to a dynamic local access control 
policy. The overhead of policy access could be significant. The peer-to-peer model is still 
restrained by a business model of central administration of users and roles, with users 
controlling access to assets. In some cases, the access to assets may be specified in the 
enterprise policy. 
Another issue for security in service based computing across organisations is the 
means of authenticating users. The discussion above concentrates on RBAC to separate user 
identities from permission specifications, thereby a mechanism is required to attribute users 
to roles in systems across organisational boundaries. Shibboleth (Cantor, 2004) provides a 
user authentication system that crosses organisational boundaries and can include attribute 
assertions, such as role. It would be feasible to integrate Shibboleth into the grid security 
architecture, to provide role assertions in SAML (OASIS, 2004) for the distributed users, 
and subsequently be used in workflow access policy decisions. 
Agarwal et al. (2002) discuss the issues of authentication across different systems and 
different administration boundaries. Agarwal et al. propose that X.509 certificates and 
Kerberos tokens can be used to identify users, extending this to using SAML to transport 
identity assertions between different systems. The intention is to provide a common 
interface to link the different methods of identification. It does not, however, address the 
issues of matching identities between X.509 and Kerberos when a person’s name is not 
identical, for example using first name and surname, when another system provides middle 
names and a further system only provides initials and surname. 
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2.8 Summary 
In this chapter the background topics were introduced, showing previous work in 
collaborative working and virtual working by support of computing concentrated on visual 
sharing and basic communications methods, such as email and video conferencing. To 
provide control in business processing, workflow management can be used to support 
collaborations, reducing errors in sharing work by promoting coherence, and recording 
status of progress. The concepts and technology in Service Oriented Architecture enables 
business processing, and therefore collaboration, across organisational boundaries. 
Service Oriented Architecture, loose coupling, middleware and virtualisation of 
services leads to virtualisation of the resource tier in Grid Computing. Collaborative use of 
services and resources across organisational boundaries leads to VOs. 
Exposing services and resource to Internet access creates new issues of security about 
provisions of controlling who can perform what function, when and in what capacity. This 
requires standardisation of authentication methods to identify users, services and resources. 
It also requires method to identify attributes of the user and the context of their access. This 
may include the role of the user, the organisation they belong to, or the identity of the 
workflow in which they are collaborating. 
Different access control solutions have been presented that build on role-base access 
control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) and team based access control (TMAC) (Thomas, 
1997) to define permissions for roles in collaborative sessions and task based access control 
(Thomas and Sandhu, 1998) to define permissions for users in workflows. In the grid 
community, much of the access control work has focused on methods for authentication 
across organisations, and user attribute based access control in policy decision engines. The 
user attributes do not include capturing the context of collaborations. Importantly, the 
collaborations are defined by the combination of the users, the executing workflow (which 
captures the context) and the services and resources consumed. Grid Computing introduces 
service instances, which have not been considered in the described access control solutions 
for collaborative use across organisations. 
Chandramouli (2000) defines temporal business associations as temporary 
assignments of users to roles in collaborative workflows, using rules derived from business 
process models. Grid Service instances created by Grid Service factories during a 
collaborative workflow can be considered as temporal business assets in a dynamic context 
of users, service instances and workflow state. In the next chapter, the DAME project is 
described, illustrating the motivating scenario that uses Grid Services as temporal assets 
during collaborative diagnostics of aircraft engines. Chapter 4 describes the requirements 
for secure collaborative workflow for the DAME scenario. Chapter 5 defines the model for 
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control of fine-grained access permissions to Grid Service instances executing across 
organisational boundaries, called Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. Chapter 6 illustrates 
the implemented secure collaborative workflow management system used in the DAME 
demonstrator.  
  40 
Chapter 3  
DAME 
This chapter presents DAME (Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment), the 
motivational scenario for workflow coordination of services with secure access by teams of 
collaborating users. DAME is a UK e-Science project to demonstrate the use of distributed 
services and Grid Computing resources for the support of aircraft engine diagnostics. This 
chapter outlines the different organisations; the roles they play and the roles the users from 
the organisations play in the collaborations. The main workflow used by the DAME 
demonstrations is illustrated showing the business relationships and the collaborative 
scenario. 
3.1 DAME Project Introduction 
DAME (Austin and et al., 2001) is an EPSRC-funded project and is supported by industrial 
partners Rolls-Royce, the aircraft engine manufacturer and Data Systems & Solutions 
(DS&S), who provide IT support and maintain service contracts for engine leasing. Between 
the two partners, they manufacture, sell and lease aircraft engines to commercial airlines. 
DAME includes the academic research partners from the universities of Leeds, Oxford, 
Sheffield and York. 
3.1.1 Project Partners 
From the University of Leeds there are two partners in the project consortium. From the 
Informatics Institute in the School of Computing, Professor Peter Dew leads the expertise 
on integration of Grid Computing infrastructures. From the Keyworth Institute, School of 
Mechanical Engineering, Professor Alison McKay provides expertise in data provenance. 
From the University of Oxford, Professor Lionel Tarrasenko provides the expertise in data 
acquisition from the aircraft engines and signal processing for initial feature detection. From 
the University of Sheffield, Professor Peter Fleming provides case based reasoning (CBR) 
to match new engine cases with past engine diagnoses. Finally, from the University of York, 
Professor Jim Austin provides fast pattern matching services. 
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The industrial partners in the project provide the motivating scenario for this research. 
Rolls-Royce is an aircraft engine manufacturer and supplies gas-turbine aero engines for 
commercial aircraft. DS&S, a subsidiary of Rolls-Royce, are experts in decision support 
systems and provide the online environment for airline operators to diagnose aircraft 
engines. Together they are expert in the supply and support of aircraft engines, with 
significant experience in online management of engines with human diagnosis support. 
The consortium partners form an example of a VO. The universities provide with 
computing services and integration service to demonstrate the virtual collaborative working 
in the supply and use of Grid Computing. This VO illustrates how different organisations 
can contribute to DAME product delivery. This chapter also presents a VO that is formed in 
the business scenario involving the end user, the Airline. 
3.2 DAME Operational Overview 
DAME is a collaborative tool to support the leasing of aircraft engine to airline companies. 
Leasing aircraft engines is a business model from Rolls-Royce, along with a subsidiary Data 
Systems & Solutions who provides through-life leasing support service. One part of this 
business model is to be enhanced with an on-wing engine data recorder that stores vibration 
and performance data during flight. When out of parameter behaviour is detected, the 
downloaded data is used in collaborative diagnostics workflows that involve people, 
processing services and data from different organisations. The services, data and results can 
be commercially sensitive, especially among competing airlines. Therefore, securing the 
services, data and collaborative processes is essential for the distributed diagnostics 
environment to be a credible business opportunity. 
DAME requires collaborative processing in the task of aircraft engine diagnostics. 
The DAME environment, illustrated in Figure 3.1, cannot be described as one system, 
because by its nature it requires independent distributed resources to store, process, manage 
and communicate the data and results. The data sources (aircraft engines) will be located at 
airports globally, and so will the maintenance staff dealing with the engines. Data storage 
and processing resource will also need to be globally distributed to cope with limitations in 
the transport of large amounts of data in short space of time. Other personnel involved in the 
diagnosis will also be globally distributed to provide 24-hour support. 
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3.2.1 DAME Scenario - Aircraft Engine Diagnostics 
Rolls-Royce has a requirement for improved engine diagnostics since the change in business 
model from selling to leasing engines. This current business model used by Rolls-Royce is 
called Power By The Hour®. This provides the airline operator with a fixed engine 
maintenance cost over an extended period of time. The business model includes scheduled 
and unscheduled engine maintenance, replacement parts, exchange of replaceable units and 
continuous spare parts replacement. Specific programs are tailored according to engine 
family and operator needs (Rolls-Royce: Services, 2004). 
This business model is a move away from product-based supply to a service supply 
model, by providing the airline operator with ‘engine thrust’ instead of selling the engine 
unit outright. The through-life supply is supported by DS&S. To best support the operator, 
the service supplier needs to understand the operating conditions of the engine and part of 
the operator’s business. Currently DS&S have significant experience in supporting aircraft 
engines with predictive maintenance cycles using knowledge of flights, typical engine and 
parts lifecycles and the types of supporting components that operators use, such as the type 
of oil. 
 
Figure 3.1 DAME operational scenario 
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Developed with the help of Oxford University, Rolls-Royce have been using a 
vibration monitoring system in ground-based testing of aircraft engines. The engines are 
exercised in the test-bed to test dependability in the design, and for pass-off testing 
production units before release. This concept has been redesigned as an on-wing embedded 
system to monitor and record vibration and performance parameters of the aircraft engines 
whilst in flight. 
To improve diagnostics and maintenance scheduling a ground-based system will 
analyse recorded data to monitor engine behaviour. This is facilitated by downloading the 
data on landing, then processing it with distributed services, to provide an on-demand 
diagnosis of the condition of the engine. Automated workflow services execute the 
diagnostics processing and by employing QoS (Quality of Service) requirements, results can 
be returned within the turn around time of the aircraft. This will be used to detect wear of 
components, foreign object damage (e.g. ingestion of birds) and other out of parameter 
conditions. 
Another aim is to provide information on the condition of engines to the maintenance 
team at the airport for predictive maintenance. The objectives in providing more 
information and diagnostics through the engine lifecycle are to reduce cost, improve safety, 
increase availability and improved scheduled maintenance models. 
To achieve an improved level of diagnostics the analysis processes historic engine 
records across all the airline operators. During the diagnostics process that is started on 
landing, case-based reasoning is used to match with the historic records and provide a likely 
diagnosis. Historic records also support improved predictive maintenance by performing 
pattern matching to identify trends of product lifecycles. 
The DAME scenario requires enhancement in the IT support systems due to the scale 
and distribution of the problem. The data sources and users are distributed. Every global 
airport is a potential target for access to the diagnosis system. Each flight generates large 
amounts of data, each engine will typically generate >35MB per hour and there can be up to 
six engines per flight. As already stated the diagnosis process uses the historic records of 
past flights, this requires access to large amounts of stored data for processing. The volume 
of data will continually increase, and locations for storage are likely to be distributed in 
several global data centres, hosted by different organisations, such as Rolls-Royce, DS&S 
and the Airlines. Along with data hosted in different organisational domains, there is 
potential to use data processing services for the organisations already identified and other 
organisations that are specialists in certain processing algorithms, such as fast pattern 
matching. 
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The diagnosis processing is required to produce an advisory result on engine 
condition within a short period of time. It needs to process the information and return a 
result within the ground staff’s available time in the turn-around time of the aircraft. To 
achieve this, processing resources will need to be dynamically available to respond to 
varying patterns of demand. 
The access to data storage and processing services requires Internet exposure of the 
supporting IT. This creates a security risk by opening access to commercially sensitive data 
and processing algorithms. Sensitivity of the data includes the engine and performance data 
and the derived results from analysis of the raw vibration data. This data can reveal the 
operating conditions of the airline. This has commercial sensitivity, for example other 
airline could use knowledge operating conditions to gain competitive advantage, or to 
damage reputation by releasing information to the journalistic press or business analysts. 
Commercial sensitivity of the processing services would be to prevent somebody replicating 
the service, then using it for there own use without paying the service provider, or reselling 
it as their own. 
For the DAME scenario to be realised, the DAME e-Science project is used to 
investigate the appropriateness of Grid Computing in addressing the problems listed above. 
Grid Computing supports the VO formed by the collaborating organisations to improve 
diagnosis and predictive maintenance. Among its properties is high-speed networking, large 
scale distributed storage, dynamic resourcing (of compute power, storage and network), 
supported by strong authentication and authorisation mechanisms for distributed access 
across organisations. 
The users in DAME require access to the distributed diagnostics services and data. It 
was identified during DAME project meetings and requirements analysis that one possible 
solution is by using a web-based portal and workflow management system. A web-based 
portal is a web site in the World Wide Web that provides personalised access capabilities 
(typically with secure access), with pages served containing tailored views and controls to 
back-end systems, such as databases and workflow management systems. 
The next section 3.3, presents how the distributed partners in the DAME business 
case, shown in Figure 3.1, form a VO, collaborating on the engine diagnosis process 
3.3 DAME Business Model 
The DAME business model is the VO that involves the people, processes and resources 
required to support the diagnosis business processes. The partners in the DAME VO are 
captured in a UML business class diagram in Figure 3.2, using the Rational Rose™ business 
modelling profile (Johnston, 2004). The diagram shows the structural relationship of the 
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business partners during the collaboration in the engine diagnosis scenario. The 
organisations in the VO are shown on the outside of the package containing diagnosis team. 
The collaborating diagnosis team includes people, processes and compute resources. 
The main partners of DAME are shown in Figure 3.2 on the outside of the package DAME 
Diagnosis Workflow Team and are represented as Business Actors are: 
• Airline (shown at the top), are the operator of the aircraft engines. Shown, as 
specialisations are the Engine Lessee and Other Airline. The Engine Lessee is the 
customer of the diagnostics process, operating the engine and employing the 
Maintenance Engineers, who start the process when the aircraft lands. The Other 
Airlines involved in the business model illustrate the pool of historic engine data that is 
owned by an airline, but used in the diagnosis of other airline’s engines. The sharing of 
data improves the quality of the result in the diagnosis process, but the raw data owned 
by one airline cannot be accessed by another airline. 
• Fleet Maintenance Management (bottom left), in this case represents DS&S. They 
support the aircraft engine operators (Airline) by providing the diagnostics support and 
employ Maintenance Analysts. They manage the integration system, executing a portal 
 
Figure 3.2 DAME Virtual Organisation, showing the diagnosis workflow-team 
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and workflow manager to execute diagnostics workflows, consuming processing 
services. 
• Engine Manufacturer (bottom right), in this case represents Rolls-Royce. The Engine 
Manufacturer supplies engines by service contract, which is managed by the Fleet 
Maintenance Management organisation. They employ the Engine Designer, who can be 
consulted during the diagnosis process. 
Additionally, the DAME scenario includes two more types of organisation: 
• Service Provider (middle right), which represents organisations that specialise in 
processing algorithms, such as fast-pattern matching. The processing algorithms are 
offered as services to be used in the diagnosis workflows. The deployment of services 
may be at a fixed location, or the services may be dynamically deployable on grid 
resources from a Resource Provider. The Service Provider can be an external 
organisation, or the organisation may be one of the three types already mentioned. 
• Resource Provider (lower middle right) represents organisations that provide the grid 
resources of data storage and compute processing power, as a service. The key 
provision for DAME is short-term available compute power, where processing tasks can 
be dynamically deployed to compute processing resources to meet the demands of 
workflows. 
In the centre of Figure 3.2 is the DAME Diagnosis Workflow Team package. Within 
the package are the Business Workers that represent the following human roles in the 
diagnostics: 
• Maintenance Engineer (ME): carries out inspection, diagnosis and maintenance of 
aircraft engines; Employed by the Airline and is based at the airport; 
• Maintenance Analyst (MA): provides technical advice and coordinates analysis; 
Employed by the Fleet Maintenance Management organisation and is based at the 
diagnostics support centre where the airline’s aircraft maintenance contracts are 
managed; 
• Domain Expert (DE): acts as a repository of knowledge and will provide expert 
diagnostic advice on unidentified features; Employed by the Aircraft Engine 
Manufacturer, and is based at the engine manufacturer’s design centre and is an 
experienced aircraft engine designer. 
The other elements inside the Diagnosis Workflow Team package are created during 
the diagnostics process. When an aircraft lands, the Engine Data is downloaded to a data 
store. The ME creates the Business Entity Problem from the new Engine Data and starts the 
automatic diagnosis process, shown as Workflow Service. The Workflow Service executes 
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Processing Services to perform analysis of the Engine Data, which also accesses Other 
Airline Engine Data. The Processing Services are executed on one or more Compute 
Resources. 
The Diagnosis Workflow Team is dynamically created as new team members join to 
collaborate on solving the Problem and execute Processing Services, consuming Compute 
Resources. The multiplicity in Figure 3.2 shows that the Diagnosis Workflow Team can 
contain many people acting in the roles using many processing services and compute 
resources. The dynamic model showing how the team evolves over time, consuming 
services is provided in the next section, 3.4. 
3.4 DAME Workflow 
The DAME workflow is the diagnostics process that is created whenever an aircraft lands 
and the vibration and performance data is downloaded. This diagnostics process has been 
captured from interviews with the business partners and documented in the Use Case 
Analysis (Fletcher, 2002). Figure 3.3 contains a simplified activity diagram showing the 
diagnostics process, interpreted from the results of the use case analysis and accepted by 
consultation with the business partners. The use of activity diagrams for this work is 
supported by the adoption of UML throughout the DAME project to capture the system 
structural and behavioural architecture, and has been shown to be useful in specification and 
communication of workflows (Eshuis and Wieringa, 2002). 
The diagnostics process in Figure 3.3 uses swim lanes to denote the activities carried 
out by each role. The roles are the Business Workers illustrated in the Workflow 
Diagnostics Team from Figure 3.2. 
The process starts when new data is downloaded after an aircraft has landed. The 
process splits into three parallel paths. On the first path, the ME performs a visual 
inspection of the engine’s condition. Concurrently, the diagnosis result of the on-wing 
system, named Quote Diagnosis, is downloaded. This result is from preliminary signal 
processing on the vibration data, which is executed during flight and indicates any out of 
parameter behaviour. The third path is the automated workflow, called Brief 
Diagnosis/Prognosis and labelled as WF1 in Figure 3.3. This is a workflow of processing 
services and is explained later in this section. The result of WF1 is joined with the other 
results and processed in Check Diagnosis. Depending on the status there are three outcomes 
from Check Diagnosis. The first is when the result is Clear allowing the ME to Release 
Engine for its next operation. The other two outcomes from Check Diagnosis are 
categorised as Feature Detected. The Feature Detected is out of parameter behaviour, which 
can be categorised as either Known or Unknown. A Known result is when WF1 produces a 
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conclusive diagnosis of the flagged behaviour. From a Known result the required 
Maintenance Procedure can be executed by the ME and then the engine released. If the 
Feature Detected is Unknown then the process is escalated to the MA. 
 
Figure 3.3 Diagnostics business process 
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The escalation task is a request for assistance from more specialised personnel. This is 
the mechanism to build the team and control team membership. The ME escalates the 
problem to the MA when the initial automated process (WF1) cannot recognise out of 
parameter vibration signals. The ME initiates the escalation and then automated resource 
allocation selects the MA to join the process. The MA investigates the problem with a range 
of tools (WF2) and, if needed, escalates the problem to a DE. Escalation is the same as 
before, but allocating a DE to the process. The DE uses further investigation tools (WF3). 
At escalation the user initiating the task provides annotation in support of the data, results 
and processing services being used in that instance of a process. The escalation task is part 
of defining the members of a collaboration, by adding users to the team. The release of the 
diagnosis process removes users from the team. 
The activities shown in Figure 3.3 are high-level business activities. There are three 
high-level activities, indicated as WF1, WF2 and WF3, which contain workflows in 
themselves. The first of these, WF1, is shown in Figure 3.4. It is an automated workflow 
triggered by the arrival of new engine data from the on-wing system. WF1 uses a chain of 
data processing tools to produce a most likely prognosis. These processing tools are part of 
on-going development in diagnosis and in order to support the inclusion of new versions 
and different implementations each tool is implemented as a service component. 
The first task in the WF1 sequence is signal processing on the engine vibration data to 
extract fragments of the signal that are performing outside the boundaries of normal 
operation. Of which, some types of behaviour are identified in this process, such as foreign 
object damage or a bearing failure. All signal fragments are sent to the second process, 
which looks for matches in historic engine data. The third process takes the matching 
records then uses case-based reasoning to identify the likely cause of the signal fragment. 
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Figure 3.4 WF1 - Brief Diagnosis / Prognosis 
 
Figure 3.5 WF2 - Detailed Diagnosis / Prognosis 
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The workflows WF2 and WF3 are shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 respectively. 
These examples show that the MA and DE roles have more flexibility by choosing which 
diagnostics tools is used. WF2 and WF3 represent a combination of static and ad-hoc 
workflows. The tools are defined in the static definition, but the order of execution is ad-hoc 
and determined by the user at runtime. The static definition means that permissions can be 
assigned by role to the workflow task. The ad-hoc elements of the workflow allow the user 
to choose which services are required to fulfil the goal of the workflow. 
The MA, who has access to tools that aid in visualisation of the engine data, pattern 
matching and further search capability across engine case history, executes the WF2 
workflow. The DE executes the WF3 workflow, who has access to specific analysis tools 
produced by the engine manufacturer. This includes more detailed information about engine 
behaviour including engine simulation models. 
 
Figure 3.6 WF3 - Detailed Analysis 
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3.5 DAME Summary 
The chapter has provided an introduction to the DAME UK e-Science project, which has 
been used as the motivational scenario for this research. The next chapter uses the DAME 
scenario to outline the requirements to achieve the business implementation and describes 
the security requirements for collaborative workflow across a globally distributed VO. 
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Chapter 4  
Requirements for Secure Collaborative Workflow 
In this chapter the DAME scenario is used to extract system requirements to achieve a 
globally distributed system for collaborative diagnostics.  
4.1 System Requirements 
The DAME scenario requires enhanced IT support due to the scale and distribution of the 
task. The user population can be summarised as: 
• Across a large number of sites (at least every international airport, Rolls-Royce and 
DS&S); 
• Across many organisations (Rolls-Royce, DS&S and many Airlines); 
• Dynamic; changes will occur to the population of DAME users within organisations, 
independent of the DAME environment. 
The processing is performed by workflows coordinating the different tasks. The tasks 
are implemented as services in a SOA. Loose coupling mechanisms in SOA means that 
changes to service deployments can happen without requiring changes to workflows. In 
particular, abstraction by service type means that workflow definitions can be independent 
of service implementation changes. Thus, SOA allows the services defined in a workflow to 
change implementation. The changes could be using services from different providers; or, 
deploying the services on different platforms, which includes dynamic use of available grid 
resources; or, evolving the services with extended functionality.  
In current SOA implementations, namely Web Services, most services are stateless 
and interactions are simply transitory. In stateless Web Service implementations, a service 
response is typically no longer than 30 seconds to complete without causing a timeout. 
Long-term services in DAME are required to execute for longer periods, this can be 
addressed using stateful service implementations, such as those offered in Grid Services. 
These long-term services will also be started by one user and subsequently accessed by 
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other users, collaborating on steering the process and viewing the results. Examples of the 
DAME long-term services are: 
• Feature Detection from WF1. The test-bed data supplied by Rolls-Royce takes more 
than 5 minutes to process, a long flight taking as much as 1 hour. 
• Engine simulation model and visualisation services. Executed by the MA and DE, these 
services can be run throughout the workflow (once launched) providing a common view 
on engine condition and shared between users authorised to see the output. 
The data sources for DAME are large scale. At the start of the DAME project, 
Roll-Royce had over 50 GBytes of engine vibration data from the test-bed system. With 
each flight, the capacity required for engine data will increase. This also increases the 
processing requirements when searching across the historic records of data. The processing 
requirements are dynamic in that diagnostics results are required for maintenance to be 
completed within the turn-around time of the aircraft. 
The project partners are interested in addressing the scalability issues of storage and 
processing by using Grid Computing. In the future, they hope to use commodity computing 
resources, as a commercial product, which can be used to cope with dynamic usage 
requirements. 
Therefore, the DAME project is using Grid Computing to address dynamic processing 
and storage requirements, along with issues of distribution of data, processing, users and 
organisations. 
4.2 Security Requirements 
The importance of security for DAME has been noted in section 3.2. This is characterised 
by the nature of a global distributed system, the exposure of services and data to Internet 
access. This creates a security risk of access to commercially sensitive data and processing 
algorithms and can reveal the operating conditions of the organisations. This has 
commercial sensitivity, for example other airline could use knowledge operating conditions 
to gain competitive advantage, or to damage reputation by releasing information to the 
journalistic press or business analysts. 
There are many areas of security and this research concentrates on access control to 
the assets used in DAME. An asset is defined in the DAME Dependability and Security 
Study, by Fletcher et al. (2004a), as: 
Asset is a resource of value to an organisation. Assets may include 
hardware, software, data, people and soft assets such as reputation or 
intellectual property. 
Chapter 4 Requirements for Secure Collaborative Workflow 
55 
The types of assets analysed in DAME were data and services used in the diagnostics 
workflow. The requirement to protect the assets has been classified in terms of system 
security and dependability goals. These are defined as goals, identified by the stakeholders, 
where success is necessary for business objectives. Failure to meet a goal will have an 
adverse impact on the business. The stakeholders are someone or something that has a 
vested interest in the behaviour of the use cases (Fletcher, 2002). The main system security 
and dependability goals from the DAME Study are listed below: 
• To maintain the Confidentiality of Detailed Engine Design and Performance Data; 
• To maintain the Confidentiality of Operational Data; 
• To ensure that any Diagnostic advice provided by the system is Reliable; 
• To record the provenance of diagnostic decisions and identify individuals’ actions in the 
diagnostic process; 
• To provide predictable availability; 
• To protect the confidentiality of technical industrial property used in the system’s 
implementation. 
The possible threats to the assets are concerned with confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. The following table summarises these concerns for data and services, from 
(Fletcher et al., 2004a): 
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Table 4-1 Notes on possible threats (concerns) to data and service assets 
 Data Asset Service Asset 
Confidentiality Lack of individual data confidentiality may include: 
A.  An unauthorised party observing 
the actual information contained within 
the data. 
B.  An unauthorised party observes the 
existence of: the transmission or storage 
of a particular data asset. 
Depending on the data asset the impact 
of this may be that it may divulge:  
• Proprietary information. 
• Business process information. 
• Operational and maintenance data e.g. 
fault incidence, deduction of general 
fault incidence from data volumes, etc. 
Lack of individual service 
confidentiality may include:  
A.  Ability of an unauthorised party to 
access the internal algorithms.  
B.  Unauthorised execution allowing, 
access to other resources, “chosen data” 
attacks, etc.  
Depending on the service asset the 
impact of this may be that it may 
divulge:  
• Proprietary information. 
• Business process information. 
• Operational data e.g. fault incidence, 
deduction of general fault incidence 
through execution occurrences, etc. 
Integrity Lack of individual service integrity may include:  
A.  The loss or corruption of data.  
B.  Inappropriate modification of data. 
 Lack of individual service integrity 
may include:  
A.  Uncontrolled modification of 
software.  
B.  Critical failure in software. 
Availability Lack of individual data availability may include:  
A.  Delay in the availability of data. 
B.  Loss of data. 
Depending on the data asset the impact 
of this may be:  
• Lack of availability of the automatic 
workflow WF1 diagnosis. 
• Impede the ability of the Maintenance 
Analyst (MA) and Domain Expert (DE) 
to make a diagnosis. 
• Lack of availability of other 
information provided by DAME e.g. 
information provided for the repair 
database as part of the completion of 
the “repair loop”. 
Lack of individual service availability 
may include:  
A.  Any regular or prolonged loss. 
B.  Unauthorised access or attempted 
access leading to denial of service. 
C.  Unauthorised execution leading to 
denial of service. 
D.  Loss of the availability of a 
communications path. 
E.  Loss of the availability of a 
processing node. 
Depending on the service asset the 
impact of this may be:  
• Lack of availability of the automatic 
workflow WF1. 
• Lack of availability of other 
information provided by DAME e.g. 
information provided for the repair 
database as part of the completion of 
the “repair loop”. 
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In the DAME Study there were 33 data assets and 20 service assets identified. The main 
assets to protect in are: 
• Engine vibration data, this is raw data downloaded from the aircraft into an available 
data store, if compromised there is little threat unless it can be attributed by its 
metadata; 
• Engine records; when engine data is downloaded, a database record is created 
containing flight details, such as airline, aircraft number, airline, flight number and 
times, this provides provenance for the vibration data; 
• Diagnosis results: this information is very sensitive and could reveal proprietary 
operating conditions. 
• Partial results: at each stage of the workflows, these are the outputs of processing 
services and annotations from the uses. The DAME Study (Fletcher et al., 2004a) 
identifies each of these results, and puts a quantitative measure on the impact of 
unauthorised access. Examples are: 
• Annotations from the escalation process could convey proprietary operational 
information and may have a medium impact to confidentiality; 
• Engine Simulation Result could divulge proprietary engine information and may 
have a high impact for new engine types, but medium for older engine type. 
• Workflow definitions capture knowledge of the diagnosis process and have commercial 
value to the operators of the service integration (such as DS&S). 
• Workflow records that capture details of the diagnosis case can reveal an airline’s 
operational information, and tampering with live records may inhibit flights in the short-
term, or damage business reputation in the long-term. 
• Long running service instances. The service instances require access during the 
workflows by collaborating users. Confidentiality is required for: 
• User access, because this can reveal the operators details; 
• The initial parameters a service is started with, and steering parameters sent during 
execution, which could also reveal operator and flight details; 
• Results from the process (see Partial results above). 
• The proprietary algorithms used in services may have commercial value. Competing 
service providers may want to replicate part or all of the algorithms, or potential 
customers may try to gain access without paying. 
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• The algorithms may contain proprietary knowledge, such as the model to simulate an 
engine’s performance, which would be of interest to competing engine manufacturers. 
4.3 Requirements for Secure Collaborative Workflow 
The DAME scenario is a collaborative process between the identified roles of Maintenance 
Engineer, Maintenance Analyst and Domain Expert. This occurs when an aircraft lands at 
an airport, data from the engines are downloaded and workflow WF1 is automatically 
started. According to the workflow model (illustrated in Figure 3.3), workflow WF1 is 
assumed to start under the identity of the ME that is responsible for connecting the engine 
and downloading the data. If WF1 produces an unclear diagnosis, then escalation causes the 
other participants to join the diagnostics process. The MA uses tools WF2 and the DE uses 
the tools WF3. Both of the people in these roles can access data and service results that were 
executed by the ME. 
It has been identified that Grid Computing will be used to address the processing and 
storage needs, and that a Workflow Management System is required to control and manage 
workflows of distributed processing and data access. These technologies support an open 
model of collaboration between distributed users, distributed data sources, distributed 
service providers extending to distributed grid resource providers on a global scale. The 
previous section, 4.2, identified the need to protect access to the components of the VO. 
Therefore, access control must prevent undesirable access and permit the business 
collaborations. 
For each execution of the business process there exists a workflow instance. The 
workflow instance captures the context of the collaboration. It contains the state of the 
workflow, such as the data associated with the workflow and the identities of the Grid 
Service instances. In the example scenario, long-running stateful services can be shared 
between users. The users act in pre-defined roles in the workflow instances. The workflow 
instances controls the use of Grid Service instances. Therefore, the context of the workflow 
instance also describes the collaborative team. 
The team has the properties: 
• Workflow instance executing the sequence from the workflow definition; 
• Users playing roles from the workflow definition; 
• Users sharing access to Grid Service instances; 
• Grid Service instances executing the service types from the workflow definition; 
• Grid Service instances executing commercially sensitive algorithms; 
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• Grid Service instances accessing commercially sensitive data; 
• Grid Service instances returning either anonymised or commercially sensitive results. 
The link between role-base workflow and role-based access control has been explored 
in previous work. The role-based definitions allow the user base to change more often than 
the business requirements that define the business process and access permissions. 
However, the DAME VO scenario highlights two specific issues not addressed in the 
previous work (Chandramouli, 2000, Liu and Chen, 2004, Kang et al., 2001, Lepro, 2003, 
Koshutanski and Massacci, 2003). The first is that role-based access control is not sufficient 
for processes that involve users and services across organisations, since services and data 
can reveal proprietary information about an organisation operating conditions. The second is 
that the previous work does not show how to handle collaborative access to Grid Service 
instances with automated dynamic fine-grained access control. 
4.4 Problem Summary 
The following table outlines the requirements for the DAME architecture to deliver secure 
collaborative workflows. 
Table 4-2 DAME problem summary 
The Problem of: 
Providing and restricting access to commercially sensitive data and services in distributed 
systems where system resources, services and users belong to different organisations. Users 
collaborate in task based problem solving, from geographically distributed locations. 
Affects: 
Owners of data and authors of services that allow access to parties on a need to know basis 
avoiding conflict of interest and exposing an organisations operating data to a competitor. 
The impact of which is: 
• No sensitive data should be read or modified by unauthorised users or services 
• No service should be instantiated by unauthorised users or services 
• No service instance should be accessed by unauthorised users or services 
• The workflow of the collaboration should not be restricted in access to 
resources/services to resolve problems, in its normal flow of execution 
• Access to data should be restricted by conflict of interest mechanisms 
• For information that is sensitive to security level, the access control policy should 
restrict read and write access 
• Access policy mechanisms should not impede the workflow time frame when 
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authorising security assertions. 
A successful system would be: 
A system that supports single sign-on by users and permits access to all resources/services 
allowed without detrimental time or execution overheads. It will react to changes in 
collaboration membership before unauthorised access can occur. It will support the 
workflow dynamics of a problem solving team using identities, roles and policies created to 
protect multiple organisations and service instances. 
The system must be managed from multiple locations, with each organisation able to 
impose policies on aspects under their own interest. There should be visibility of available 
services and resources and the impact of policies imposed. Access to services should be 
logged under fine-grained detail, with security exceptions clearly identified. 
There should be a means of recording access to services in a manner that is non- 
repudiable to support auditing. This includes intruder detection whether access has been 
gained or not, and auditing for economic reasons. 
The workflow instance should manage its own access control policy to itself and the 
service instances currently being used. This may or may not be triggered by user 
intervention. 
4.5 Summary 
The DAME scenario to support aircraft engine maintenance requires a highly distributed 
solution, which raises issues of managing user access to data and resources. The diagnostic 
team model requires the use of data from all participating organisations, some of which 
compete on a commercial basis. The operating data from that recorded on the engines is 
commercially sensitive and requires protection. Supporting the diagnosis are algorithms that 
process the data, which are also commercially sensitive to the service provider. The actions 
by all parties in the collaboration need to be protected against the release of sensitive data or 
access to protected algorithms. 
Using the scenario presented in Chapter 3, this chapter presented the list of 
requirements for securing the collaboration of users from different organisations, consuming 
services and grid resources from suppliers in further different organisations. The next 
chapter presents the generalised solution to secure collaborative workflow. In Chapter 6, 
concepts in the generalised model are tested in the secure collaborative workflow 
implementation, part of the DAME project demonstrator. The evaluation of the 
implementation and model are presented in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5  
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
This chapter presents a generalised architectural model for automated control of dynamic 
access permissions in collaborative use of Grid Service instances in workflows across 
organisations. 
The requirements from previous chapters are analysed and compared with the 
published work to produce the access control model. The proposed solution is the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture, which address the issues raised in the analysis, and 
fulfils the requirements for secure collaborative Grid Services across organisations. The 
architectural structure and components are described in section 5.3. To express the scope of 
the design, the assumptions about the commercial policy, technology and the case study are 
listed in section 5.4. At the end of the chapter there is an example of how the Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture would be implemented in a portal-based, collaborative problem-
solving environment. 
5.1 Analysis of the Workflow Security in the DAME Demonstrator 
The DAME demonstrator was successful in illustrating how Grid Services can be combined 
for collaborative use of Grid Service instances in a diagnostics environment. The evaluation 
showed that there are still issues for controlling access and controlling business processing 
for distributed services. This analysis uses Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and compares the 
requirements with published work. Also used in the analysis are the DAME Security and 
Dependability Study (Fletcher et al., 2004b), feedback and discussions from the DAME 
project meetings and during the Workshop on Grid Security Practice and Experience, July 
2004, Oxford, UK, at which the author presented part of this work (Russell et al., 2004b). 
The analysis of the data resulted in some architectural decisions for a scheme to 
manage the authorisation to use collaborative services instances in a grid environment 
across organisations. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture solution is presented in this 
chapter in section 5.3. 
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Key issues from the results of the demonstrator are discussed in the following sub-
sections: 
• Business organisational issues relating to the demonstrator’s appropriateness to the 
DAME business model; 
• Business process definition issues relating to how processes are defined and mapped to 
access control, and how process and access control are coupled in the demonstrator; 
• Access control issues, discussing other approaches and complementary solutions; and, 
• Architectural issues, regarding scalable solutions for DAME. 
5.1.1 Business Organisational Issues 
The DAME business model has shown the need for workflow to control the user of 
distributed services. It requires a portal to provide a location independent collaborative 
environment with multiple users accessing common services that are required to be Grid 
Services for reasons of scale and availability. Users interacting with the workflows controls 
access to the services. Therefore, the point of collaboration is the workflow. This is because: 
• It is the point where all users access services for launching, service control and 
retrieving results; 
• It is the point where all data passes to and from services. 
The collaborative business process creates service instances that require collaborative 
access by specific users. However, the business process definition cannot specify specific 
users and specific service instances ahead of use. For manageability, the business process is 
defined by role and service type. Therefore, on instantiation of a workflow fine-grained 
access control policies are required to state which users can access which service instances. 
This policy needs to be dynamically modified to follow the actions in the workflow, to add 
access rules for the created service instances and to provide changing access for users. 
The model used for the demonstrator is based on a VO of consumers and suppliers of 
services. The business model reflects the DAME scenario shown in Figure 3.2, from section 
3.3. The DAME demonstrator has illustrated a feasible VO by modelling the different roles 
and organisations using the different partners of the project. 
The different partners in the business model relate to the SOA tier shown in Figure 
2.1. This shows how a VO relates to a traditional supply chain, which is reflected in the 
DAME VO model. The supply chain is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The labels are generalised, 
but also indicate the positions DS&S and Rolls-Royce occupy in the DAME VO. External 
organisations or any of the VO member organisations could provide the Grid Services and 
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Grid Resources. Whoever provides the services or resources is subject to contractual 
responsibilities between supplier and consumer. 
In a traditional vertical supply model, the contractual responsibility for provision is 
between the direct consumer and provider. For example, if a service provider dynamically 
uses resources from the grid resource provider to meet performance requirements of the 
service consumer, then dynamic selection and payment of the grid resource is the 
responsibility of the service provider, not the service consumer. Therefore, grid resource 
and service consumer would not be in direct contact. This is required to maintain business 
relationships when there are many customers and many suppliers. 
In Figure 5.1, the Support and Service Integration organisation executes the workflow 
management system. The workflows consume the processing services from the Grid Service 
Providers. The integration of services decouples the consumer of the support (Primary 
Customer) from the organisations that provide processing services and grid resources. In the 
example scenario, the Service Integration also decouples the Primary Customer from the 
Domain Expert. 
 
Figure 5.1 Supply chain, related to DAME VO 
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Previous studies have suggested that a conceptual VO policy can be used to define 
access to services and resources in a VO (Russell et al., 2004b, Bertino et al., 2004). The 
conceptual VO policy, from (Russell et al., 2004b), defines vertically the authorisation of all 
types of components (user roles, services and data) from the top-level consumer to the 
lowest level provider. 
However, the DAME example illustrates the contractual relationships in a vertical 
supply chain. The contract would be enforced by policies between the consumer and 
provider, and does not require a policy managed across the whole supply chain. To produce 
a single policy for user types and service types for the VO would require collaboration on its 
contents, possibly lengthy negotiations, and would be less flexible for the inclusion of new 
service types and new service providers. Most importantly, it reduces the flexibility in 
defining access control for workflows. 
Another issue in the VO policy is privacy. The workflow is used as the context for a 
collaboration and it has been stated that the roles in role-based workflow and RBAC can be 
linked by the business requirements. Therefore, if the VO policy is defined for the workflow 
across the VO, then partial knowledge about the workflow can be gained by interpreting the 
policy. The workflow definitions are assets that belong to the Support and Service 
Integration organisation. Therefore, using a VO policy could reveal proprietary information. 
Before the access control policy can be used to determine authorisation, the users, 
services and resources need to be authenticated. For a VO policy to make decisions based 
on each user, they would need to understand the identities of every user in the VO. The 
example highlights problems with identifying users at each resource. The example has a 
large user base. It can be assumed that a large user base will be dynamic due to changes in 
staff. 
Another issue with user identities is the workflow management system. For example, 
in the DAME workflow the process is started by the ME results and access to the services 
can then be escalated to the MA and DE. The workflow process permits this. However, if 
the workflow did not understand access permissions, then the results from a service 
accessed on behalf of one user could be passed to another user. This would occur, for 
example, if the MA retrieved results a service and escalated the process to the DE, then the 
DE viewed the results via the workflow, and not accessing the service directly. The access 
control policy at the service would have restricted the action by the DE, however the MA 
had already performed the permitted action. This is because the workflow is the point of 
collaborative access to the service instances. 
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5.1.2 Business Process Definition Issues 
The aim of workflow systems is to provide a flexible approach to defining and 
managing business processes. This is achieved by defining the process at an abstract level, 
by describing the workflow in terms of the tasks performed, rather than defining it by the 
implemented resources. This creates loose coupling between the definition and 
implementation, which is echoed in the philosophy behind SOA, as discussed in section 
2.5.1. SOA promotes decoupling of components by abstract description. Referring back to 
the Introduction, Figure 1.1 illustrates the high level creation of workflow from business 
requirements. The abstraction method of defining by types (service, method, data) that is 
used in SOA is required to form workflow definitions that match business process 
requirements. The abstraction removes them from rapidly changing implementation. Such 
that, well formed business processes remain unchanged whilst the implementation of 
services can change without redefining workflow descriptions. The Workflow-Team Policy 
Architecture illustrates this in section 5.2, along with exploiting the link between role-based 
process definition and role-based access permissions. 
5.1.3 Access Control Issues 
Analysis of the business requirements from the DAME scenario has been used to define 
access control rules. The VO model illustrated in Figure 3.2 is accurate for the limited 
requirements of the demonstration scenario, but does not show enough detail to determine 
access control across the organisations. This statement is vindicated in the evaluation in 
Chapter 7 and in Fletcher et al. (2004b). The airlines share sensitive data within the DAME 
system and this needs to be protected. Therefore, the organisation is an important attribute 
in the control of access to the workflow instance and its service instances. This extends 
RBAC (Sandhu et al., 1996) and has been recognised that additional attributes are needed 
for RBAC, for example in (Simon and Zurko, 1997, Thomas, 1997, Ferraiolo et al., 2003a). 
The team-based approach modelled in the demonstrator has been accepted in the 
evaluation. In the demonstrator, the portal provides some of the task-based control over the 
actions a role can perform. In the general model, the team-based access control 
implemented by the workflow control point must enforce the task control by role. This 
compares with team-based access control, TMAC (Thomas, 1997) and TMAC 2004 
(Alotaiby and Chen, 2004) reported in section 2.7.2. Both of these schemes control fine-
grained permissions by team membership, which includes user identities and object 
instances. TMAC 2004 extended the TMAC framework with collaboration instances. The 
approach used in the demonstrator uses a similar fine-grained policy by defining the 
workflow as the collaboration. However, this research has combined the team based 
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approach with the task-based ideas presented in TBAC (Thomas and Sandhu, 1998) for task 
based creation of a roles permissions. 
The DAME scenario requires that fine-grained access permissions be defined from 
high-level tasks and role permissions. The high level definitions form a template of the 
team-based access control, which is used in collaborative workflow instances. The 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture provides the framework to define policy templates 
from role-based collaborative workflows that are used for fine-grained control when 
executing workflow instances. 
5.1.4 Architectural Issues 
The architecture of the business model has been illustrated in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and 
Figure 5.1. In a distributed system, such as a SOA using grid-computing resources, there are 
issues about where access control components are located, and how the components are 
defined. The following are issues about the position of access control components in the 
business architecture. 
• Point of access control to collaborative service instances, PEP as shown in Figure 2.9; 
• Location of user identities and attributes; 
• Location of access control policies; 
• Management of dynamic access control policies; 
• Scalability of the architecture, for multiple users and organisations in many 
collaborative teams, each with permissions and service instances; 
• Privacy of permitted actions and instances used in any collaboration; and 
• Loose coupling of SOA components. 
As already stated, the workflow establishes a context for the collaborative access to 
services. Therefore, a solution would be the concept of a single access control policy for 
each workflow containing fine-grained access constraints for the service instances 
consumed. Dividing the policy into components at each service, as reported in (Russell et 
al., 2004b), would require each service provider and resource to understand the user 
identities and attributes. 
If the policy and its control are distributed, then managing the collaboration 
introduces problems of synchronisation, ensuring all service instances have the correct users 
added to their policy on changes in the users in the team. Dependant on the situation, it may 
be important to ensure the propagation of a change in policy rapidly throughout the system. 
From discussions, it has been noted that ensuring permission to team members in a 
collaboration is more important than a denial of access. 
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Distributing policy rules to each service instance also has implications of privacy. The 
policy rules are fine-grained, specifying the users identity, role and permitted actions on the 
service. In a vertical supply chain, it would not be desirable for the Integration organisation 
to reveal details of their customers to the service providers. 
The user identity and attribute servers would need trust to be assured in the 
contractual relationship. The employer of the user would be trusted to assert the user’s 
identity and their organisation name. However, the employer may only suggest the role. The 
role relates to a definition in the workflow, therefore the Support and Service Integration 
organisation would assert the role on the user. One method would be for the external 
organisations using the workflow to assert the user’s qualifications. A policy would contain 
a template of the qualifications a role requires that would be checked at the point of access 
to the workflow management system or web-based portal. 
Management of the policies has implications on scalability. In the VO policy 
approach (Russell et al., 2004b), a single, dynamic policy associated with the collaboration 
instance would require remote access on each request of a service instance. Alternatively, 
the VO policy approach could distribute policy rules to each service instance. Therefore 
reduce the number of remote accesses and requirement for distributed policy management, 
along with reducing issues of synchronisation and privacy. 
It would be preferable to use a single access control policy per workflow instance, 
which is controlled in one place. Ideally, this would be the point of collaborative access to 
the workflow, and restrict users access to the services based on role-based constraints for 
the workflow. 
5.1.5 Summary of Objectives 
The requirements for secure collaborative workflow can be summarised in by the following 
rules: 
1. The architecture must cope with a dynamic user base. 
2. The architecture must cope with dynamic target objects. 
3. The architecture should not expose participants to each other through the vertical supply 
chain. This includes user and service identities and the organisations of customers and 
suppliers. 
4. The access control mechanisms and workflow management system should not expose 
details of the business process. 
5. Access control should relate to the collaborative process using contextual access 
control. 
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6. The architecture must scalable to cope distributed users, data and services. 
From the analysis of the DAME requirements and the requirements for secure collaborative 
workflow, the following objectives for the general model are stated: 
• Authentication and authorisation information flow should correspond to contractual 
links in Business-to-Business relationships; 
• The definition of business process and access policy should remain unchanged whilst 
allowing changes in users and implementation of services; 
• The collaborative access policy is controlled and managed in one place; 
• The authentication and authorisation architecture should be scalable. That is, easy to add 
users and services, especially if they fit into existing roles and service types. 
• The architecture should be heterogeneous to exist in a heterogeneous grid-computing 
platform. 
5.2 General Model of Secure Collaborative Workflow 
In this research, SOA abstractions have been used to promote decoupling of workflow 
definition from implementation. As Figure 1.1 from the introduction illustrates, the 
workflow definition is created from the business requirements. The business requirements 
also define the access permissions within the workflows. Figure 5.2 expands on Figure 1.1 
by presenting the definition of the workflow and access control policy from the business 
requirements, and illustrating the instantiation to workflow instance and policy instance, 
discussed in Chandramouli (2000). Mendling et al., (2004), also discusses this issue, in 
which they investigate automating the definition of RBAC rules by interpreting BPEL 
workflow scripts. 
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The access control policy template in Figure 5.2 is called the Workflow-Team Policy 
Definition. It is defined using the roles from the workflow definition, and is instantiated as 
the Workflow-Team Policy Instance when the workflow is instantiated. The new scheme 
retains the Role to User assignment from Figure 1.1, but extends it with the same concept 
for services. In the definitions of workflow and policy, the service type is given. When 
instantiated the service instances are recorded in the workflow instance, and specified in the 
fine-grained access control policy instance with user access. 
The Definition Components in Figure 5.2 are the static, structural descriptions of the 
workflow and policy. On enactment, they become Active Components. The workflow 
instance and policy instance capture the dynamic changes of time, recording the users in 
role instances and service instances. Chandramouli (2000) defines temporal business 
associations, that define fine-grained permissions for users, based on roles from process 
definitions. In the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture, there are temporal business assets 
created for consumption during the process of the workflow. The Workflow Instance and 
Workflow-Team Policy Instance capture the workflow context. This includes the state of 
 
    
Business 
Requirements 
Workflow 
Definition 
Workflow-
Team Policy 
Definition 
Workflow 
Instance 
Workflow-
Team Policy 
Instance 
creates instantiates 
links 1:1 links 1:1 
Definition Components Active Components 
Service 
Instance 
Service 
Type 
Role User 
contains contains 
binding 
assignment 
 
Figure 5.2 Business requirements creates workflow and access policy used in instances 
of workflow enactment 
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the workflow, the users assigned to the roles and the service instances created to execute the 
service types. 
Since a workflow management system has the ability to handle the data received from 
a service executed in the workflow, it is possible to pass the data to any user with access to 
the workflow. Regardless of the access control on a service, it is still essential for the 
workflow to ensure service results are presented only to the permitted user. 
5.3 Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
The collaborative workflow tested in the DAME demonstrator is refined by the analysis to 
form a general model for secure collaborative workflow, using teams of users and service 
instances. As discussed in section 2.7.3, grid security mechanisms, such as CAS & VOMS, 
can provide control for predetermined teams using static services and data in the VO. 
However, a workflow has a subset of users from the VO and includes service instances as 
temporal business assets created for the workflow. The proposed Workflow-Team Policy 
Architecture is used to control collaborative access to service instances from definitions of 
role-based workflows. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is designed to control the 
collaborative access to services without service providers implementing collaborative inter-
enterprise access control mechanisms. 
The workflow creates the context for the use of services; it is also the point of 
collaborative access to the services and service instances. Therefore, the workflow instance 
has an access policy, which is called the team policy. There is one team policy per workflow 
instance. It uses the template policy, which defines role permissions to access service types. 
The team policy linked to the workflow instance resolves user to role mapping and defines 
fine-grained access to service instances. 
The Workflow-Team policy is concerned with the authorisation of users’ access to 
workflow instances and the corresponding services instances that are managed and deployed 
by different organisations. One important fact is that the Workflow Instance is trusted, such 
that it guarantees to carry out team policy. Therefore, service instance access control only 
needs to validate the workflow context. The next section illustrates the components of the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
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Figure 5.3 Workflow-Team policy architecture 
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5.3.1 Architecture Description and Static Workflow-Team Classes 
Figure 5.3 shows the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture in its structural context, using 
analysis style syntax for UML class diagrams. This diagram shows the template definitions 
used to derive the active parts of the policy that are highlighted by the Dynamic Definition. 
The parts outside of the Dynamic Definition are considered static definitions because they 
are created from the slow changing business requirements. The Workflow Definition is made 
of Tasks that are linked by Transition Conditions, as in Aalst and Hee (2004 p.49). The 
classes in the static definition in Figure 5.3 are described below. 
5.3.1.1 Role Activation Rule 
When conditions are true, this rule in the business policy permits a User to assume the 
identity and permissions of a Role. For example, in DAME the rule is governed by the 
attributes a user is asserted by the employing organisation and that match a template of the 
Role requirements. There is also a list of organisations that can be permitted to use a Role. 
The organisation is another attribute of the user, asserted by the organisation. The 
organisation assertion is also checked that the organisation attribute matches the 
organisation providing the assertion. The Role activation rules are maintained in a business 
access control policy, because this applies across workflows. However, Role activation 
rules may be placed in the Workflow-Team Policy Definition if the rule is only ever applied 
to this workflow context. For example, if only one user can enact this role at a time in this 
type of workflow. Workflow specific controls over role usage in a workflow are contained 
in the Authorisation Rule. 
5.3.1.2 Role 
A template for users, a Role is usually constrained by the qualifications of users. Users are 
mapped to the roles that can enact in collaborative workflows, reducing the administration 
overhead of mapping users to permissions to enact workflows. In this architecture, the users 
are mapped to roles dynamically at the start of each workflow instantiation. The user to role 
mapping is validated against the Role activation rules and is recorded in the Workflow-Team 
Policy Instance. 
5.3.1.3 Authorisation Rule 
The Authorisation Rule provides conditions for the link between Roles and Tasks. For 
example, a user in the role Maintenance Engineer must belong to the organisation of the 
Maintenance Engineer that started the workflow. 
5.3.1.4 Task 
The Task is an activity in a Workflow Definition. The Task details a single service that 
executes and its parameters, as with Activities in BPMN (Object Management Group 
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(OMG) / Business Process Management Initiative (BPMI)) and in UML Activity Diagrams 
and <invoke> in BPEL (Andrews et al., 2003). Each task is linked to authorisation rules that 
map to the required role or roles that execute it and access it. 
5.3.1.5 Service Type 
The Service Type is a type of Task. Specifically it is a Grid Service type definition that 
creates service instances. The WSDL of the Grid Service is captured in the Workflow 
Definition document. Depending on the WSDL contents the service may be bound to a 
service implementation by providing the URL of the service factory that creates the service 
instances. 
5.3.1.6 Transition Condition 
This defines transition between each Task in a Workflow Definition. In the UML Activity 
Diagram it is the link between activities, this is a Flow, Fork or Join and can constraints of 
Condition, Decision or Merge. The transition types include Sequence, OR-split, AND-join 
(Aalst and Hee, 2004) from Petri-Net style definitions and relate directly to the Sequence 
and Gateway blocks in BPMN which include the Fork/Join and Inclusive Decision/Merge. 
When mapping to BPEL these notions become <sequence>, <flow>, <switch>, <while>, 
<pick> and <eventHandlers>. 
5.3.1.7 Workflow Definition 
The Workflow Definition is the document that captures the tasks, transition conditions, 
authorisation rules and roles. One entity exists for a workflow definition that is a static 
capture of a business process, such as a BPEL script. Each Workflow Definition entity links 
to one Workflow-Team Policy Definition. 
5.3.1.8 Workflow-Team Policy Definition 
This static description is linked one-to-one to a Workflow Definition. The document 
captures how Roles enact the Tasks by containing the Authorisation Rules for Roles to enact 
Tasks in the Workflow Definition. This is a template policy for the active dynamic 
workflow. It captures the rules by type, i.e. roles rather than users, that create the instance 
rules in the Workflow-Team Policy Instance. 
5.3.2 Dynamic Workflow-Team Classes 
When the workflow is enacted, the definition of the workflow is instantiated, becoming a 
Workflow Instance. The Workflow-Team Policy Definition becomes a Workflow-Team 
Policy Instance linked to the Workflow Instance. Tasks from the Workflow Definition that 
enact Service Types become Service Instances, and Roles that were permitted to access 
those Services via the Authorisation Rule are entered in the Workflow-Team Policy Instance 
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as Users, by their corresponding Instance Access Rule. In Figure 5.3, the Dynamic 
Definition is the architecture used in the enactment of the Workflow Instance. These types 
are defined in the following. 
5.3.2.1 User 
The User is a person whole can execute tasks in a workflow by enacting roles. As a 
minimum requirement the User has a name and may include additional attributes such as 
qualifications, experience and location. A User can be linked to many roles and can enact 
different roles at different times. The Role played by a User for a particular workflow is 
recorded in the Workflow-Team Policy Instance. 
5.3.2.2 Instance Access Rule 
The Instance Access Rule is derived from the Role Activation Rule and the Authorisation 
Rule. The Instance Access Rule defines which User can execute the Service Instance, stating 
the Role of the User and retaining constraints from the static rules. 
5.3.2.3 Service Instance 
A Service Instance is a stateful Grid Service instance created by a service factory. The 
Service Instance is of a type defined in the static Service Type derived from the Task in the 
Workflow Definition. 
5.3.2.4 Workflow Instance 
The Workflow Instance is the runtime state associated with the Workflow Definition. It 
records to progress of execution for a workflow, position in the sequence and acts as the 
document to contain information about the Service Instances. It replicates the static 
structure by linking one-to-one Workflow Definition to a Workflow-Team Policy Instance. 
5.3.2.5 Workflow-Team Policy Instance 
This is the policy instance created from the Workflow-Team Policy Definition. It is the 
dynamic document that contains the constraints on the executing Workflow Instance, 
providing fine-grained control as to Users permissions for actions on Service Instances. 
This dynamic policy architecture can be used across a VO, so long as VO partners 
trust the workflow engine. However, the architecture can be easily implemented to provide 
team based access control within a single organisation, and prevent unauthorised access 
within an organisation. 
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5.4 Design Assumptions 
The following lists the assumptions made on the supporting policies, business relationships 
and technologies used to complement the structure and behaviour of the Workflow-Team 
Policy Architecture. 
5.4.1 Commercial Policy Assumptions 
As mentioned in section 5.1.1 the business relationships form part of the structure for 
protecting information, services and the business processes. The following are assumptions 
derived from the DAME case study about the commercial relationships. 
1. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture must protect the business process definition 
and fine-grained instantiation from access by the consumers and service providers. 
Valuable business relationships could be revealed, and once the process is exposed 
consumers could go directly to providers. 
The business process definition and the names of service providers are likely to be 
discovered at some point. The next two points address this: 
2. A number of service providers and late-binding of services during the process can be 
used to select the service providers depending on cost or other quality of service metrics 
(such as speed, reliability). 
3. Constant innovation will be used to evolve services, improving delivered results and 
operating conditions, such as speed to result and dependability of service. Another 
target for innovation is improved efficiency, resulting in lower operating costs. 
Access control to the services is dependant on business relationships. The following are 
assumptions about the business relationships between the DAME stakeholders: 
4. The workflow engine is trusted to execute the access control policy. 
5. The definitions of access control and workflow understand the level of secure access 
that is required to protect the data returned by a service. This needs to be agreed as part 
of the service interface definition and implemented by the service provider. 
5.4.2 Technology Assumptions 
The following points relate to complementary technologies that support the Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture. 
6. An auditing system will record the actions of the workflow manager, to be stored by a 
third party. Access to the data is append only and only from the workflow management 
system. It will also include access control decisions (permit and deny) that are linked to 
execution of the workflow. 
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7. A policy decision engine such as PERMIS can be used to provide decisions on access 
determined by the workflow action (Task) and the Workflow-Team Policy Instance and 
linked policies. 
8. All communications that need to be secure are assumed to be secure by the use of 
appropriate encryption. 
9. User identity is asserted using X.509 certificates. The issue and management of 
certificates is the responsibility of the user’s employer, and a trusted certificate authority 
signs certificates, which could be the employer. 
10. The employer asserts user role attributes and the assertion could be an extension to the 
X.509 user certificate or retrieved via LDAP. The employer digitally signs the role 
assertions. 
11. Performance of the access control mechanism is improved by reducing the number of 
policy documents required to form a decision, therefore a single document is used for 
the workflow rules. 
5.4.3 Case Study Assumptions 
The following point relates to the DAME case study presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
12. The captured workflow includes all the interactions required to complete the business 
objective. It is likely that the workflow used is incomplete in the real business situation 
since the case study is speculative and cannot be tested in operation. 
5.5 Example policy system 
The example in Figure 5.4 illustrates a system using the Workflow-Team Policy 
Architecture. The example illustration is based on the established DAME case study, 
however the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is intended to apply to general 
collaborative workflow using service instances. 
A user connects to the Portal using a standard web browser and logs in using their 
identity and password. The Portal retrieves the user’s attributes, such as role and 
organisation, from an external location, such as the user’s organisation. This method is 
scalable by using Shibboleth (Cantor, 2004), where the user authenticates to their own 
organisation’s portal to retrieve SAML (OASIS, 2004) assertions about the user’s attributes. 
The login authentication can use more than ‘username and passphrase’. Further forms of 
identity authentication in combination with username and passphrase, are such as hardware 
key or fingerprint. 
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The Portal customises the users’ views according to the role and organisation. It 
presents the work available from the Workflow Management System (WFMS) by a 
connection that passes the user’s identity, role and organisation. The Portal displays status 
and results from available workflows. Stages in the workflow change the team membership 
or create new service instances, which are recorded in the Workflow-Team Policy Instance, 
by the Policy Controller. The Portal and WFMS form the collaborative environment. 
The users and service instances in a Workflow Instance are specified in the Workflow-
Team Policy Instance. Access to the Workflow Instance is controlled by its own Workflow-
Team Policy Instance, via the Policy Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point. This 
extends the architecture presented by Bertino et al. (1999) which also uses workflow 
instance policies, that are generated for the fine-grained user access control on rules that can 
only be determined at runtime. The Workflow Instance creates and controls Service 
Instances according to the Workflow Definition. The Policy Controller records the Service 
Instances in the Workflow-Team Policy Instance. The changes made by the Policy 
Controller are subject to the Workflow-Team Policy Definition, which defines the dynamic 
rules. Since, the user access has already been managed, it is not necessary to pass the user’s 
identity to the Service Instance. Instead, each Workflow Instance is given a unique identifier 
(automatically generated) that is digitally signed by the WMFS. The Service Instances and 
Compute Resources are contacted only by using this unique identifier. This presents 
advantages when considering a business model, such as DAME; some of which are: 
• Services and Resources do not need to understand collaborative access conditions; 
therefore, they do not need to interpret roles, organisations, or understand the context in 
which the users access the service/resource; 
• Services and Resources do not need collaborative access mechanisms, making it easier 
to create new services and bring in new service suppliers; this also supports ease of 
creating a loosely-coupled service architecture; 
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Figure 5.4 Workflow-Team implementation architecture 
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• Services and Resources do not need knowledge of every user in the system. In the 
DAME demonstrator, suppliers of processing services and compute resources are 
employed by the company operating the WFMS and not by the DAME customers, 
therefore services suppliers only need to deal with the workflow system, and rely on its 
mechanisms to control collaborative user access. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture from analysis on the 
DAME requirements and experience with the DAME project. The analysis addressed issues 
on VOs, linking business process definitions with access control rules for roles in teams and 
maintaining loose coupling in a distributed scalable architecture. 
The result illustrates the management of a Workflow-Team Policy Instance for each 
Workflow Instance that links control of collaborative access with the execution of the 
workflow in the workflow management system. The main advantages are: 
• No need for many remote Grid Services to retrieve user information from several 
sources; 
• The remote Grid Service do not need to implement collaborative security controls; 
• The management of policy components is restricted to one place; 
• The architectural model for policy usage relates to the business-to-business contractual 
arrangements for service provision in a VO. 
The next chapter described the implementation of secure workflow for the DAME 
demonstrator, which is used to test the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
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Chapter 6  
Secure Collaborative Workflow for DAME 
This chapter describes the experiment to test the concepts of the Workflow-Team 
Policy Architecture by implementing a secure collaborative workflow in the DAME 
demonstrator. As part of the DAME project, a collaborative demonstrator was implemented 
to investigate the use of Grid Computing for the business case of distributed aircraft engine 
diagnostics. The implementation described in this chapter provides the integration of the 
Grid Service provided by the academic project partners by using workflow management and 
access using a secure portal. 
The next section, 6.1, defines the objectives of the experiment. Section 6.2 describes 
the architecture of the workflow management system in the context of the DAME 
demonstrator. In section 6.2.1, the implementation and deployment of the workflow 
management system is described and related to the secure web-based portal and the 
deployed Grid Services. Section 6.2.4 lists how the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is 
implemented in demonstration environment. Finally in this chapter, section 6.2.5 lists the 
assumptions about the implementation system in representing the case study requirements 
and Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
6.1 Secure Collaborative Workflow Experiment 
The experiment demonstrates the VO and diagnostic workflow illustrated in Chapter 3. The 
experimental setup used a portal and workflow manager to control the execution of remote 
Grid Services. Its main purpose was to evaluate the method of dynamically controlling 
collaborative access to Grid Service instances. This demonstrated the constructs of the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
6.1.1 Demonstrator Process 
The experiment executes the business process from Figure 3.3 in section 3.4 DAME 
Workflow, by walking through paths represented in the DAME Use Cases (Fletcher, 2002). 
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The process simulates the arrival of new flight data that has been loaded into an engine data 
store and automates the launch of WF1 in Figure 3.4. The process uses real engine vibration 
data obtained from the Rolls-Royce engine test-bed. By choosing data known to cause a 
feature to be detected, the WF1 result was ‘Unknown Feature’. The portal is collaborative, 
supporting simultaneous users, in different roles from different organisations. The ME could 
view the results of WF1 and escalate the process to a MA assigned automatically. Since the 
workflow instance is attributed to a particular case, it would only appear on the worklist of 
the correct user assigned to the ME role. The escalated process would appear on the worklist 
of the assigned MA, who could view the results and services already associated with the 
case. The MA could execute new processes, as per WF2 in Figure 3.5, and escalate to a DE. 
The automatically assigned DE would access results and services permitted to them from 
the escalated case and run their own services from WF3, in Figure 3.6. 
The workflows use test data from Rolls-Royce, simulated case history for case-based 
reasoning services and the deployed engine model executed proprietary algorithms from 
Rolls-Royce engine modelling. The process was completed when the DE provided a 
diagnosis annotation about the cause of the detected feature and release the case to the MA. 
The DE no longer has access to the workflow. The MA can also provide annotation, and 
then must release the case to the ME. Again, this modifies the access policy and restricts the 
MA. The ME can then complete the case by releasing the engine for flight. All services 
instances and temporary data are destroyed. 
The test procedure was not limited to the one case. The chosen input data was varied 
to produce different results from WF1 and subsequently the escalation requirements were 
different (i.e. WF1 results was ‘Clear’ and no escalation was required). Different users in 
the ME role could run cases and the case would be escalated to different MA users, who 
escalate to different DE users. Members of the consortium were assigned different roles and 
different simulated organisations to test the team dynamics. The Grid Services were hosted 
and executed at different organisations. One service employed a Grid resource broker to 
dynamically assign and transfer the processing task to different Grid Computing machines. 
The test was repeated on several occasions, with different stages of implementation 
during the life of the DAME project. Changes occurred in services deployments, with 
changed location, functionality and service interface. Changes also occurred in the security 
used in the Portal and Workflow Management System, improving methods of login, by 
using myProxy server and grid X.509 certificates for all users and methods for defining 
policy templates, which define how, the dynamic team is controlled (subsequently known as 
the Workflow-Team Policy Definition). 
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6.1.2 Experiment Setup 
The secure collaborative workflow was tested in the DAME demonstrator. The 
demonstrator components consist of: 
• A web-based portal, with secure login, myProxy identity server and supporting 
databases; 
• Workflow management system; 
• Grid Services, running on GT3 (v3.02) middleware and provided by the project partners 
at the universities of Leeds, Oxford, Sheffield and York; 
• White Rose Grid compute servers and storage, running GT3 (v3.02) middleware, hosted 
by the Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York. 
The implementation of the demonstrator uses GT3 Grid Services, and GT2 resource 
management; as GT4 was only fully released in 2005, part way through this research. The 
analysis of the results in Chapter 7 includes a discussion relating the research to GT4 
implementations. 
The architecture of the demonstrator is shown later in this chapter in Figure 6.1, and 
the implementation architecture in Figure 6.2. Further implementation details are contained 
in Appendix A. 
6.1.3 Secure Collaborative Workflow Implementation Objectives 
The objectives of the implementation of the secure collaborative workflow is to demonstrate 
and evaluate the following: 
• Secure login of users from distributed locations and different organisations; 
• Secure access to stateful services and grid resources; 
• Role-based access control to commercially sensitive service and data, in particular the 
protection of competitors operating conditions; 
• Collaborative business process that executes the diagnosis process identified in the Use 
Case Analysis (Fletcher, 2002); 
• Dynamic use of grid resources, for dynamic process deployment across organisations; 
• Single sign-on, for automated authentication to services and grid resources without the 
user logging in to each service or resource on each access request; 
• Automation of collaborative team, to demonstrate users joining the team on escalation 
of diagnosis problem and leaving team on release of the problem; 
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• Automation of access control permissions for collaborative team members to access 
long running stateful services. 
Also under investigation are the following objectives: 
• Determine the point of collaboration, so that access control can clearly identify the user 
requesting access; 
These objectives have been used to focus the development of the workflow 
management system in the DAME demonstrator. The implementation has been developed 
along with the Workflow—Team Policy Architecture and used to prove the structure 
presented in Chapter 5. 
6.2 DAME Demonstrator 
The architecture for the DAME demonstrator is shown in Figure 6.1. The collaborative user 
accesses the distributed system using a web browser client, connecting to a web-based 
portal that executes on a White Rose Grid server at Leeds. The user logs into the portal 
matching the user’s grid certificate that is installed in the Role database. The Role database 
contains user information, such as user identity, role and organisation. It also contains the 
policy template. The Case database contains a record of the users involved in the workflow 
and the workflow identity. 
 
Figure 6.1 DAME demonstrator architecture 
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The portal connects to the workflow manager for users to launch, control and monitor 
workflows. The connection between the portal and workflow manager creates a session 
containing the user’s identity and role. The session exists whilst the user is logged into the 
portal, and can be used to update the user on workflow events. 
The workflow manager executes workflows, which in turn call GT3 based Grid 
Services. It was recognised that the workflow manager is the point of collaboration between 
different users, and the point where multiple services are called from different service 
providers. Using the users role and organisation information access to the services is control 
in the workflow manager and a single X.509 grid certificate, the workflow credential, is 
used to identify the workflow manager to the Grid Services.  
The Grid Services are deployed on White Rose Grid compute nodes. The Feature 
Detection is deployed as a GT3 service on the grid and dynamically uses any compute node 
on the White Rose Grid selected using a broker service. The Feature Detection executes grid 
jobs in GT 2.4, and requires an identity and account space on the machine to which the job 
is submitted. This is achieved using the grid extension to X.509 that allows delegation of 
rights. This means the Feature Detection service can use the identity provided by the 
workflow manager to access the White Rose Grid. 
The execution of workflow needs to be accessible by the distributed users. A web-
based solution was chosen for its capability to reach users within corporate networks 
without modifying firewalls. This assumes the use of standard web server ports7 and the 
organisation in the business case do not block the Integration Service Supplier’s web site. 
The analysis of the requirements captured for DAME, result in the first build and test 
phase of the project in the form of the DAME demonstrator, with the workflow 
management implemented as the integration point for the services to support engine 
diagnosis. 
                                                      
7 Web server ports are port 80 for standard unsecured traffic over http and port 443 for 
secured traffic over https. 
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6.2.1 Workflow Management System 
The implemented architecture for the DAME demonstrator is illustrated in Figure 6.2 as a 
concept class diagram. The diagram shows three packages Portal, Workflow and Grid. The 
Portal is the user’s interface to view and control the workflows that are executed in the 
Workflow package. The Workflow package provides service integration by executing the 
Grid Services in the Grid package. 
The internal architecture of the workflow package was based on the WfMC reference 
model, described in section 2.3. Further detail on the implementation architecture of the 
WFMS can be found in Appendix A. The key points of the workflow management system 
(WFMS) and the demonstrator architecture are summarised below. 
 
Figure 6.2 DAME implementation architecture 
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The user logs into DAME using a web browser with secure login, illustrated at the top 
of Figure 6.2. The portal uses Apache Struts (The Apache Jakarta Project, 2004b) to control 
user access by role. The Controller provides the Views and Actions based on the 
configuration for that user’s role. The flow of the portal actions is illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
On login, the portal displays a worklist of workflows available to the user that the portal 
retrieves from the workflow manager. Example worklists are shown in Figure 6.4. 
The portal connects to the workflow manager using a session for each user logged in. 
The session is a bidirectional connection that is made by using the identity, role and 
organisation of the user. The session exists whilst the user is logged into the portal. The 
portal is trusted to handle user authentication and provides the user’s grid certificate. The 
bidirectional connection is used to inform the user of workflow events, so a user can be 
notified on workflow events, relating to the observer and event8 patterns (Gamma et al., 
1995). The WFMS contains the worklists of workflow instances associated with the users. 
This means that workflow events can be sent to collaborating users assigned to a workflow 
instance. 
The workflow manager executes workflows, which in turn call GT3 based Grid 
Services. In GT3, a service factory creates a service instance and assigns it a unique URL 
                                                      
8 Observer and event patterns originated from the composite MVC (Model-View-
Controller) pattern in Smalltalk 
 
Figure 6.3 Apache Struts Architecture (JSP Model 2), from (The Apache Jakarta 
Project, 2004b) 
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for http communication. As mentioned in Chapter 2, workflow management systems 
execute workflow defined in scripting languages, such as BPEL. However, at the time of 
implementation, no existing workflow language had support for the dynamic URL 
assignment used by GT3 Grid Services. Another issue raised in section 2.7.2, is that BPEL 
and other workflow languages do not support any security mechanisms. Therefore, to 
demonstrate secure collaborative use of GT3 services, the workflows were modelled as 
sequences in UML and coded in Java. 
The Java code included the Grid Service client code generated from the WSDL for the 
services. Service discovery was a manual process. The generation of client code was also 
started manually by executing scripts to generate code stubs by retrieving remotely located 
WSDL. 
During development of the demonstrator, interface changes to services required 
regeneration of the client code, using the updated WSDL. Depending on the level of 
interface change, this could require changes in the workflow code, typically when data 
exchange formats changed. 
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By coding the workflows, the access to service results, initiation of service execution 
and event notification rules could be handled in the java class. Whilst not being very 
flexible, this allows the complete access control solution to be tested in the workflow 
manager. Some of the access control rules were duplicated in the configuration of the portal. 
Both WFMS and the portal access the Role database. The Role database contains user 
attributes such as user identity, role, organisation and the escalation route. The escalation 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Portal view - worklist view for ME and MA role 
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route details to which user the diagnostics workflow can be escalated, forming a template 
for the collaboration team. 
Even though the user is connected to the WFMS by passing in their identity, the 
execution of Grid Services uses the identity of the WFMS. This identity is a X.509 grid 
certificate that identifies the WFMS to the services. The WFMS identity is recognised as 
‘DAME’ and trusted by the services to provide adequate access control for the collaborating 
users. 
The portal could initiate the execution of workflow by proxy, without the user 
needing to login, because it contains the identities, roles and organisations of the users. This 
is to simulate a user launching the automated workflow WF1 by retrieving data from an 
engine on an aircraft that had just landed. The workflow is launched and attached to the 
worklist of the ME responsible for that engine at the airport. The workflows achieve single 
sign-on by using the workflow certificate, and the users’ worklists. Users can log on and off, 
creating and destroying session connections, to monitor and control the independently 
autonomous workflows. 
6.2.2 Portal 
The portal uses Apache Struts (The Apache Jakarta Project, 2004b), running on a Tomcat 
web server (The Apache Jakarta Project, 2004a). The Role database contains user 
information, such as user identity, role and organisation. It also contains the escalation path 
for users in the diagnostics workflow, a template of access control policy. The Case 
database contains a record of the users involved in the workflow and the workflow identity. 
The Case database also holds records of the access control policy instances, specifying the 
users involved in a workflow instance. 
The management of users’ identities uses the myProxy service that contains grid 
proxy certificates. The Tomcat web server contained an applet for users to install their grid 
proxy certificate. Once the grid proxy certificate is installed, the user logs into the portal by 
providing their username and passphrase that matches their proxy certificate, which is 
retrieved and used in the session connection to the WFMS. 
The portal connects to the workflow manager for users to launch, control and monitor 
workflows. The workflow manager is also executed in the same web server as the portal, 
but could be executed on a separate server. 
The Apache Struts portal uses an MVC pattern based architecture that is configured 
by ‘role’ to serve views and respond to controls. This reinforces the access control in the 
WFMS by allowing the users to only see the types of views and controls their role is 
permitted. The WFMS provides the fine-grained access control by ensuring that only 
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particular users can access services instances, and destroys service instances on destruction 
of the workflow instance. The example view in Figure 6.5 shows the tools the DE can view 
for a particular case, some buttons are greyed because the service is either unavailable at 
this point in the workflow, or the service is currently executing and results are not available. 
The same view can be seen by the ME and MA, however the range of tools is different, 
showing only those they are permitted to use. 
The portal can support multiple users, each with individual sessions connected to the 
WFMS. It can even support multiple logins from the same user, which would share the 
WFMS connection session. The MVC pattern in Apache Struts allows the users to get 
updated views on updates events from the WFMS. 
The original DAME specifications indicated that the roles ME to MA to DE are 
hierarchical with the MA inheriting the permission of the ME and DE inheriting 
permissions of the MA (and therefore the ME). On implementation, it was found not to be 
the case. The tools used by the ME and MA may not all be available to the DE. The DE is 
an expert in engine design and not directly part of the through-life delivery of engines, 
whereas, the MA is the business provider for the through-life support of aircraft engines. 
6.2.3 Deployment 
The DAME demonstrator deployment involved a collaborative VO. It involved services 
supplied from each of the four universities. The users that tested the portal were entered in 
 
Figure 6.5 Portal view - diagnosis tools  view Domain Expert 
Chapter 6 Secure Collaborative Workflow for DAME 
91 
the Role database and given simulated identities for the DAME business model. Since the 
business model involved many MEs, most users were given the ME role and each one on a 
different airline. Other users were given the MA role, with organisation DS&S, and less 
users were given the role DE at Rolls-Royce. 
The WFMS and portal were deployed on the White Rose Grid machine ‘chablis’. The 
Role database, the Case database and myProxy server were deployed on White Rose Grid 
machine ‘alba’. The Feature Detection GT3 service was also deployed on ‘alba’, with the 
XTO processing service dynamically deployable using GT2.4. The other GT3 services were 
deployed on the White Rose Grid compute nodes ‘maxima’, ‘snowdon’, ‘pascali’ and 
‘tatania’. 
The White Rose Grid machines create a heterogeneous system with two multi-
processor architectures: either Sun SPARC or Intel-based. The operating system on these 
machines is either Red Hat or SUSE Linux. Sun Grid Engine is used for queue management 
and Globus Toolkit 2.4 is used to manage the heterogeneous Grid Computing access to all 
machines. The Globus Toolkit 3 services are deployed in a GT3 container that connects to 
the installed GT2.4. 
The White Rose Grid is a consortium, but has separate administration domains at the 
three universities. Users wishing to access White Rose Grid machines can obtain a White 
Rose Grid X.509 grid certificate and apply for accounts on each machine they wish to use. 
Access to the grid machines used the DAME identity via the WFMS. This only required 
DAME to be recognised and mapped to a user account on each White Rose Grid machine. 
6.2.4 Implementation of Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
This section describes the relationship between the DAME Demonstrator and the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. The following table describe the implementation of 
the components from the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture: 
Table 6-1 Workflow-Team Policy Architecture Implementation 
Workflow-Team 
Component 
Implementation in DAME Demonstrator 
Role Activation Rule The activation rules are coded into the relationship in the Role 
database, relating the list of users to the roles. This is a limited 
implementation of the user to role mapping. Extensions would 
enable organisations to specify the user’s role and the rule 
would list organisations against roles and include attributes the 
user must have in order to enact that role. 
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Role The list of roles is in Roles database. A full specification would 
include role attributes, such as qualifications required. 
Authorisation Rule The activities a role can perform are captured in the rules in the 
Struts configuration. The Struts files link the roles to 
permissions in the MVC model relating directly to the 
workflow. The limitation of the implementation is that the 
rules are not be contained within the workflow document. 
However the XML configuration of Struts would allow the 
individual rules to be directly mapped between the Workflow 
Definition and the Struts configuration. 
Task The tasks are listed in the java coded workflow definition as 
service calls, from generated GT3 service clients. 
Service Type The service types are captured as GT service definitions, which 
is contained within the WSDL file and also implemented as the 
service client within the workflow manager. Extensions to the 
implementation would be to capture the service type as the 
type described in the WSDL, or semantic description of the 
function and parameters. Both extensions would require an 
activity within the workflow execution to locate and bind a 
service implementation, possibly generating service clients at 
bind time. 
Transition Condition The demonstration scenario required simple transitions 
between tasks. The sequence and decisions were encoded 
within the java workflow definition. The decisions were simple 
loops based on completion of the workflow as stated by the 
user. 
Workflow Definition The workflow definition captures the tasks and transition 
conditions by coding in a java class. The class reflects the 
workflow as captured in the UML activity diagram. Each 
coded workflow conforms to a defined interface in the 
workflow management system, so that workflows can be 
discovered by name and dynamically included in the system. 
Workflow-Team Policy 
Definition 
The policy definition is the collection of authorisation rules 
relating to the workflow. These are captured in the 
configuration of the struts portal, coded a rules in XML that 
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map role permissions to actions and viewable results for a 
workflow type. This includes checking attributes of the role, so 
that organisation of the Maintenance Engineer is validated 
against the organisation of the launching Maintenance 
Engineer. 
User The list of users and their attributes is contained in the Role 
database. The limitation is such that user information is 
contained centrally and not obtained externally. However, the 
implementation was structured such that user details were 
retrieved on workflow instantiation, simulating the effect of 
retrieving them remotely. The retrieval code could be simply 
replaced to access the relevant external information system. 
Instance Access Rule The rules that capture which users are operating on which 
workflows and in which role is captured in the Case database. 
This is a dynamic list of workflow, user, role and task for each 
task in the workflow. This is the main part of the dynamic 
definition of the Workflow-Team Policy Instance. 
Service Instance The GT3 service instance is created by remote service factory 
and exists on a remote server. The workflow instance retains 
the reference to the remote service instance via the create 
service client instance. 
Workflow Instance The Workflow Instance is created by the workflow manager, 
from the given workflow name. It creates a instance a java 
class by locating it using the given name and adds it to the 
worklist with a unique identifier. The Workflow Instance then 
autonomously executes the Workflow Definition, coded in 
java, passing information to and from the user via the 
workflow manager. 
Workflow-Team Policy 
Instance 
The Case database captures the attributes of the executing 
workflows. In addition to the Instance Access Rule, the 
database links to the Workflow Instance and list other 
attributes: the organisation of the Maintenance Engineer that 
launched the workflow, start time and details of the aircraft 
engine. 
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6.2.5 Implementation Assumptions 
The design of the DAME Demonstrator to test the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
required some assumptions about the implementation of complementary systems. The 
assumptions are listed in the following statements: 
1. The implementation of the workflow security is assumed to provide the correct access 
to users, with respect to their role, organisation and permitted level of participation as 
defined in the business process derived from the DAME Use Cases, as described in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
2. The use of GT3 Grid Services does not restrict the architecture to GT3 implementation. 
The Grid Service instances are created in a service factory. They are referenced using a 
unique URL. This reference provides access to the long running process that is 
maintaining its own state. This is much like accessing the workflow process containing 
state of the workflow. The general model of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
assumes that techniques other than a URL referencing the long running process can also 
be used by modifying the implementation, but not the architectural model. An example 
of a different reference would be WS-Addressing (W3C, 2004), using in GT4 that 
contains a reference in the SOAP envelope. 
3. Portal access uses X.509 certificates to identify users. In the implementation these are 
contained in a MySQL database accessed by the Portal. The assumption is that secure 
login to the portal would include providing X.509 identity and these would be managed 
and provided by external companies. This was considered outside of the design scope 
considering there are already techniques for identity management (Liberty Alliance 
Project, 2006, Yao, 2003, Becker, 2002, Mont et al., 2002). 
4. The case study has a requirement for a diagnosis result to be returned within the turn 
around time of the aircraft. The design of the workflow management system uses Grid 
Services. The implementation assumes that workflow processing uses available 
compute power to achieve adequate results in the time frame. In the DAME 
Demonstrator the Grid Broker, shown in Figure 6.1, fulfils this task. 
5. The implementation assumes that the security protocols in GT3 Grid Services provide 
sufficient protection against attacks such as snooping, man-in-the-middle or taking 
control. Since the implementation uses the security standards in the Globus distribution, 
when security protocols are updated then the system will inherit the new protocol. It is 
expected that changes in security standards would require little or no change to the 
Demonstrator implementation and would be require no change to the architecture. 
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6. The implementation assumes that access to sensitive data is via secure Grid Services 
and that the remote data is stored securely. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the DAME requirements have been used to define the requirement for secure 
collaborative workflow. The implementation of which has been integrated into the DAME 
demonstrator. This provides the integration of services into a diagnosis process, supplying 
part of the aircraft engine support application. It also creates the collaboration point in the 
distributed DAME architecture. This is a good candidate for secure control of access to the 
Grid Service instances temporarily created during the workflow execution. The 
implemented workflow management system uses fine-grained access control for users’ 
access to service instances in workflow instances based on template collaborations defined 
in the user identity attributes. 
The next chapter presents the evaluation of the demonstrator using the results of 
interviews with the industrial experts and the results of the DAME Dependability and 
Security Study (Fletcher et al., 2004b). The evaluation analyses the implemented workflow 
management system against the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture and compares it with 
recent developments in the field. 
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Chapter 7  
Analysis of Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
This chapter present the results from the qualitative evaluation of the DAME demonstrator. 
The primary results are from interviews with industrial experts, providing valuable feedback 
on the secure collaborative workflow concept and implementation. The industrial experts 
were used to provide opinion on the validity of the implementation and the business model 
in the case study. Other results have been obtained from feedback on DAME project 
meetings and conference presentations. Section 7.3 presents a comparison of the Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture with recent work in several areas, including workflow and 
business processing. In section 7.4 the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is compare with 
developments in access control, including Grid Computing middleware GT4. Section 7.5 
reviews the architecture of the solution. Section 7.5 discusses the limitations of the research 
and section 7.7 looks at the next steps in Future Work. 
7.1 Evaluation of Collaborative Workflow Security in the DAME 
Demonstrator 
Feedback about the DAME demonstrator was obtained during live demonstrations of the 
portal, showing multiple users collaborating of the diagnosis and engine data. The 
demonstrations were based on the identified use cases (Fletcher, 2002) and specifically they 
presented walkthroughs of the scenario presented in Chapter 3. To gain in-depth knowledge, 
an industrial representative from DS&S and one from Rolls-Royce were interviewed using a 
semi-structured interview. Full transcripts and a list of questions can be found in Appendix 
B. Further feedback was obtained by presenting the architectural models to the consortium 
partners during DAME project meetings and presentations at external conferences (Russell 
et al., 2004b, Russell et al., 2004a, Russell et al., 2005). Additionally, this analysis draws on 
the DAME Security and Dependability Study from DAME project partners (Fletcher et al., 
2004b). 
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7.1.1 Interview Process and Scope of the Evaluation 
The aim of the interviews is to assess the research into secure control of collaborative 
workflows, in the context of the DAME case study. This provides a concrete example of 
how the research has targeted a real problem. The interview candidates were representatives 
of the business concerns of the case study and the interviews were aimed at testing the 
following topic areas: 
• The validity of the DAME case study against real business objectives. 
• The implementation of the DAME Demonstrator against the case study.  
• The collaborative use of processing and the extent of the secure protection of the 
collaborative workflow and access to commercially sensitive information. 
The scope of the above topic areas was restricted using the following: 
• Collaborative use of workflows and grid processing tools in the diagnostics procedures. 
• Designation of users and roles in inter-organisation processes. 
• The protected access to competitors operating data using business processes. 
• Access control to data, workflows and services across organisational boundaries. 
• The architectural management of the link between workflow control and access control. 
• The architectural link between the secure collaborative workflow and the DAME 
business requirements. 
• Relevance of the demonstrator collaborative workflows to DAME business 
requirements. 
During the interview the interview candidates were guided as to whether the question 
applied to the case study as known at the start of the project, or if it should be compared 
against recent understanding of the DAME requirements with future business objectives in 
mind. The interview exercise also benefited from more exploratory questioning, where the 
interview candidate was free to provide extended answers. 
The industrial interviewees were chosen because they have broad experience of the 
business requirements for predictive maintenance service contracts and understand the 
technical challenges for employing SOA and Grid Computing across organisations. The 
interview was designed to gain the opinion of the experts by using open questions targeting 
the collaborative workflow concept implemented in the DAME demonstrator. 
The interview candidate from DS&S was Charlie Dibsdale, who has experience of the 
service supply business supporting Rolls-Royce products. DS&S support business for 
Rolls-Royce includes decision support systems and services for aircraft engines, marine 
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engines and gas turbines for power generation. Dibsdale’s interests lie particularly in the 
secure collaboration and control of decision support services, with the opportunity to use 
available compute power and storage via Grid Computing. 
The interview candidate from Rolls-Royce was Graham Hesketh, who is leading 
research groups in agent based software, and is experienced in supporting aircraft engine 
design, manufacture and through-life issues with IT based solutions. Hesketh’s interests in 
DAME are based on the diagnosis support of engine data, and maintaining the privacy of 
data, results and services employed by Rolls-Royce. 
The interview questionnaire addresses the collaborative workflow, the collaboration 
procedure, the DAME roles and the access control scheme. The questionnaire was first 
tested on DAME project members at Leeds that have been involved with the portal and 
business modelling. Based on the test answers the questionnaire was modified to clarify 
question wording and change the order to a more logical progression. The interview 
questionnaire and full results from both expert interviewees are in Appendix B. Quotations 
from Dibsdale are referenced from Appendix B.2. Quotations from Hesketh are referenced 
from Appendix B.3. 
7.2 Evaluation of Interview Results 
The interview results show that the DAME system successfully demonstrated the secure 
role-based collaborations and proves the feasibility of integrating grid-services from 
different organisations. The demonstrator was used as a proof of concept. It proved the 
feasibility of GT3 based grid-services in a pseudo environment of different service suppliers 
and compute resource suppliers, modelled using the White Rose Grid. 
The demonstrator captured the collaboration procedure in the business process 
definition, using the escalation task to add users and the release task to remove users, for the 
limited use cases investigated. However, future development of a DAME system needs to 
refine the business process and access control definitions. Dibsdale expressed that there are 
other similar opportunities for collaborative diagnosis with other types of operator, such as 
power generation. Hesketh expressed that the access control and workflow should not be to 
inhibit other collaborations that are acceptable to the business of solving problems: 
Not telling this fleet operator that somebody else’s fleet has a problem 
with its engines, they are simply providing a recommendation based on their 
own data. But it is an analysis which is inspired, if not the conclusions drawn 
from somebody else’s data … What we wouldn’t want to do is construct a 
system that would prevent that from happening (Hesketh). 
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The demonstrator was useful in illustrating that role alone is not enough to restrict 
access to the workflow. A user’s organisation attribute would be used to ensure that a user 
in a similar role in one Airline could not access data owned by other Airlines. This was 
reinforced in the Dependability and Security study (Fletcher et al., 2004b), but had not been 
identified in the original use case requirements (Fletcher, 2002). An example from Dibsdale 
states that at the Maintenance Analyst level, sharing diagnoses provides benefits to the 
customers (albeit a benefit to one customer gained from experiencing problems from 
another), which is typical in a diagnostics environment.  
The specific data relating to a specific operator would not be divulged to 
other operators, but it is going through the same people (Dibsdale). 
Therefore, a Maintenance Analyst can view data across airlines, but should not be 
able to divulge specifics to another airline. However, Dibsdale did illustrate ways of 
anonymising data by aggregation so that it can be shown to competing operators: 
However, there are ways and means of anonymising data, because a lot 
of operators are very interesting in bench marking themselves against the whole 
industry averages and therefore can plot their performance with some derived 
key performance indicators. Against the fleet average is a very powerful output 
that most operators are happy that their data contributes to and that they get a 
comparative view of their performance and others get the same (Dibsdale). 
Dibsdale went on to relate another example where access control by role is not 
enough and organisation needs to be taken into account. The example discusses that support 
operators at Rolls-Royce and DS&S enact the same role. Both roles can access costing data 
from Rolls-Royce. Users at DS&S are restricted to certain fields whereas Rolls-Royce 
employees can see all the data. 
Specific data privacy issues still remain in the DAME demonstrator, such as 
controlling the data returned from the services that can be seen by the airline MEs. The 
workflow and access control definitions assume the level of information disclosure returned 
from a service remains constant. Specifically, the case when deriving information from the 
combination of results from different services is difficult to address. Dibsdale stated: 
An intelligent user of the system could fire up a whole series of them 
[workflows] and reverse engineer who it came from. You have to be sure that 
the instances of the conglomerated results are not attributable to specific 
customers. It is going to be very interesting in the CBR [Case Based Reasoning] 
approach, (Dibsdale). 
Chapter 7 Analysis of Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
100 
Using dynamic resource allocation in Grid Computing for dynamic deployment of a 
service can create another issue of privacy. Schemes to protect algorithms and data in 
remotely deployed services are in a developing field (Yang and Xu, 2005), but essential for 
applications like DAME. Dibsdale expressed concerns of privacy when using brokered 
services across available grid resources: 
The other aspect is in general grid usage that the security model needs to 
be extended to actually protecting applications as they are running on external 
processing devices, not only the application but also the data, (Dibsdale). 
The portal and workflow manager have been demonstrated with user authentication 
using single sign-on across all organisations, which is required for integration of 
commercial services. DS&S have expressed that organisations are responsible for asserting 
username to role assignments. DAME would provide a template that details the 
requirements of a user to assert the role. The requirements would be similar to a job 
description that may include qualification levels and be passed as user attributes to validate 
the role assignment. 
Another point to arise from the evaluation was that this system provides the 
opportunity to separate the business critical workflow definition from the service 
implementation by using SOA and grid-services. Dibsdale expressed concerns about 
adapting the business process by managing changes to services and the level of services 
offered: 
“…you have to constantly re-invent the service level and adapt it to higher and 
higher levels as you are going along. Spotting those up sells and deciding to delegate 
some of those services down to a freebee is an art, a science in its own right”, 
(Dibsdale). 
Both Hesketh and Dibsdale stated that the business process and security environment 
must be adaptable to new users and services. From Hesketh, concerns were expressed about 
the accuracy of the role definitions; in particular, the hierarchy of roles defined early in the 
DAME project do not reflect access permissions: 
“The security environment must be adaptable to new users and services”, (Hesketh). 
These points reinforce the need to provide abstractions from users and service 
implementations by using roles and service definitions, which need to be managed along 
with managing changes in business processes (Smith and Fingar, 2003). 
The architecture of the DAME demonstrator received differing comments. Both 
Rolls-Royce and DS&S agreed that a centralised approach to managing the portal and 
workflow system meets the business requirements, in particular control of workflow 
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definitions and access policies. Airline user attributes would be provided by the airlines, 
such that assertions would state the users’ qualifications. These qualifications would 
establish that the user could fulfil a particular role. Dibsdale stated that the role would 
equate to a job description with qualification requirements. The Dependability and Security 
Study stated that the centralised workflow provenance records could cause issues of trust. 
Both Dibsdale and Hesketh stated that the workflow provenance records are valuable assets 
that can be used to improve the diagnostics business process. However, a trusted third party 
should hold the workflow records, accessible by the customer (the Airline) and management 
company (Fletcher and DAME Architecture Working Group, 2003). The workflow records 
system, called the Provenance System, was still under development at the time of the study 
and is outside the scope of this research. 
One comment on the architecture, from Dibsdale, conveyed that the workflow 
management system and workflow instances should be accessible by external components, 
for integration into other organisations’ processes. In the DAME demonstrator the 
workflows are accessible only via the user interface of the portal. In the demonstrator the 
workflow management system was executed in the same web container as the portal, using 
a simple applet connection to link the two. It would have been straightforward to expose the 
workflow manager to remote access. However, the implementation did not model 
requirements for authentication by external components. 
7.3 Comparison with Workflow and Business Processing Concepts 
Discussed in the high-level model for the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture in section 
5.2. The transformation of business process requirements into the Workflow Definition and 
Workflow-Team Policy Definition was similar to techniques linking business process 
definitions to workflow definitions and collaboration control are stated by Aalst and van 
Hee (2004:258) and Smith and Fingar (2003:250). Aalst and van Hee discuss mapping 
Petri-nets to workflow engines. They consider issues of how to map dynamic workflow 
allocation rules, including separation of function (separation of duty) and authorisation 
requirements. Smith and Fingar discuss using a pi-calculus based approach to flexible 
business process management, extending the early techniques of process modelling and re-
engineering by adding monitoring and continuous process improvement. Smith and Fingar 
present a tiered approach, shown in Figure 7.1. The business process executed in the 
automation tier creates a ‘Business Firewall’ to protect the internal assets of the company in 
the integration tier. The components in the automation tier control who can perform which 
functions in the business. Similar to the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture, this requires 
external access to services to be captured in the business logic and controlled by a workflow 
management system. 
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The works from Aalst and van Hee, and Smith and Fingar highlight the need to 
automate the generation of workflow and access policy definitions from business 
requirements. Bussler and Jablonski (1995) propose a user interface to create access policies 
from workflows. Chandramouli (2000) and Mendling et al. (2004) describe methods to 
derive access control policies from process descriptions. Smith and Fingar describe a 
Process Integration Environment for business process developers to specify the mapping of 
high-level business process modelling, deployment and management to workflows. None of 
the examples address collaborative access to temporal assets. They also do not cite any 
example methods for mapping business requirement to workflow. In practice, this is current 
research that requires rules to link the business process domain; collaborative workflow 
integration and service oriented computing. Such mapping rules would be best supported by 
semantic ontologies with inference processing rules to automate mapping and validation 
between domains (Shadbolt et al., 2006, Beco et al., 2005, Chen-Burger et al., 2004). 
The concept of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture has been based on secure 
sharing of stateful service instances deployed in GT3. The more recent development of GT4 
changed from the stateful service model to the Web Services Resource Framework 
(WS-RF). The concept describes state as a property of the resource that is exposed by a 
Web Service interface. The main impact on the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is that 
all stateful services created from a deployed service factory in WS-RF use the same URL, 
unlike in GT3 where each Grid Service instance has a unique URL. This change means GT4 
services can be integrated using the workflow language BPEL. The ‘instance’ resource is 
now located using WS-Addressing. Therefore the addressing mechanism is the only change 
and the instance would be recorded in the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture as a shared 
temporal business asset. 
 
Figure 7.1 3-tier, BPMS architecture (Simplified), (Smith and Fingar, 2003) 
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One of the original concepts for using Grid Computing in the DAME scenario 
described a requirement for VO support for delegation of rights to execute processes across 
grid compute resources. The DAME business process shows that when the ME from the 
airline launches the diagnosis process a service can operate on the user’s behalf but the user 
does not have permission to view the output result, because it may reveal sensitive data. 
Another example is revealed in the interview with Dibsdale is when benchmarking data is 
released to the airlines. This is obtained by aggregating data across all fleet operators but 
without exposing a particular operators data. An additional workflow would allow airlines 
to access the results of an aggregation process but not see any intermediate data. This 
highlights the need to protect access to a service instance within workflows, supporting the 
‘business firewall’ model proposed by Smith and Fingar and is also highlighted in grid 
security models by Norman (2006). 
7.3.1 Comparison with Workflow Management Systems 
The following table is a list of features used in workflow management systems and indicates 
which features are implemented in major commercial and research-based workflow 
management systems. As can be seen, some service based workflow systems, such as Triana 
and MyGrid Taverna did not implement security in the workflow engines. The most 
complete is the commercial package from IBM Websphere that includes many add-on tools 
for modelling and monitoring. However the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is the only 
system to provide dynamic collaborative access control, which is essential in offering 
service integration in a competitive global market. 
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Table 7-1 Comparison of Workflow Management Implementations 
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7.4 Comparison with Access Control Developments and standards 
This section compares the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture with areas of authentication, 
authorisation, specific development for security in GT4 and methods for delegation of 
rights. Comparisons are made to complementary systems that could be used in the 
implementation of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. These complementary systems 
include the Akenti policy decision engine (Thompson, 2003), the PERMIS policy decision 
engine (Modular PERMIS Project, 2006) and the Shibboleth identity service (Internet2, 
2006). 
7.4.1 Authentication 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture uses X.509 certificates for identity assertions, for 
users and services, but could be implemented independent of the authentication format. The 
Akenti system is limited to using X.509 for identity. However, the PERMIS policy engine is 
identity format agnostic and relies on the application to validate identity, such as verifying 
the Certificate Authority (CA) signature in X.509. Shibboleth can be used to issue identity 
assertions and uses SAML to provide the identity assertions in different formats including 
X.509 and can include attributes attached to the identity. In Shibboleth, the release of user 
attributes and identity can be controlled by the context of the request to improve privacy of 
a user’s identity and attributes. 
Shibboleth could support the assertions for identity of users connecting to a workflow 
management system executing the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture (as illustrated in 
Figure 5.4). Specifically in the DAME example, the assertions for user identities requires 
the additional attributes of the user’s organisation and role identity, which in turn requires 
assertion that the user conforms to the required qualifications. The issuer of the user’s 
identity (the user’s employer) could assert the role on trust, alternatively, the issuer could be 
required to provide assertions of the qualifications along with the role assertion. The policy 
decision point would assess the claim for the user’s role based on a policy that states 
required qualifications and a list of organisations that can claim that role. 
Authentication across a large VO can cause concerns of privacy, as shown in the 
DAME example. Shibboleth offers methods of anonymity in the use of remote resources. 
The method of authenticating with a trusted external server could issue the user with an 
anonymous assertion about their attributes. This has been developed so that universities can 
issue assertion that a user is a member of the university and is permitted to use the remote 
resource, without the resource owner needing to know who the person is. The trust model in 
this scenario works in the commercial sector, since the use of a resource would involve 
some cost to the asserting organisation. However, as with the DAME scenario, there are 
requirements for non-repudiation of a user’s actions. 
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Shibboleth can provide another method of authentication to provide traceability of 
anonymous actions. The user is issued with a pseudononymous identity. This would be a 
randomly generated unique identity that is recorded by the issuer, but the name in the 
identity has no value to an external organisation. Except that the external organisation can 
record the actions that can be traceable to a person if needed. In DAME, the organisation 
and role is probably the most important identifier, rather than user identity. The privacy 
requirements for DAME would need to be explored further to consider future work on 
identity management. 
7.4.2 Authorisation 
In RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2003a) the role assignment is considered temporal by using a 
session to control the user to role assignment. The role assignment tends to be linked to a 
higher-level agreement, such as job specification and therefore employment. TBAC 
concentrates on using RBAC in secure workflow management to create just-in-time 
permissions, thereby reducing vulnerabilities. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
addresses further to these by managing dynamic policies for a workflow. This is runtime 
management of changes as users acting in roles join or leave the workflow and their 
permissions to the assets that are created or destroyed during the workflow. 
By moving the policy decision to the collaborative point of access (the workflow), 
services need not authenticate individual users. The service only needs to authenticate the 
identity of the workflow engine. The DAME demonstrator illustrates this point by showing 
where the users’ identities are interpreted, and then the workflow accesses the services with 
its own certificate. 
It would be possible to use Akenti or PERMIS in the Workflow-Team Policy 
Architecture to interpret the dynamic policies, by configuring them to retrieve the policies 
on each request and provide policy decisions based on attributes. The proposed solution 
would need to manage the dynamic policies to record role assignments, service instances as 
temporal assets and create subject-action-object predicates according to the workflow 
constraints. 
7.4.3 GT4 Grid Security Infrastructure 
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Developments of new grid technologies that occurred during this research included the 
release of GT4. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) in GT4, illustrated in, Figure 7.2 
contains the following areas: 
• Communication security, using transport-level and message-level security. Transport-
level security is proprietary to Globus Toolkits and is to be deprecated. Whereas, 
message-level security complies with WS-SecureConversation (Della-Libera et al., 
2002) of secure message exchange; 
• Authentication, using X.509 certificate or username and password; 
• Delegation, which supports single-sign on by using X.509 proxy certificate, when 
authenticating with X.509 certificates. This conforms to WS-Trust; 
• Authorisation uses either SAML authorisation assertions from an external policy 
decision engine such as CAS or the GSI uses the GT3 model of grid-map file, which 
maps user identities to local user accounts, and inherits the user’s rights on that 
resource. 
Additional methods of authentication and authorisation not part of the GT4 
distribution can be included in a customised installation. Code hooks that allow security 
extensions have been placed in the Grid Service container. The container is the host 
environment for Grid Services. However, this would make authorisation mechanisms non-
standard and a possible barrier to integration of external service providers. External service 
providers would be required to implement a security mechanism unique to the customer’s 
requirement, a barrier to reselling a service. However, the security requirement could also 
 
Figure 7.2 Overview of the GT4 Grid Security Infrastructure, (The Globus Security 
Team, 2005) 
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be a business enabler by defining a standard for suppliers, stated by Dibsdale (Appendix 
B.2). 
7.4.4 Delegation 
This section briefly considers the work in PERMIS on delegation. The development of 
PERMIS policies definition and management has included a method for specifying a 
delegation policy for the Delegation Issuing Service (Chadwick, 2005). The policy defines 
the delegation permissions a user has in order to delegate their rights to another user, 
specifying which actions on objects can be delegated to which users. The policy can be 
written with coarse-grained constraints, so that users and objects can be defined by 
attributes, such as role for a user or type for an object. For example, using the DAME 
diagnostics process, the role ME can delegate the right to read the results of WF1 to the 
MA. The delegation of rights must be fine-grained, specifying users, actions and objects. 
The delegated rights can be constrained by properties such as a time period. 
The delegation policy performs a similar function to the Workflow-Team Policy 
Definition. However, examples of the Delegation Issuing Service in operation show manual 
methods of delegation, by using a browser interface to demonstrate temporarily granting 
access to documents in a structured VO (such as pre-defined roles, permissions, object 
types). The DAME scenario requires the changes in access permission to automatically 
update on changes in the team membership, including users and service instances. 
Therefore, the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is designed to automate dynamic 
changes in fine-grained permissions and would be complementary to provide contextual 
process control of PERMIS delegation rules. 
7.5 Policy Architecture Considerations 
One of the targets for the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is scalability across many 
users, many service providers and many concurrent collaborations. Part of the solution 
addressed the architecture of policy distribution. VO policy solutions implement a 
distributed policy architecture that interprets multiple policies on each resource access. 
Some issues when using multiple policies in access decisions are: 
• Communications overhead (taking time and bandwidth) when reading policies from 
multiple locations on every service request, to ensure that interpretation is up-to-date 
and includes changes and the evaluation of temporal rules; 
• Out-of-date decisions may be caused by caching policies to speed decision making by 
avoiding communication overheads; 
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• Trust relationships have to be established between every consumer and supplier in a 
truly vertical VO, if user credentials are used to authorise access to services; 
• Privacy of permitted actions, or resources in use may be compromised in common 
access to VO policies, a concern in DAME since it may reveal process information and 
operating procedures; 
• A remote policy that is included in a VO policy decision may be capable of hijacking 
the decision and denying particular users or organisations (Chadwick and Otenko, 
2003). 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture addresses this by separating the end user 
from the service supplier, with the WFMS hosted by the integration organisation controlling 
access with a single policy. Services are free to restrict access with their own policy, but the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture reduces the requirement to access multiple policies at 
the point of service access. 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture requires the management of dynamic access 
rules. PERMIS uses distributed management of attributes and roles, but requires tools to 
manage distributed access conditions. Akenti does support distributed policies where each 
stakeholder can manage its own dynamic policies. However Akenti does not control who 
can state which constraints, therefore any one of the stakeholders can deny permission to 
others. 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture integrates access control and workflow 
management, but retains the separation of concerns of the two mechanisms. Periorellis et al. 
(2006) proposes a coordination layer distributed in the middleware to control access and 
police electronic contracts, combing access constraints, quality of service requirements and 
task-context. This provides a coordination layer on service access that also records a non-
repudiable log of activities across a VO. However, it does not state how the peer-to-peer 
style contracts are managed for dynamic fine-grained access control, and how privacy of 
actions can be protected in a commercially sensitive environment. 
7.5.1 Experience 
During the building and testing of the demonstrator, the workflow management system 
integrated different services developed by the different partners. During this time, 
differences in deployment platforms had to be taken into account in the development of the 
workflows. Despite the use of common middleware, some components were not common 
on all platforms. The effect of these differences caused complications in the building the 
workflow management system to cope with different standards of interface. 
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The use of collaborative access control policies at each deployment platform would 
cause further compatibility issues. If the business model uses loose coupling of services, 
each service provider would need to implement the collaborative policies and dynamic 
policy management control interfaces. This would reduce the overall flexibility to 
incorporate any service provider. However, Dibsdale remarked that requirements such as 
security implementations could be part of qualifying standards for services to be DAME 
providers. 
7.6 Limitations of approach 
One of the risks in this research is that the DAME scenario is limited in producing and 
evaluating a generalised solution. There are significant parallels in access control 
requirements in collaborative use of distributed systems with other publications this work 
has been compared to, despite the use of different domains and scenarios. Similar scenarios 
in collaborative processing have used the medical domain (Chandramouli, 2001); others 
have used typical business processes such as purchasing (Papazoglou and Dubray, 2004), or 
academic processes such as student admissions (Liu and Chen, 2004). The Workflow-Team 
Policy Architecture could be applied to these other domains, in particular the collaborative 
problem solving in the medical domain. 
The workflow model used in the research is limited to the example diagnostic 
collaboration from DAME. This provides a rich example of cross-organisational use of user 
expertise, with automated decision support, use of sensitive data across organisations and a 
requirement for Grid Computing. It does however only show a limited view of workflow 
problems. The workflow scenario is relatively simple and exercises few of the workflow 
control patterns (Aalst, 2006). An interesting extension to the access control requirements 
for collaboration would be to incorporate conflict of interest, separation of duty and role 
hierarchy, such as reported in Ferraiolo et al. (2003b). 
This research in this thesis addresses the case for centralised management of 
workflows and access control. It has been shown that the business model supports the 
control at the point of integration, however there is work on modelling and validating 
decentralised coordination and mediation in workflows (Wombacher et al., 2005) and VOs 
(Periorellis et al., 2006). 
Integration of workflow in the portal did not explore all complexities in providing 
access to external components. Such as, methods of authentication, and subsequently 
authorisation by this type of access were not explored. However, the connection point 
should be the same as the portal session-based connection, providing the identity of the user 
and their role (and qualifications to authenticate role assert). This would define the access 
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control in terms of the ‘business firewall’ discussed in section 7.3, from Smith and Fingar 
(2003). 
Since the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture has concentrated on automation of 
permissions based on workflows, it requires that all activity take place within workflows. 
Whilst this is a requirement for most business procedures, it does constrain collaborations to 
fixed or semi-fixed types. As stated by Hesketh, the access control mechanisms should not 
constrain collaborations that would benefit the business. The Workflow-Team Policy 
Architecture does not support ad-hoc workflows, since they would not link to a Workflow-
Team Policy Definition. A general access control policy could be used to enforce access in 
ad-hoc workflows. 
Another limitation of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture that it does not manage 
services instances after the workflow finishes. The architecture assumes that workflows 
have been defined so as not to leave hanging instances or that a clean-up mechanism is 
implemented to ensure remote service instances are destroyed at the end of the workflow. In 
support of ad-hoc workflows, it would be necessary to extend the architecture to the control 
of access to Grid Service instances beyond the lifetime of the workflow in further 
collaborations. Methods to achieve this would require extracts from the policy that define 
access for a particular service and can be attached to that service. This is similar to methods 
of flow control discussed in a later point. 
A limitation on the technology meant the experiment uses GT3. This is the result of 
the required collaboration between the DAME project partners and the need to use a 
common grid platform running on the White Rose Grid. Current grid technology from the 
Globus Alliance is GT4. The differences between the two versions has been described 
(Harmer and McCabe, 2005, Silva, 2005, Harmer et al., 2005). Required changes for the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture to use GT4 appear to be minimal. The interface 
protocol for the management of Grid Service instance has changed, however the concepts 
have not. Therefore, the impact is likely to be mostly syntactical changes to the 
implementation and would not affect the proposed architecture. 
In this work, it has been assumed that all access to information and services are 
performed using a web-based portal, and that data retrieval is ‘eyes only’. In practice, the 
web output may be printed, or subsequent implementations may allow the user to save 
results or raw data to a remote system. Access control to confidential data outside the side 
boundary would require complex techniques such as flow control. Flow control tracks and 
regulates the dissemination of sensitive data, and thus guarantees only authorised 
information flow (Denning, 1976). 
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Access controls are insufficient to regulate the propagation of 
information after it has been released for processing by a program. Similarly, 
cryptography provides strong confidentiality guarantees in open, possibly 
hostile environments like the Internet, but it is prohibitively expensive to 
perform nontrivial computations with encrypted data. Neither access control 
nor encryption provides complete solutions for protecting confidentiality. 
(Zdancewic, 2004) 
This work considered access control within the boundary of the business system by 
ensuring data could only be viewed from recognised applications, identified using the 
authentication mechanisms with the Workflow-Team Architecture. 
7.7 Future Work 
This section discusses some areas in which further research would improve the Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture contribution. 
One area of research, highlighted as incomplete is the automated generation of 
workflow and access policy definitions from business process requirements. This would 
extend pervious work (Mendling et al., 2004, Chandramouli, 2000) and assist in agile 
business process management (Smith and Fingar, 2003). The third wave of business process 
management (Smith and Fingar, 2003) introduces agile methods of running business 
processes by ensuring the integration of process definition, monitoring and change control. 
In the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture this would require automatically reflecting 
changes to the Workflow Definition in the Workflow-Team Policy Definition. 
An issue raised in the interview with Dibsdale related to the changing level of service 
delivery. Different levels of service delivery (and cost) provide different levels of 
performance from the services. Dibsdale suggested coarse levels for the marketing of 
services, such as gold, silver and bronze. These quality of service levels can include time to 
produce a result, accuracy of results and functionality. As new services are developed these 
are charged at the premium level and the previous premium service may be demoted to the 
standard package. As stated changes in the service used in workflows need to be reflected in 
the access policies. However, appropriate descriptions of services may provide another 
solution. 
New description methods could lead to further work in workflow descriptions. Using 
abstract descriptions of services, loose coupling between service implementations and 
workflow definitions can be maintained. If services are described using abstract descriptions 
of functionality and quality of service levels, this can reduce the cost of maintenance due to 
service evolution and lifecycles. If a workflow is defined as the premium ‘gold’ level, then 
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premium level services can be assigned to ‘gold’ as an attribute in its description. When this 
is replaced by better functioning services, it loses the gold status and may be automatically 
offered in the lower level workflows. Loose coupling between workflow definition and 
service implementation is achieved. However, research is required to understand appropriate 
descriptions of quality of service and to define methods to monitor that the required level 
has been fulfilled. 
An alternative method of describing services in workflows would be to discover 
service implementations by semantic definition. Semantic descriptions of the requirements 
of a workflow could be used to locate the services at runtime. The semantic description 
could specify the types of data to be processed and the type of process, along with quality of 
service requirements, such as processing time, accuracy and security. Semantic services is 
currently an expanding area, as can be seen in the activities on the Semantic Web (Shadbolt 
et al., 2006) and the Semantic Grid (The Semantic Grid, 2003). 
The Delegation Issuing Service (Chadwick, 2005) from PERMIS is a possible target 
for future work to the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. An investigation would be 
required into automating the delegation process and how to automatically include new 
service instances into fine-grained access. The investigation would need to include how to 
link the delegation policy to the workflow definition and how to restrict delegations based 
on the workflow context. 
The Delegation Issuing Service could also be used to expand on the limitation that the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture does not support ad-hoc workflows. The PERMIS 
decision engine could use the Workflow-Team Policy Instance and combine it with a 
general access control policy, the definition of which could support delegation of rights. An 
interesting exercise would be to see if the Delegation Issuing Services could be used to 
automate permissions in ad-hoc collaborations, sharing temporal business assets, such as 
long-running Grid Service instances. 
Ongoing work to support secure collaborative workflow for aircraft engine 
diagnostics will continue in the DAME follow-on project BROADEN (Business Resource 
Optimisation for After market and Design On Engineering Networks) (ComputingLeeds, 
2005). 
7.7.1 Extensions using complementary approaches 
The identity management in this work could benefit from a restricted release policy on 
attributes during workflow. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture uses a role template, 
where a user must conform to all the requirements to have permission to enact the role. This 
typically includes their level of qualification. If certain tasks require only partial 
conformance to the role template and an identity management system contained all of a 
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users attributes then a policy decision could be made by retrieving only relevant attributes. 
Koshutanski and Massacci describe this method as the abduction of credentials (2003). This 
is mainly designed for “mobile” processes that execute across different workflow engines. 
However, the DAME example could benefit from this by having a more flexible approach 
to attribute management and the requirement of not revealing the details of the process, due 
to the process definition being a valuable asset to the service integration organisation 
(DS&S). 
If the Workflow Management System were refactored and redeployed in the DAME 
demonstrator it would be an opportunity to incorporate standards that have been defined 
during the building of the original demonstrator. These standards would be: 
• BPEL, for the definition of the workflow. To use this would require all the DAME 
services to be re-implemented using GT4. 
• SAML, for identity assertions from remote systems to connect to the workflow 
management system. The connections would be either from the portal, or from an 
interface application run by an external organisation. 
• XACML, for the definition of policies, although this would need to be compared with 
the capabilities of using PERMIS policies. 
As shown in the previous section, the Workflow-Team policy can be applied to the 
DAME demonstrator. In order to satisfy the refined objectives, the next stage of work 
involves an implementation to modify the DAME Portal and Workflow Management 
System to use the Workflow-Team policy. This also presents the opportunity to utilise some 
of the rising standards along side the dynamic policy, such as: 
• Replacing Globus Toolkit 3 with Globus Toolkit 4 and therefore use the resource model 
in WS-RF (OASIS, 2005) instead of grid-services; 
• By using WS-RF resource model: 
• Service Instance references in the Workflow-Team policy become WS-Addresses 
(W3C, 2004), which is a change in format but not concept; 
• BPEL, which wasn’t suitable to integrate GT3 services, can be used to establish 
Workflow Definitions. 
An initial feasibility study into moving from Globus Toolkit 3 to 4 reveals this to be a 
logical progression, with minimal architectural changes. 
The re-implementation provides the opportunity to investigate distributed identity and 
user attribute management by using Shibboleth, with SAML assertions. Shibboleth supports 
the distributed authentication of users required to make DAME scalable across many 
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customers. SAML assertions are passed from the authenticating organisation stating the 
users ID, the roles they can assume in DAME and the organisation they belong to. An 
additional policy would validate that the organisation can assign users that role, it would 
also be used to add attributes such as the level of service that organisation has paid for. This 
policy could be expressed using XACML (OASIS, 2003). 
In the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture SAML could be used to communicate 
user attributes. In the WFMS the policies could be expressed in XACML. Communication 
of access requests and decision responses could use either SAML or XACML. This cross 
over of the technology standards is subject to further investigation. Also, when 
implementing the architecture using policies expressed XACML it would be possible to 
evaluate the use of Akenti or PERMIS policy decision engines and how they manage 
dynamic policies. Another point of interest would be to compare how the team constraints 
are dynamically recorded in Workflow-Team Policy Instance with the management of static 
and dynamic constraints at runtime, as in Bertino et al. (1999). 
Another important component of the system is the management of workflow 
definitions and the generation of the Workflow-Team Policy Definitions. This is a 
requirement to support changes in the business requirements, and subsequent changes in 
workflows and roles. One approach would be to extend the work in Mendling et al. (2004) 
to automate the production of XACML role based policies from BPEL workflow 
definitions. Like Mendling et al., this could be performed using a XLST script to transform 
from BPEL to XACML, mapping from the activities assigned Partner and PartnerRole in 
BPEL to service activation constraints for roles in the Workflow-Team Policy Definition. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter presents the results of qualitative evaluation of the Workflow-Team 
Policy Architecture and the implemented DAME demonstrator. The interview results of the 
industrial experts are presented in section 7.1, which provides useful feedback on how the 
business model corresponds to the VO model in the DAME implementation and how the 
implemented method for controlling dynamic access control for teams matches the business 
requirements for DAME. Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 compare recent developments of similar 
and complementary work against the proposed Workflow-Team Policy Architecture and the 
implemented demonstrator. Section 7.3 addresses work in workflow and business 
processing. Section 7.4 addresses the access control areas of identity management across 
organisation, other authorisation system, the security infrastructure in GT4 and the 
Delegation Issuing Service for PERMIS. In section 7.5, considers aspects of scalability and 
dynamic control in the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. Section 7.6 discusses the 
limitations of the research, providing a critique of the scenario based approach and the 
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proposed solution. Finally, section 7.7 proposes how continuing research can extend the 
work presented here. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions 
The content of this thesis is summarised in this final chapter. Section 8.1 provides a 
summary and conclusions of the main findings. In section 8.2, the salient points of the thesis 
chapters are presented. Section 8.3 lists the contributions of the research, conveying the 
implications to business processing and e-Science. 
8.1 Main Conclusions 
This thesis has presented the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture as a solution to address 
the problem of providing secure collaborative workflow across different organisations. In 
pursuit of this solution, the research combines the topic areas of collaborative workflow and 
business processing, Grid Computing, service-oriented architecture and role-based access 
control. 
8.1.1 Summary of Workflow-Team Policy Architecture 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture has been derived from analysis of previous related 
work and the requirements from the motivating business scenario from the DAME project. 
The example scenario shows teams of users in a collaborative workflow sharing Grid 
Service instances, which make use of commercially sensitive services and data. The security 
requirements illustrate the need for fine-grained access control for the collaborative team. 
The team is defined as the users, Grid Service instances and data that exist for the duration 
of the workflow. 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture allows users to share temporary instances in 
secure collaborations within Virtual Organisations. This cannot be achieved in standard 
approaches to access control. Many variants of access control lists and security policies 
provide the ability to specify a number of users access to the same asset. The asset may be a 
service, data file or record in a database. Roles in RBAC allow users to be changed without 
affecting policy definition and access control rules can be defined in terms of business rules. 
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Previous work has identified conditions where RBAC is insufficient in defining access 
rules, requiring addition attributes such as context, or membership to a team. This thesis 
identified that role-based business processes can be used across organisational boundaries, 
and derived access control from such processes require extension to protect access by 
competing organisations. 
The architecture describes the static components of the architecture that are linked to 
the business rules. The static components are the workflow definition, the policy definition, 
the roles and associated rules for users to enact roles and execute tasks in the workflow. 
The architectural description shows the dynamic components of the architecture that 
have temporal existence during the lifetime of the workflow instance. The dynamic 
components are the instances of workflow, dynamic policy and service instances. Using the 
static definitions the dynamic parts are controlled by the workflow engine. The dynamic 
policy contains the temporal rules for team members to collaboratively access the temporal 
assets. 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture uses a centralised policy instance to 
dynamically manage and control access to the temporal grid services created and shared by 
users from different organisations during the workflow. This is created and controlled from 
the Workflow-Team Policy Definition which contains the static rules. The policy definition 
is linked to a workflow definition. The executing workflow is dynamically managed in the 
workflow engine using a Workflow Instance, which is linked to and manages the Policy 
Instance. This linkage is described in section 5.3. 
The architectural solution uses a centralised policy instead of a distributed on to 
reflect the business concerns of revealing valuable process information. Such information 
could be used by competitors to discover operating practice, and customer-supplier 
relationships. A distributed policy across the members of the VO was rejected since it opens 
visibility of the complete supply chain. A VO policy for fine-grained access control would 
reveal end customers and end suppliers. For DS&S, the most valuable parts of their business 
are the process information, customer confidentiality and protection of operating conditions. 
In the DAME case study, the workflow management system is the point of collaboration 
between users and the point of integration of grid services. Therefore, the Workflow-Team 
Policy Architecture is designed to control multiple users access to long running grid 
services with the framework of a workflow management system. 
This research has extended previous work on access control and role-based business 
processing by defining an architectural approach to controlling dynamic policies for teams 
of users to share temporal assets created and consumed within a workflow. The Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture responds to the business requirement of DS&S to protect 
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customer data. The research illustrates some of the issues with cross-organisational 
collaborations and methods to share competitive services and data without exposing 
valuable operating conditions. 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture has been evaluated, in the DAME project 
demonstrator, by implementing a role-based portal and workflow management system 
controlling GT3-based Grid Services instances across the White Rose Grid. The analysis of 
the architecture has illustrated that the architecture can be independent of implementation 
technology and is capable of managing dynamic access control to GT4 services. 
8.1.2 Summary of Limitations 
The business model in the case study was limited to protecting access to services and 
processes, but did not extend to the commercial sensitivity of the returned data. In the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture the sensitivity of the data returned by the service is 
derived in the capture of the business process and business rules. An extension to the Policy 
Definition and Policy Instance is required to dynamically process security levels of return 
data using meta-data provided by the services, such as in IBHIS (Kotsiopoulos et al., 2003). 
The business case study scoped the research to investigating a limited range of 
business processes across organisational boundaries. Due to the speculative nature of the 
case study, the business processes exercised a few of the control-flow patterns from van der 
Aalst (Aalst, 2006). The case study would need to be expanded beyond the diagnosis 
workflow to test the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture in managing the different 
workflow patterns, assuming the expanded case study uses other control-flow patterns. 
8.1.3 Summary of Future Enhancements 
Adaptive processes and security play an important part in coping with change by innovation 
and different customer usage. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture adapts using a well-
defined process and role-based access policy derived from the business requirements and 
rules. For the implementation of the demonstrator, the defined process and access control 
policy were manually created from the analysis of the business requirements. Future work 
would provide methods to automate the link between the business requirements and the 
defined process and policy. The automated link may generate the process and access control 
from business rules, such as in Mendling et al. (Mendling et al., 2004), or there could be a 
more dynamic linkage as in Smith and Fingar (Smith and Fingar, 2003). 
An emerging method to achieve automation uses semantic descriptions, from 
Semantic Web and Semantic Grid (Shadbolt et al., 2006, The Semantic Grid, 2003). 
Semantic descriptions of services and return data can be used to decouple process 
descriptions from service descriptions. Services can be replaced easily by discovering 
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descriptions of the service function. Security protection of the returned data can be 
automated using semantic meta-data describing the security level of the returned data. 
Since the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is a model of workflow and security, it 
can be implemented using different technologies. Enhancement of the DAME Demonstrator 
would be to employ recent developments in technology with the framework defined by the 
architecture. Current appropriate technologies would be: 
• PERMIS policy decision engine and delegation issuing service. 
• Shibboleth authentication service. 
• BPEL process language. 
• Secure grid services Globus GT4 using WS-ResourceFramework. 
8.2 Summary of Thesis 
In this thesis, the research approach gathered information, identified a problem, designed 
and built a solution to address the problem and evaluated the solution. The major 
contributions are enumerated in 1.4 and the research methodology is presented in 1.5. 
Chapter 2 contains the background information of the topic areas in this research. 
Section 2.1 to 2.4 introduces the concepts of collaborative working and workflow 
management in business processing. To support collaborative work across organisations, 
section 2.5 introduces SOA discussing the properties of loose coupling. This illustrated that 
workflow definitions, linked to business requirements, can remain static, whilst deployed 
services can change, supporting dynamic deployment across grid resources, integration of 
services from different suppliers and evolutionary change in services to respond to 
customers needs. 
Grid Computing, in section 2.5.6, provides dynamic resources and virtualises the 
management of available compute processing and data storage in a common middleware. 
By supporting globally distributed collaborations of users, services and resources, Grid 
Computing is instrumental in forming VOs. 
Security is introduced in section 2.6 and essential in maintaining properties such as 
privacy, confidentiality and availability. One aspect of security is Access Control is 
presented in section 2.7. This section describes some of the solutions to defining and 
controlling access control policies in distributed computing, illustrating the use of Roles in 
access control (RBAC), and how it relates to roles in processes and workflows. Extensions 
to RBAC use tasks and teams to create a context for controlling access. 
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Chapter 3 introduces the DAME project and illustrates the business case study 
example, collaborative problem solving for aircraft engine diagnostics. In a competitive 
environment, competitors share engine operating data to improve the accuracy of engine 
diagnosis. Section 3.3 presents the VO model for the collaboration and the diagnosis 
workflow in section 3.4. However, only privileged roles can access the competitor’s data, 
that is distributed, large in volume and consumed by distributed processing services 
supplied by further third parties. The business requirements for security and scalability are 
given in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the architecture of the proposed solution, called the Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture. The issues raised in Chapter 4 are analysed and compared with 
the background in securing collaborative workflows. The resultant solution uses role-based 
access control with role-based workflow management to control collaborative access to 
remote Grid Services, by defining the workflow as the point of collaboration, forming a 
team of users, services and data. The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is presented in 
two forms. The first, is a high-level model about how the workflow definition and access 
control policy definition are linked, leading to a coarse-grained access control policy that is 
used to control a fine-grained policy instance or each workflow instance. The second form 
shows the architectural links between the static parts, Workflow Definition and Workflow-
Team Policy Definition, and the dynamic parts, the Workflow Instance and the Workflow-
Team Policy Instance. The scope of the architectural solution is bounded by the assumptions 
list in section 5.4. 
Chapter 6 presents the implementation of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture in 
the DAME Demonstrator, a web-based portal to access a workflow management system that 
executes the secure collaborative workflow and consumes GT3 grid service instances. 
Section 6.1 provides an overview of the test cases executed in the implementation. In 
section 6.2, the implemented demonstrator is described, including a secure web-based 
portal, the workflow management system and an outline of the deployment. This was 
evaluated by the analysis of interviews with two industrial experts. The results are presented 
in Chapter 7. 
Section 7.2 summarises the interview results in which the feedback on the DAME 
implementation confirms that the implemented method for controlling dynamic access 
control for teams supports the DAME scenario test case. Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 compare 
the proposed Workflow-Team Policy Architecture and the implemented system with other 
work in the field of workflow, business processing and access control. Section 7.6 discusses 
the limitations of the research, providing a critique of the scenario based approach and the 
proposed solution. Section 7.7 proposes how continuing research can extend the 
contribution of this research. 
Chapter 8 Conclusions 
122 
8.3 Summary of Contribution 
8.3.1 Summary of Research Objectives 
The research objectives are been summarised in the following points and referenced against 
the contributions C1 to C7 listed in section 1.4: 
• Contribution C4, the design and build of an experiment to study a workflow 
management system to execute and control long-running Grid Services across a multi-
organisational grid, allowing shared access by users from different organisations. The 
research tested the constructs of the Workflow-Team Policy Architecture by 
implementing a workflow management system (WFMS) and workflows that execute 
GT3 Grid Services. The WFMS integrates with the portal to provide role-based access 
control to the workflow and Grid Services that is dynamically managed to specify fine-
grained access of users to Grid Service instances created and deployed by external 
organisations. 
• The investigation of issues of access control in a VO for collaborative access to services 
and data, where some services and data are commercially sensitive and could reveal 
proprietary information to competing members within the VO. The DAME VO business 
model (contribution C5) illustrates a case where organisations share services and data to 
achieve business goals, but require protection of the service and data assets. The 
security requirements illustrated have been incorporated into the model for Workflow-
Team Policy Architecture, tested in the DAME demonstrator and evaluated by 
qualitative interviews with industrial experts. 
• Contribution C3 is the general model for the provision of dynamic fine-grained access 
control to stateful Grid Service instances used in collaborative teams of users, services 
and data from different organisations. Contributions C1 and C2 fulfilled in the 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. This solution is the result of contribution C6, the 
analysis of the business case, comparison with other state of the art solutions and 
experience building the workflow management system with dynamic access control. 
The research has presented the workflow as the collaborative point of access to Grid 
Service instances. In order to manage collaborative access control in a scalable solution, 
across organisational boundaries, requires management of many users and dynamic 
collaborative teams using coarse-grained access control policies. Therefore, to achieve 
fine-grained access control to Grid Service instances across organisations, the workflow 
instance is used to coordinate execution and manage a dynamic policy instance. The 
role-based Workflow Definition is linked to a Workflow-Team Policy Definition for 
high-level definition Of policy, which is executed as fine-grained policies to protect 
access to service instances by permitted members of the collaborative team. 
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• Contribution C7 is fulfilled by the evaluation of the access control for secure service-
based collaborative workflows using the business example from the UK e-Science 
DAME project. The business VO and collaborative workflow was defined by working 
with representative from Rolls-Royce and DS&S, and in collaboration with the 
definition of the DAME use cases (Fletcher, 2002). The business case study is study is 
presented in chapters 3 and 4, fulfilling contribution C5. The DAME project provided 
the opportunity to present the concepts and implementations for access control to the 
Grid Computing environment, gaining useful feedback in developing the resultant 
Workflow-Team Policy Architecture. 
8.3.2 Implications to Business Processing 
The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture is an important step in the use of business 
workflows across organisations. The solution addresses the requirements for the a business 
to supply a diagnostics support service to many competing customers, using secure access 
mechanisms to consume Grid Computing services from third party suppliers and benefit 
from collaborations whilst protecting commercial interest. To quote Dibsdale: 
It is absolutely not allowed for one airline to see the actual performance 
of a rivals operating fleet. So that would be the fastest thing that would shut us 
down as a service business, that you could imagine. A lot of our effort is to 
ensure that we don’t actually do that. From Dibsdale, Appendix B.2. 
8.3.3 Implications to e-Science 
There is increasing awareness in the growing scientific use of HPC and large-scale clusters 
in Grid Computing. The use of Grid Computing supports not only large scale computing, 
but also large-scale collaboration, similar to the collaboration discussed in this research. 
Therefore, e-Science use of Grid Computing demands controlled access to HPC and 
executing services and presents situations where collaborative use of executing services is 
required. For example, in collaborative visualisation in the gViz project uses dynamic 
allocation of grid processing to render images that can be steered and viewed by different 
users simultaneously (Brodlie et al., 2004). The Workflow-Team Policy Architecture can 
provide the means to control collaborative access to grid services across the VO, by using 
workflow to mediate collaboration and automate team membership. 
UK e-Science projects, such as myGrid and Triana (UK e-Science Programme, 2005), 
show that service and workflow definitions can be shared between users. This research 
extends the capability by illustrating the collaborative use of active workflow instances. 
Recent projects have also extended methods of workflow and security in collaborations. For 
example, controls on service usage in VOs by automated contract negotiation and 
monitoring in the Gold project (Periorellis et al., 2006). The Workflow-Team Policy 
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Architecture can be used in these e-Science projects to provide a complementary solution to 
access control, by using workflow as the context for using Grid Services and linking this to 
control access of Grid Services. 
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Appendix A  
DAME Workflow Architecture 
A.1 Workflow Manager Components 
The Workflow Manager is shown below using a collaboration diagram. The workflow 
manager executes autonomously by monitoring the state of individual workflows. Each 
workflow executes independently in a separate thread. Asynchronous connection to the 
system is achieved using the Portal base class, via the Portal Connection. This allows 
workflows to be started, monitored and the results to be retrieved. An additional connection 
to the workflow manager, the Event Agent, is used by the Ground Support System to launch 
the automatic workflow. The automatic workflow “Workflow Brief Diagnosis” is shown in 
the diagram, with multiple instances. However, all workflows share the same interface and 
there can be other workflow types executing simultaneously. 
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The text following describes each component shown in Figure A.1. 
Event Agent 
The Event Agent is a specific connection for the Ground Support System to the Workflow 
Manager, with the purpose of launching the automatic workflow when new engine data 
arrives. It provides a simple interface to the Ground Support System, hiding the more 
complex interface to the workflow manager. 
Engine Data Store 
The Engine Data Store represents the repository for engine vibration data files. New data is 
loaded via the Ground Support System when an aircraft lands. Other system components, 
such as XTO, retrieve vibration data sets by querying the Engine Data Store with flight 
details. 
Ground Support System 
The Ground Support System represents the station used to download vibration data from the 
on wing QUOTE system and upload it to the Engine Data Store. Then, on the event of new 
data, launch the automatic workflow using the Event Agent. 
Portal 
This is the abstract base class that provides the external connection to the workflow system. 
Specific implementation of the Portal can be provided for connection into different systems 
 
Figure A.1 DAME Workflow Management System Architecture 
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such as Struts based MVC style web server, WAP interface for mobile devices or a simple 
pager interface for alerts on workflow status changes. 
Portal Connection 
The Portal Connection follows the observer pattern (Gamma et al., 1995) used in the 
composite MVC pattern. Many Portal classes can connect to the workflow system, using the 
Portal Connection. Each Portal registers interest in workflow instances, and the Portal 
Connection notifies the relevant Portals on change of status. 
Run CBR 
The RunCBR Class represents the client component to execute the remote CBR process. 
Workflow Brief Diagnosis 
The Workflow Brief Diagnosis is an implementation of the Workflow class. It represents 
the automatic workflow launched on the event of new engine data arriving. It executes a 
sequence involving most tools in DAME. 
Workflow Factory 
The Workflow Factory creates workflow instances. The name of the workflow is passed to 
the factory and an instance of the relevant workflow type is created and initialised with the 
parameters passed into the create function. 
Workflow Manager 
This is the central enactment engine. It is a permanently executing thread that controls the 
creation of workflow and monitors their execution. Changes in workflow instance status are 
forwarded to the Portal Connection. Requests from the Portal Connection are forwarded to 
the worklist. 
Worklist 
The Worklist contains the workflow instances. Each workflow is accessible by using its 
unique ID. 
XTO Job 
The XTO Job represents the Grid Service executing the XTO data analysis process. 
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Appendix B  
Evaluation Interviews 
B.1 Interview Questionnaire 
Collaborative Workflow Interview 
Issue 2D. Russell
 27th October 2004 
Purpose and Scope 
The aim is to assess the research into secure control of collaborative workflows, in the 
context of the DAME case study. This provides a concrete example of how the research has 
targeted a real problem. By interviewing representative of the business concerns for the case 
study the data collected will be used to validate the current state of the demonstrator of the 
research and provide validation for the vision of how the system would ideally be 
implemented. 
Interview Candidates 
There are two interview candidates, one from each of the target companies involved in 
DAME. 
Graham Hesketh from Rolls-Royce 
Charlie Dibsdale from DS&S 
As there are only two respondents it will not be possible to keep the interviews anonymous. 
However, there is a need to protect commercially sensitive information. Therefore, it may 
be necessary to collect data that may be useful in validating the demonstrator and vision, but 
will not be included in the results or publications. This may make it difficult to publicly 
validate the research. 
Contacting the candidates 
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The candidates will be contacted by email to arrange possible times for the interview. This 
will take place at a convenient venue to the interview candidate. Typically in Derby for 
Graham Hesketh and either Bristol or Derby for Charlie Dibsdale. 
A confirmation of the arrangement will be sent by email, along with a guide as to the topic 
of the interview and an agenda for the meeting. 
To motivate participation, the interview will be made convenient to the candidate, and they 
will be provided with the results. 
Interview Design and initiation 
The interview should be structured in the question format so that on repetition the proposed 
questions will be similar. The limited number of candidates for the interview makes it 
important that the interview process is kept similar so as to improve consistency of results. 
The structured interview is aimed at directing the questioning in the context of collaborative 
workflows. However, the exercise will also benefit from more exploratory questioning, 
where the interview candidate is free to provide extended answers. Some of the questions 
are intended to prompt the candidate to answer more in-depth, possibly revealing 
information not thought about when compiling the questionnaire. The interviewer will have 
sufficient knowledge on the topic and would be able to ask more probing questions if time 
allows. 
Situation 
The interview should take place at candidates place of work, for their convenience and to 
make them feel more comfortable to talk about the problems from their perspective. 
Recording information primarily by note taking, both during and directly afterwards. By 
requesting to candidates it may be possible to use tape recording equipment (e.g. 
Dictaphone). 
It is intended that the interview duration is 1.5 hours maximum. This includes a brief 
demonstration of the aspects to be evaluated. It is understood that the candidates are familiar 
with the DAME demonstrator, and the demonstration at the interview will be used as a 
refresher to the demo and to focus the discussion on the topics in the questions (namely the 
implementation and control of the collaborative workflows). 
Interviewer will dress smartly to appear professional, conscientious and to match the formal 
environments of the candidate’s work place.  
Testing the Interview Design 
The interview questions will be trial on personnel at Leeds to ascertain: 
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Relevance to the target subject 
Ease of understanding of the questions 
Length of time taken to execute the interview process 
As a result of the trial, the questions may be rephrased to improve their understanding, or 
relevance and the number of questions may be reduced. There may also be a list of 
guidelines to for the interview to use a prompts to gain relevant answers from the 
candidates. 
Recording Information 
Other than the answers to the questions recorded information from the interview should 
include: 
Whether all questions were answered 
Duration of interview 
Opinions on respondent 
Perception of interaction 
Results of interview test 
The interview was tested on 27th October 2004 from 10:20am to 11:30am with Georges 
Honore. During the 70 minutes the procedure involved an Introduction for 3 minutes 
followed by structured interview questions and a 2 minutes summary. There was also a 5 
minute interruption and some comments on the suitability of the questions. 
The answers were drawn from Georges’ knowledge of the current DAME demonstrator and 
the use case study documents (which were used as requirements input to the design of the 
demonstrator). However, this test revealed some repetition of the questions and some 
questions that were irrelevant. The results meant that some repeated questions were 
removed and some were modified. The questions addressed aspects of both the 
demonstrator and future requirements of a production DAME system. Therefore, where 
there was repetition the questions needed rephrasing to ensure they addressed either current 
or future requirements. 
Interview Format 
Item Title Duration Scope 
1 Open Interview 3 mins Open the interview 
2 Introduction 5 mins Introduction and Purpose of interview, 
including aims to orient the respondent. 
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Reaffirm the confidentiality of the interview? 
3 Demonstration 10 mins Demonstration of collaborative workflow in 
DAME demonstrator 
4 Interview questions 50 mins Structured interview questions 
5 Comments 15 mins Open Comments 
6 Interview Summary 5 mins Interview Summary 
7 Close 2 mins Close 
The total time should be no more than 1.5 hours, including the introduction and 
demonstration and concluding with a short summary of the interview results. 
In general, the evaluation will attempt to elicit answers around the following: 
Collaborative use of workflows and tools in the diagnostics procedures, 
Designation of users and roles in inter-organisation processes, 
Access control to data, workflows and services across organisational boundaries, 
Relevance of the demonstrator collaborative workflows to DAME business requirements. 
Interview Follow-up 
The documented results of the interview with a candidate will be sent to the respondent by 
email and say ‘thank-you’. This will be done before it is used or published to give the 
candidate the opportunity to correct any mistakes of omissions. These changes should be 
recorded as such in view of provenance to the data. 
Also send any additional material that may have been promised or realised in the interview 
that the candidate would like to have. 
Structured Interview Questions 
The questions will be shown on a form that should be filled out with answers during the 
interview. These will need to be thorough if tape recording is not permitted, and will 
probably need to be checked and completed after the interview. This would allow the 
interviewer to concentrate on the rapport with the candidate rather than spending time note 
taking. 
Collaborative Workflow in the DAME Demonstrator 
1. Does the workflow in the Demonstrator reflect the expected business process? 
2. Does the secure access in the demonstrator match the expected business process? 
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3. Does the demonstrator represent all the organisations and roles in the DAME 
diagnostics process? 
Collaboration Procedure 
4. What happens in the escalation of diagnosis problems between: 
4.1 The Maintenance Engineer and the Maintenance Analyst? 
4.2 The Maintenance Analyst and the Domain Expert? 
5. What information is passed during escalation? 
6. In what way would the roles use DAME to collaborate? 
7. What information do users in the same role share and are there restrictions on 
sharing? 
DAME Roles 
8. Are the three defined roles sufficient to define access control for collaborations? 
9. What restrictions are there between: 
9.1 Maintenance Engineers sharing a process? 
9.2 Maintenance Analysts sharing a process? 
9.3 Domain Experts sharing a process? 
Workflows 
10. How should the processing resources be managed securely? 
11. What restrictions would there be on executing workflows from the different roles? 
12. What restrictions would there be on sharing workflow definitions? 
13. What restrictions would there be on sharing/collaborating in active workflows? 
14. Who can define new workflows for DAME? 
Access Control 
15. How should users login to the DAME portal? 
16. How should organisations provide user identities? 
17. Who is responsible for assigning roles to the users? 
18. How should the roles be defined? 
19. What restrictions are there on sharing data and services across organisations? 
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B.2 Interview Results DS&S 
Interview Results from 4th November 2004 
Issue: 1 Author: D. Russell Issue date: 17th November 2004 
Purpose and Scope 
The aim document contains a summary and transcript of the research interview with Charlie 
Dibsdale that took place on 4th November 2004. This interview conducted by Duncan 
Russell addressed the author’s PhD subject area of  ‘Secure Collaborative Workflow’. 
Summary 
The following is a summary of the points discussed separated into categories for 
Collaboration, Workflow, Access Control, Roles and General Security. 
Collaboration 
The current demonstrator accurately represents the desired business process for the 
diagnostics case, but is limited to the identified use cases to be achievable in the project 
timescale. 
The collaboration between roles will require increased sources of data, such as performance 
data and engine configuration (currently DAME only uses vibration data). DAME would 
not require much dialogue between the roles, however other examples of diagnostics would. 
Example being, in power station diagnosis the operator’s experience would need to be 
obtained and captured within the system, usually in longer term diagnostics. 
The current operations room has a multi-disciplinary team that would collaborate on solving 
a problem. This would require shared access to active workflows and possibly collaborative 
services. These Maintenance Analysts would be performing most of the problem solving. 
Workflow 
Workflow definitions intrinsically capture knowledge and therefore have business value. 
A workflow administrator role was identified to control: 
Access to launch workflow, especially with workflows (and their capabilities) and restricted 
by the level of service (package) the customer pays for. The general example is bronze, 
silver or gold packages for service contracts. 
Who can define/add a workflow into the system. And within that definition what users are 
able to access which parts.  
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More complex is in access to workflows automatically defined from captured knowledge 
(usage history) in the system (e.g. Workflow Advisor). This service could improve one 
company’s performance by using the practices of another. 
Access control to services & data 
The main assets to protect are data for competitors. This is characterised as data that is 
identifiable by airline. Methods of anonymising (by aggregation) allow sharing of data. This 
is mainly concentrated in accessing persistent data, and not diagnostics service results, 
although the data aggregation may be a service operating on the stored data. 
Service access is still restricted mainly by the information that can be obtained. There could 
be restrictions on launching processing on resources to ensure availability of processing 
power for other users (DAME processes or internal users, such as design simulation). This 
is based on resource usage/allocation and one of the decisions used in access to resources 
will be cost (financial). 
Roles 
In addition to the roles already defined for DAME, other roles that use the system would 
have different access rights. For example, regulators may require access for assurance of 
operation. This may be used to view summary data, showing averages and trends. It is not 
assumed that access for these roles includes diagnostics tools. 
Users will be attributed with role and organisation to define what data, services/tools and 
screen they can see. Additionally a working context might be a constraint on access to 
services or data, e.g. the workflow would define the context. 
A central administration for DAME would provide the organisations with user templates, 
detailing role name and access rights. An organisation is then responsible for naming the 
users in that role and informing the administration when access should be revoked. 
The access rights in a role template would be like a job description, detailing how the user 
fits in the overall process. Attributes in the role template can also be used to check if the 
user is qualified to that level of access. 
General Security 
Single Logon is required across organisations. Other companies’ portals with access to their 
own systems could also make use of DAME tools. This maybe access to the services or 
sections of the portal. It would not be desirable for a user to enter username and password 
for each system. 
DAME would require central administration for control access to workflow/services/data 
controlled by the DAME contract. This would include user identity mappings to roles and 
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access policies. A ‘central’ administration could be a distributed effort, but is essentially 
within one organisation/trust domain. 
Secure applications (obfuscated operation and data) would be required for execution on 
third-party grids. 
Access control policies could also ‘judge’ suitability of a service by requiring it to 
correspond to certain standards, such as z-mod for data exchange and the MIMOSA 
operating standard. 
The security framework must be adaptable to changes in users and possibly organisations 
access by package. Also changes to the packages to respond to a services life-cycle. 
Interview Transcript 
The following is a transcript from the taped interview between the two people: 
CD = Charlie Dibsdale 
DR = Duncan Russell 
Some details of the speech have been omitted in the transcript such as ‘Err’ and ‘OK’ and 
‘Yes’. 
Interview started at 1:05pm 4th November 2004, in Charlie Dibsdale’s office, DS&S, Bristol 
and finished at 2:15pm. 
Introduction 
DR: OK, so a brief introduction so we know where I am with this interview 
CD: Yes 
DR: It’s part of my PhD research so it’s part of my data that I am gathering. As you know, 
my research is concentrating on the secure access and the collaborative access to the tools 
within DAME. 
CD: Yes 
DR: So that’s why this is different to the previous interview which you did with Richard 
and Ian which concentrating on the usability of the portal. I am still going to be referring to 
the portal in the current demonstrator. And we are looking to see what your views are on 
how that suites the need and what you see the future need is. 
CD: OK 
Collaborative Workflow in the DAME Demonstrator 
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DR: So I have split this up into a few categories and I am going to start with the 
demonstrator. OK so the first question, I’ll just make a few notes. Does the workflow in the 
Demonstrator reflect the expected business process? 
CD: OK. What I would say first off is that the demonstrator project decided to choose a set 
of use cases based around a very sort of narrow scope of process. Because we had to bound 
the project and obviously make it achievable. Whilst at the same time demonstrating some 
of the features of using grid, distributed and all that sort of stuff. First off the demonstrator 
itself as far as I am concerned only has a small scope of its potential value. And its usage I 
believe, in an operational environment, would have a far wider scope and set of 
deliverables, etc. That would substantially increase its expected business value. Is that a fair 
answer, or… 
DR: No, that’s good. 
CD: The other thing I would say in terms of what the project set out to achieve and did it 
achieve it in the workflows, then, yes it did. 
DR: Right. 
CD: Which is the other side of the question I think you are asking. 
DR: Yes, OK. Does the secure access in the demonstrator match the expected business 
process? 
CD: I think that we have a secure logon site and probably if we went in Rolls-Royces 
requirements we would require two-factor authentication. So as it stands, if it went 
operational, probably not. But I don’t see that there is a problem to implement that extra 
layer of functionality. The other aspect is in general grid usage that the security model needs 
to be extended to actually protecting applications as they are running on external processing 
devices, not only the application but also the data. So if we are brokering with somebody 
else that we want to be protected against is that they can take a look in as things are being 
processed and not be able to interpret from that point of view. And I am not sure that grid 
technology goes that far nowadays. 
DR: I can say it doesn’t quite tackle that, but I know somebody in Leeds who 
CD: is looking at it? 
DR: yes, looking at privacy in the application itself. 
CD: That is absolutely the issue. Now whether that is a big issue or not is debatable 
because, we may choose to implement a grid either internally or with a trusted third party 
compute supplier. And it may be years before we get out to the general grid community. 
Where that level of security will be required. 
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DR: I agree, also the market model for that is a bit muddled at the moment. 
CD: Yes, it is not mature. 
DR: I don’t know if you heard, that at the moment Hewlett Packard Data Centre. Because 
they were building a warehouse. 
CD: Oh I see 
DR: In fact, they did they built a warehouse of compute processors. They were looking at 
about five thousand processors in this one warehouse. That’s what they were aiming 
towards. But they have closed it now. 
CD: Have they really? 
DR: Already closed, they didn’t get enough take up. 
CD: Well it’s too immature at the present time. 
DR: OK, Does the demonstrator represent all the organisations and roles in the DAME 
diagnostics process? 
CD: Within the bounds of the scope, yes it does. 
DR: OK. The interest there is the accuracy of how the airlines are represented, because so 
far we have used yourselves at DS&S to explain the role of the airline, because they are not 
partners in the project. 
CD: but by the other token what we are moving to, as a business model are product services 
based for Rolls Royce. As far as diagnosis on the application is concerned its all within 
Rolls Royce’s interest because the are responsible for the availability of the whole unit. The 
Airline in that business model has got a very much reduced interest in the ins and outs of 
what is wrong with the engine. So they don’t need the diagnostic output. What they need is 
the assurance that they can fly to their schedules. 
DR: Yes, that’s good. 
CD: So, I am not concerned with that at all. 
Collaboration Procedure 
DR: So. This is specifically about how you see the process evolving. In particular one area 
that wasn’t captured very well is the escalation process. And really the collaboration 
between the Maintenance Engineer and the Analyst, and then the Analyst to the Domain 
Expert. So how would you see that process actually happening? 
CD: I think that there will be occasions that some failure modes, and it is a rare occasion, 
that are not, have not ever been experienced before. And in that sense I think the escalation 
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will be fairly quick up into the domain expert. Who will need a whole series of tools, 
capabilities and visibility of data. I think recently I think some of guys who are trying to 
disentangle the root causes are probably not explicit domain experts but they are a part of 
the crew who are trying to run the operations of engine support. Therefore they are trying 
get to a root cause by looking at event data and also configuration data is important. Perhaps 
unfortunately with aeroplane engines, they are very complex assets with lots of 
modifications. And a failure occurring in one node, one part of an engine, there might be 
several candidate equipment items that are fitted there all with different modification states. 
So it’s very important that the failure is sentenced against what modification state of the 
equipment. Maybe that’s one area that we need to look at and exploit, is bringing in these 
other sources of data. That does not need the Dennis King type who is looking at raw 
vibration data, that’s more at the maintenance level. 
DR: Yes. OK. 
CD: The output of DAME is more aimed at going to somebody like Dennis King. The real 
output and the real value exists in the people who are trying to support the asset out in the 
field. That is through the Rolls Royce operations room. 
DR: Right, yes. 
CD: But that is where the value to Rolls Royce exists compared with, sending information 
back to engineering and the reliability groups within Rolls. 
DR: OK. When they are looking at the data, obviously you said about the configuration data 
and things which on the whole you would expect to be able to pull from databases. 
CD: Yes 
DR: Is there going to be much dialogue between the different layers. Are they going to back 
to the ground staff, are they going to try to ask questions. 
CD: I think that a dialogue with the ground staff in reality is going to hardly exist. That’s a 
consequence of choosing this very narrow use case. So we have this hypothetical question 
that we have a severe time delay because we want to dispatch aircraft in time to reduce 
delays. In the real world it doesn’t happen like that. The majority of these things are 
probably longer term investigations. Otherwise we are already able to detect the reoccurring 
failures. 
DR: Right. That has kind of covered my next question which is the information that is 
passed during the escalation. Do you see any other ways in which the roles collaborate? 
CD: I see massive potential for a complete explosion of use cases. 
DR: Right 
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CD: It is that big. I think we have been very narrow focused. The diagnostic capability is 
not limited to aeroplane engines either. So there will be slightly different use cases because, 
in different market sectors it is all just as applicable. So collaborating with the actual 
operator, say in a power station situation we would be talking the operator because we 
would want perhaps anecdotal information, or trying to talk to them about the experience of 
how failures, but what you would hardly not envisage in the DAME situation is talking to 
the pilot. There are many more examples. My belief is that this whole environment has a 
whole set of other uses and use cases. 
DR: That’s good. One of the issues with my research is that I am really focused with the 
DAME use cases, and that’s fine if I was in development. But for research in want to 
address a wider audience. So that’s good information. 
CD: I am not criticising DAME, because it had to demonstrate that, and it had to be 
controlled for the project deliverables. So going back on the decision, would we do the 
same? Yes, absolutely. 
DR: I think along with the collaboration, probably applicable to DAME with the fact that 
you have the different airlines. Would there be, or what sort of restrictions would there be 
on sharing information. 
CD: OK, we have massive experience of this within DS&S, because we are doing on-line 
condition monitoring as we speak. It is absolutely not allowed for one airline to see the 
actual performance of a rivals operating fleet. So that would be the fastest thing that would 
shut us down as a service business, that you could imagine. A lot of our effort is to ensure 
that we don’t actually do that. However, there are ways and means of anonymising data, 
because a lot of operators are very interesting in bench marking themselves against the 
whole industry averages. And therefore can plot their performance with some derived key 
performance indicators. Against the fleet average is a very powerful output that most 
operators are happy that their data contributes to and that they get a comparative view of 
their performance and others get the same. So I think in that respect, as long as you 
anonymise it and you aggregate it then not a problem. So it is benchmarking is a big value 
string. 
DAME Roles 
DR: OK, again back to our diagnostics process, covering the roles. I think you have 
probably already answered this, but are the three roles sufficient to define access control for 
the collaborations. 
CD: For the scope of work that we have, yes. But, not for a wider scope. 
DR: And you have mentioned the operations extending the use cases. 
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CD: That’s the Rolls Royce operations room. What they have is a bunch of people to 
execute the total care contracts to make sure that engines are available to fly. So that set of 
operations people a group of multi-discipline people. There may be some logisticians, there 
may be some maintenance planners, there may be a repair and overhaul guy. There are all 
kinds of different people who are all interested in understanding the condition of certain 
components of the engine. So we have to take a look at the operations staff and the output 
they want to see. And in different operating contexts or the market, the operator of the asset 
may be a person that you would also be speaking to, such as the operator of the power 
station. 
Now I can envisage that regulator may be a valid customer. Because they are ensuring 
themselves of compliance to health and safety. You could demonstrate to other 
stakeholders, lessors and financiers of the assets. They are interested in understanding what 
is the condition, what is the history of an asset. ‘Am I safe to lease this thing or not?’. So, I 
could spout off for quite a long time to widen the potential customers. 
DR: That sort of fits in with access control mostly to persistent data. 
CD: Yes. What you wouldn’t expect is for some of these people being able to dig into the 
diagnostics tools or that raw data. They want to have a summary status of condition. Things 
like that, that is derived from... Very much a subset of what we are looking at. 
DR: Good. I think we are now looking at specifics of the DAME roles. This is something 
that we haven’t modelled, would be any of the roles sharing between the same roles. So 
Maintenance Engineers sharing the same process, or Maintenance Analysts or Domain 
Experts involved collaboratively through the DAME portal. 
CD: You talk about the escalation, I don’t think it’s ‘I have finished my bit now I need to 
delegate up to you’. I think its ‘OK, guys I need the Domain Expert to become involved’ 
and I think the collaboration be the Domain Expert will give advice in looking at it. ‘Yes, 
where I think you need to concentrate on is in this area’ and the Maintenance Analyst, 
DS&S personnel would do a bit more of the leg work. 
Workflows 
DR: This is now going to the diagnostics tools and, how should process resources 
themselves be managed securely on the grid? 
CD: There is going to be some concerns about cost, initially. This could be regarded as 
being a bit miserly by the commercial guys. If you are able to set off a load of processing 
that is going to either grab a lot of the available processing power then there are cost 
consequences of that, if going out to a general environment. There are also priority 
constraints. For instance, you have to look at the wider use of an internal grid. There might 
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be times that the design community might want to run an optimisation and take up 90% of 
the internal processing. Yet, we need to do a fundamental Aura search that is also going to 
grab 90% of the processing power and come back with the service level. Because the 
brokering and the service level need to be integral to everybody’s use of the shared 
resource. Who can be authorised to set off the jobs? I don’t know the answer. I think it is 
partly a process thing and partly an authorisation or brokerage problem. 
DR: What about executing the workflow. What restrictions would there be on executing the 
workflows from different roles? 
CD: Let’s take one side, because there is an automated section that the system itself is 
authorised to conduct workflows in certain scenarios. I think that is obviously easy 
controllable and easy enough to think about whether that would automatically happen 
according to some criteria or rule. So that is probably embedded within the workflow 
system, classified. And, what workflows? Again, there maybe workflows that the 
maintenance guys use that maybe subsets of bigger workflows that the domain expert might 
want to use. How do you mix and match that? Has there got to be the concept of a workflow 
administrator I wonder? 
DR: I think in the general model of grid, it is quite difficult to pin that down. But in this 
specific case, there is the concept of control administration, so it is easier to place somebody 
in charge. 
CD: That would be the short term answer. But I was thinking that maybe it becomes 
another role in the use case scenarios. 
DR: I think that goes onto the next question, on sharing workflow definitions. Once we get 
to the state where the Sheffield workflow advisor would be able to create workflows, I 
suppose it would be the same sort of thing. 
CD: There is also another issue to do with workflows, because what you are doing is 
explicitly capturing knowledge. And the knowledge embedded within the workflows is 
explicit and it has also got high value and also got a level of intellectual property. Which has 
intrinsic business value. Who has access to and who can reuse is a debate for the business 
people to decide. If perhaps they want external people to make use of that as a service in 
maybe a more traditional business, then it becomes a revenue stream. 
DR: OK 
CD: You can also think of a case where you can segment service provision from decision 
support, for a third party operating assets. Because you can say ‘Do you want the bronze, 
silver or gold contract?’. And the gold may involve the full automation of the workflow 
management system. And by the way, that becomes an issue because if we are allowing a 
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third party to use the diagnostics capability, we are actually capturing their knowledge 
within the workflow system. So you can see the kind of issues. As the service provider if 
you have three or four of these customers and you are looking at similar assets, the fact that 
you are capturing knowledge explicitly by yourself you can make that reusable and use one 
persons ‘best practice’ and improve somebody else performance. 
DR: Yes 
CD: That is a knotty business problem, that will be an issue. 
DR: I think that comes down to the same as the benchmarks, that if you can pool it, and 
everybody benefits, then you can agree on sharing workflows 
CD: Yes 
DR: I think we have kind of cover restrictions on sharing active workflows. 
CD: I would say restrictions because the workflows have value. You want to restrict access 
in order that you can exploit that value. 
DR: Yes, and another we have kind of covered, but just to clarify. Who can define new 
workflows for DAME? 
CD: Well, if you have got this system that is monitoring usage of workflows, then surely it 
defines its own new ones. In a way that, perhaps is not a straight question because the 
system itself is define new workflows. The other aspect is that if the DE or the MA comes 
up with a novel way of diagnosing a particular classification of problem then of course we 
want to capture that as best practice. Then both of those parties should be able to define a 
new workflow. 
Access Control 
DR: OK Last set of questions. Access Control, again you have kind of answered this: How 
should users login to the DAME portal? 
CD: I’m talking as an administrator, so administrating the DAME system. User access 
control is very important. I’ll give you a scenario: You may have a Maintenance Engineer, 
who is employed. Gets sacked for some reason and we omit to take the off the access 
control. Next day, they log in to the system, extract a lot of data and sell it to The Sun. 
Because they feel aggrieved that they have been unfairly dismissed. But of course we have 
got to be extremely tight in access control and indeed with the current commercial systems 
that we have now it is something that we take very seriously. And make sure that the user 
access profiles are done virtually on an on-demand basis. We also have a whole area of our 
portal by which we can administer the user access, friendly and easily. It becomes a big 
overhead when you have potentially thousands of users who are able to log on. 
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DR: Would that be explicit areas on a per user basis, or does map it to roles and groups? 
CD: No, I think you have got to map to roles. There is a whole area of debate here. On 
some occasions you may require to go down to data field level. I’ll give you a for instance. 
We run forecasting and services for Rolls Royce that are linked into lifecycle cost. Our 
analysts are interested in the forecast, per say. Rolls Royce doesn’t want us to see the cost 
data associated with it. When we are able to log on, we can see all the machinations of how 
to do forecasting with all the data transformations that takes. What we don’t see are all the 
cost elements that are associated with that. So, we may be simulating a failure and recovery 
of an asset, where you need labour and material costs for that. We can see the labour, the 
people who are required and qualified to do the fix. And we can see the material, but we 
can’t see the cost rates. In that case, the security access for a person designated as a DS&S 
person, is allowed to see everything apart from cost data. There are possibly the instances 
where you have to go down to the data level to restrict access. 
DR: And effectively that restriction is done by attributing the user to the organisation? 
CD: Yes. Possibly you might not be able to foresee. But you do need to be able to build an 
architecture that could limit you at any level within the architecture to a subset of attributes 
that you might possibly want to define. So it could be work page, it could be data element. 
DR: OK, this here is an interesting one. This is to do with the administering of the system. 
How should organisations provide user identities? 
CD: There is obviously the person. Are you trying to get at the fact that you are trying to 
authenticate the person or the machine that they are logging in on. 
DR: The person, at this point. 
CD: I think you have to have named person/people with a defined role, within a defined 
organisation. I think those attributes are the tree things that drive the security. There maybe 
more but I can’t think at the present time. 
DR: So, who is responsible for assigning the roles to the users? 
CD: I envisage an administrative function with the portal and there is also a commercial 
aspect, again. It would put this in an operational environment . The part of the process doing 
the sale, or whatever it is you are doing to you customer set, will be the definition of what 
the customer can log on for, what purpose. And what can they use and see. There may 
several different classifications of different types of customer, because they have different 
job roles and work with different customer processes. If you essentially say, Person-Role-
Organisation, I think you can define that. 
DR: Again we are talking about that being centrally administrated. 
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CD: Yes. Centrally of course, if you think a little laterally, the grid itself allows you to do a 
distributed effort. And therefore you might have administrators who are scattered, 
depending on where their market is. You might have a US one, you might have a UK one. 
What I would guess there is that there are potential conflicts, because the interpretation for a 
role in the US might be completely different from what it is in the UK. 
DR: Yes, so you might want context for that role. I think what we are saying is essential 
here is because it is in the same trust domain. We are not trying to cross boundaries. I think 
the question is addressing the issue of whether the airlines could provide identities and 
attributes to those identities. 
CD: I think we give a template definition, and say these are the roles, these are the 
groupings. They have to supply the names of the people who are actually fulfilling those 
and when let a contract for say accessibility to health monitoring today. We contractually 
put the onus of the customer to make sure that they keep us informed of who is an authority 
user and who is not. We cover ourselves commercially by saying, if you don’t tell us, we are 
not liable to the kind of accident I described earlier. We also have a service level around 
that, that when we have a new user or somebody who needs to be deleted the system or 
revoked. There is a timescale and a response time under which we must do that. 
DR: OK, That’s good. I think we might have addressed this one, but I shall ask it anyway. 
How should the roles be defined? 
CD:  Almost like a job description, is what I feel. Give some context of that role in how it 
fits into the overall process. It’s got an expected set of responsibilities. Have a set of 
processes that you are linked to. How those processes are triggered. In fact, you could 
probably extract that from the use cases themselves. There maybe other things that the use 
case doesn’t include. Say, what qualifications do we expect a person to have and what 
attributes, a sort of job description. 
DR: That’s good, because that fits in with what I am looking at with the policy. So you 
might be able to define some of those to be used with the policy. So it maps it when it looks 
up the role, and the role might have a policy. So you can explicitly and quickly see what a 
role can do, without have to look up the rest of the system. 
CD: Yes, and there maybe a qualification that a person gets labelled as a DAME 
maintenance advisor. It may be training, and a who set of other attributes that you must have 
in order to fulfil that role. 
DR: That makes sense. And again I think we have answered this one, but the restrictions on 
sharing data and services across organisations? I think what would be interesting is to 
expand on that question, was the notion where the airline would possibly be providing their 
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own services to access the data and diagnose their own fleets and look across their own 
fleets. 
CD: Yes 
DR: Or you could possibly provide them with some access to other organisations data. 
CD: Lets differentiate the difference between data and enablers. With enablers what you 
could possibly do is open up a restricted set of services such that: Somebody like Lufthansa 
is probably one of the main airlines in the world that likes to keep a lot things in house. I 
could see value in that one of the diagnostics services that we have is so good they might 
want to make use of it, but from their environment. So they are passing data to it, and taking 
the results back in house as raw data. Not actually accessing via the portal user interface. 
So, I guess what we are exposing there is some kind of Web Service for a particular enabler, 
and they are just calling it on an as required basis. Now I believe that is a service up-sell 
opportunity, because you can charge Lufthansa for the availability of that. We don’t have to 
constrain them to use the user interface that we have. 
As far as data is concerned, I think anything that gives (or is seen as giving) competitive 
advantages to a set of customers is the quickest way you can shut down a business. But, 
with benchmarking if you can get the complete data, then there is great benefit in customers 
measuring themselves against the average. 
DR: OK, so you might on one level be providing access to data that is aggregated and 
anonymised. 
CD: Now, there is another, If we have access to the full fleet historical data. Let’s say that 
Lufthansa wanted to do a search because they have just seen an anomaly through the whole 
database. I think that is possible. As long as the results are anonymised, going back. 
Because it has to be non-attributable to where it has been experienced before. Now that’s 
going to create problems when you look at the use cases. Because, you are extracting event 
data based on the index of finding similar anomalies with your research, then you are going 
to have to make damn sure that that event data is anonymised. I don’t know how you are 
going to manager that. 
DR: I can see it would be extremely difficult to maintain it without some way of cross 
referencing to tell where that data had come from. 
CD: Yes, an intelligent user of the system could fire up a whole series of them and reverse 
engineer who it came from. Because you could get clues about who is operating in an 
operating context. Yes, could be an issue. 
DR: So that might mean you would have to provide, I assume that there would be a level of 
that within DAME anyway. So, that the say, aura-g search result would be processed by 
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CBR. And then CBR would say this is the likely result because this matches up with the 
case. If that’s the sort of thing you could provide to Lufthansa, that would be anonymised 
because that would provide a diagnostic result. 
CD: You have to be sure that the instances of the conglomerated results are not attributable 
to specific customers. It is going to be very interesting in the CBR approach, because I can 
see all kinds of searchable attributes that we haven’t delved down into in order to isolate. 
Because operating context and environment are very big drivers of reliability. So how do 
you classify those. And certain operators will be in predominately one context i.e. the 
different between short haul and long haul. 
DR: Yes, I remember from some of the discussions with Dennis King that he looks at which 
airline it is, so he knows what the operating conditions, what altitude they run at. 
CD: That’s precisely my point. 
DR: That is all the question I have. Do have any other comments you would like to add. 
CD: I think I made the comment earlier on the general use and not being able to reverse 
engineer. What we didn’t do very much within this project is look at the metadata. 
Getting more out into the grid, if you want general purpose providers, i.e. they have got an 
algorithm. You not going to be able to be a general provider of those services for anybodies 
z-data. A silly example, you have a really novel method of doing fast Fourier 
transformations, and you want to offer that out to anybody. You are going to maximise your 
market if you can get data into a defined standard. We haven’t really talked about those 
defined standards of metadata within DAME. So that we can link up several different 
diagnostic capabilities much more conveniently. I think the metadata standard that has been 
intrinsically in there is the z-mod file format. For vibration spectrum data. That I think 
helps. This also plays into the security game, because you could think about the concept of a 
certified service provider for a certain algorithm. One of the things in your brokering, you 
could say what metadata standard are you using for vibration data. 
There are standards that are coming on. The MIMOSA is the condition monitoring standard 
in the US. And of course PLCS is more associated with the event and maintenance data 
from ISO. 
DR: The sort of thing that I am trying to move on with is combining the workflow with 
secure access and then trying to provide templates. And the template really works directly 
with the workflow and says, here are the roles and when you generate the instance of the 
workflow, then it starts mapping users to role instances. And then you can define the users 
who can use this workflow. 
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CD: That’s a very knotty problem, because there may be some small workflows that say 
maintenance guy could not access, and yet you could have a super workflow where the one 
that you are not allowed to run is right in the middle. Can you run that and not see the input 
and output results? It becomes a black box that you wouldn’t see the workflow. It could 
become a horrible rats nest. 
The kind of instance that you might not want, is that you pull out a report that says this is 
the relative safety this year, this month compared with this month last year. And the 
industry is saying we have improved safety performance by ten percent and in fact it has 
fallen by twenty percent. That’s dynamite data. 
DR: So as a summary, I have certainly got some good information, on expanding the 
DAME use case with other examples and I have a good idea of the surface of those. So I can 
apply them to the general model, so that’s very useful. I also have a clearer idea of the 
DAME problem, in aspects which had been touched on but not quite addressed. In 
particular, where you can see the grid is going to go in the short term and the administration 
of the system is quite important and with cross organisational systems, the admin and the 
access control is important. 
CD: Absolutely vital. If you haven’t got that you haven’t got a business. 
DR: I think that you have explained with good example (and I don’t see any reason that 
DAME would be any different) I think there would need to be some kind of central control 
of users. In particular, using the idea follow the money, Rolls Royce is being paid for the 
contract, but they have to protect the interest of everybody. So you can see why the central 
administration would work in this instance. 
CD: You are right because administration goes further. You have to consider Rolls Royce’s 
fundamental culture and business is going to change to a service-based culture. Now where 
you have self adapting system that are capturing knowledge and the administration of the 
site, you have got to be fairly astute because you are always going to be looking for up sells 
of services. So if you have discovered something new out of your extraction for knowledge 
it becomes a potential revenue stream as a new service. Not only that you could get into the 
point of view that the service offerings themselves have got a finite life. Therefore today, 
the whole of the DAME ability to do say the automatic aura-g search might be charged for 
at a certain rate. In five years time if all the other rivals have cloned that, operators may 
expect that as a free service. So you have to constantly re-invent the service level and adapt 
it to higher and higher levels as you are going along. Spotting those up sells and deciding to 
delegate some of those services down to a freebee is an art, a science in it own right. 
DR: I hadn’t quite thought of that. I suppose costing that initially must be difficult if you 
can’t really see the lifecycle. 
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CD: The lifecycle of a service is obviously much shorter than the lifecycle of a product. 
You are dealing with quite complex assets. So One, having a handle on the lifecycle of a 
service, in terms of ‘can I charge for it’. The second trick is in trying to understand on what 
the intrinsic value of that service is. Now, if I am going to give the diagnosis of a failure 
mode, then internally I can repeat that again and again. How much value is it to that 
customer? How do I get in a position where I am not charging for the cost base for the 
service I am providing, but I am charging them for the value. You have be able to have a 
mechanism to understand the value of what you are delivering as well. That’s not easy. 
DR: As an aside I think it is quite interesting that Rolls Royce has been able to change to a 
service model. 
CD: Sixty percent of its revenue in civil airspace is on a service base. It is completely 
different product. It is incredible. 
DR: It must have been quite difficult. 
CD: Take a look at their share price. Take a look and see what it has done in the last couple 
of years, then you will see the story. 
Some discussion followed about the roles and how their requirements affect the design of 
user interface. Also about data quality, as fitness for purpose, therefore how this is presented 
to the user. Including issues of style and control (data manipulation). 
Repeated user and ad hoc user access, such that entry into the system would be different and 
alert requirements. 
CD: Another thing about accessibility is single logon. There maybe a requirement that 
certain users access via another portal. We go back to the Lufthansa point of view, 
(conjecture). That the Lufthansa user might want to log onto their own intranet and have 
accessibility to the DAME user interface via their own intranet. What you don’t want to 
burden those customers with is that they have to logon to the intranet, and then have to 
separately have to logon to the DAME system as well. You want single logon. 
 
B.3 Interview Results Rolls-Royce 
Interview Results from 12th November 2004 
Issue: 2 Author: D. Russell Issue date: 7th December 2004 
Purpose and Scope 
The aim document contains a summary and transcript of the tape recorded research 
interview with Graham Hesketh that took place on 12th November 2004. This interview 
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conducted by Duncan Russell addressed the author’s PhD subject area of  ‘Secure 
Collaborative Workflow’. Additionally Martyn Fletcher was in attendance to the interview 
to offer suggestions and opinion based on previous security work on the DAME project. 
Summary 
The following is a summary of the points discussed separated into categories for 
Collaboration, Workflow, Access Control, Roles and General Security. 
Collaboration 
Collaborations may take place by telephone, but would still involve DAME to determine 
context of collaboration (such as engine number and previous prognosis results). Using the 
system to identify the task/problem reduces risk of ambiguity. There would need to be a 
record of decisions made during the telephone conversation. 
Security in the portal should not be restricted to current business process, but should allow 
for collaborations between people. Especially between different Maintenance Analysts, or 
between Domain Experts. 
Collaborations between users of the same role has not been addressed, but needs to be 
managed within the portal. Access control should not prevent this from happening within 
the same organisation (at least). Simply put, this would prevent Maintenance Engineer from 
different organisations sharing data, but allow Maintenance Analysts all within DS&S to 
share diagnosis of a problem. 
The collaborations between users of the same role, although not currently implemented, will 
benefit by using DAME in reducing ambiguity, by sharing a workflow instance and the 
pertaining contextual information. 
Workflow 
DAME central workflow accurately represents a simplified  possible business of engine 
diagnosis. 
Workflow definitions, considered as IPR, would require restricted access. Predominately the 
Domain Expert analyses vibration data and the Maintenance Analyst analyses performance 
data. The Maintenance Analyst can use the Domain Expert’s results automatically if the 
Domain Expert’s workflow can be captured and automated. Also, this aids training other 
Domain Experts. 
Access control to services & data 
Access control to assets is predominately viewed as restricting access to data. 
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Authorisation mechanisms would need to restrict user by Role and Organisation to view 
data, or service output or workflow output. Not as strong a need to restrict access to launch 
workflows or services, compared to retrieving results. Therefore users would be identified 
by the user id, but access restrictions would use attributes such as role and organisation, 
possibly extended by task or context (which may be derived from the workflow type/stage). 
Restricting access to services, data and algorithms is currently viewed as feasible by using 
an in-house grid behind a firewall, possibly extended to DS&S. This could be an internally-
shared processing/storage resource and would need policies on how the sharing takes place. 
If methods of obfuscating services and data are available, then execution of parallel tasks 
could be delegated to external grids. However, no business case for large parallel execution 
is currently foreseen in Rolls-Royce, except possibly MEROS at DS&S. 
Roles 
There are more roles in the business than those defined for DAME. 
The three basic roles are a simplification on the possible user community, but provides a 
basis to incorporate other stakeholders with appropriate access privileges. 
At the Maintenance Analyst level, sharing diagnoses provides benefits to the customers 
(albeit a benefit to one customer gained from experiencing problems from another), which is 
typical in a diagnostic environment. Therefore a Maintenance Analyst can view data across 
airlines, but should not be able to divulge specifics to another airline. 
Maintenance Analysts and Domain Experts typically do not have restrictions on seeing 
customer data, but would not reveal specifics to other customers, either explicitly or 
implicitly. 
General Security 
Portal security is good by using x.509, but not in external tools with separate or no 
authentication/authorisation. 
DAME would need a central control to administer: users and their rights, issuing certificates 
(or defining who can issue certificates), workflow definitions. 
Grid raises the issue of confidential data and services potentially being rapidly available. 
Protection mechanisms are seen a piecemeal rather than a generic solution that applies to all 
parts of the system. 
Interview Transcript 
The following is a transcript from the taped interview between the three people: 
GH = Graham Hesketh 
Appendix B   Evaluation Interviews 
164 
MF = Martyn Fletcher 
DR = Duncan Russell 
Some details of the speech have been omitted in the transcript such as ‘Err’ and ‘OK’ and 
‘Yes’. 
Interview started at 10:00am 12th November 2004, in a meeting room, Rolls-Royce, Derby 
and finished at 11:25am. 
Introduction 
DR: As introduction, the previous interview with Dennis King was more focused on the 
usability on the DAME portal. This is more focused on my PhD research, which is still 
referring to the DAME demonstrator, but is more focused on secure collaborative workflow 
within the portal and how you see that for a future deployed system. 
Collaborative Workflow in the DAME Demonstrator 
DR: First question, and this is aimed at the current demonstrator, Does the workflow in the 
Demonstrator reflect the expected business process? 
GH: Now, the workflow that you are talking about is the automated response? 
DR: Yes 
GH: Which effectively kicks off the search process, the analysis process for XTO. Right, 
yes it does. That is essentially what we want to do. And I believe that came out of the initial 
requirements. We spent a lot of time coming to terms with what the business requirements 
were and constructed a process that would reflect that. And I think that is what the current 
workflow in the portal does. 
MF: Do you mean the actual workflow that is executed for that automatic thing? Because 
the view was that it could be changed depending on what people thought. 
DR: It is kind of encompassing not just the initial stage of it but the whole business process. 
GH: You mean the escalation process and everything? Yes, it seems quite natural. It seems 
to work quite well. I have been through the portal on several occasions and followed 
through the scenarios. And yes, as far as I can tell for what we would like to do, although I 
am not an end users in as far as Dennis King is, it matches my understanding of the 
processes we would like to conduct. 
MF: The only comment I have is that, to me it is not exactly clear the difference between 
the roles of different Maintenance Analysts and the Domain Expert. I am not clear in my 
mind the exact demarcation of those jobs. 
GH: Does that come out in any of the later questions or should we tackle that now? 
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DR: There is an opportunity to tackle that later. So, with the current demonstrator does the 
secure access match the expected business process? 
GH: That is a bit more difficult to confirm. We are currently using username password 
access, which is layered on top of the X.509 certification underneath. So you don’t get a 
username and password until you have those underlying certificates created. That’s an 
additional level of security which is good. But having got the password access, what I can’t 
say is whether or not Rolls-Royce would be happy to deploy assets, as in datasets and 
algorithms which are only secured by that method alone. That I can’t confirm. 
MF: Also, the dependability study has said that the separate things that pop, such as the 
engine model, are a big no-no as far as security is concerned. Because you download 
executables onto your machine and have no access control from that point. There are 
criticisms of the current demonstrator bore out in this dependability and security study 
which are fairly valid to this stuff. 
GH: Having said that Rolls-Royce is intending to have a corporate portal. Which will allow 
employees access to some aspects of the business systems. Particularly email, but also 
corporate intranet and that implies some of the company data. Now if they have a corporate 
portal over the internet, that will have to be protected again via probably just logging in 
through username and password connections. It won’t even have X.509 certifications. So if 
they are going to be happy to do that, again it depends on the extent of the information that 
will be allowed to be transmitted over that portal. Probably not to the same extent as we are 
talking about with engine datasets, potentially customer information and engine models, 
algorithms and so on. That is unlikely to be, accessible through the corporate portal. So we 
are talking about requiring more level of security than that. And I believe that the 
demonstrator does offer that, but whether it reaches the high standards or levels that are 
required is another matter. I think what it has done is opened an avenue of opportunity that 
wasn’t previously available and so not enough thinking has been done to decide what is an 
adequate level of security, given that opportunity. 
DR: Good, Does the demonstrator represent all the organisations and roles in those 
organisation in the DAME diagnostics process? 
GH: We have currently settled on just the three roles, although we did identify more 
stakeholders than that. I think for the purposes of demonstrating the usability and the 
functions that are available, the workflows that are available and the integration. I think 
those roles were sufficient. Because you can make the mental leap from there to 
incorporating other stakeholders with appropriate access privileges. 
MF: Such as MRO people? 
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GH: Yes. So the airline customers themselves could be integrated into that model. Although 
they may have a different access point and different requirements, of course. But 
nevertheless, the idea of the virtual organisation that will allow different stakeholders to 
take part in the process, with appropriate levels of access, I think, is adequately 
demonstrated within this package that we have (within the demonstrator). And it’s a 
straightforward extension to include other parties. 
DR: Great, OK. 
Collaboration Procedure 
DR: Moving onto what you perceive outside of the demonstrator. Concentrating on the 
collaboration procedure, can you say what happens in the escalation of diagnosis problems 
between the Maintenance Engineer and the Maintenance Analyst? And then the Analyst and 
the Domain Expert? 
GH: In what respect? 
DR: What information is passed, how they interact, how you expect the collaboration to be? 
GH: Within the demonstrator and to an extent possibly in real life as well, they would 
exchange messages to request additional assistance or to clarify issues, problems and so on. 
But in real life they may well pick up the phone and talk to people. It depends on the 
timescale of the problem they are trying to get a resolution from. If it needs to be urgent, 
then having a physical presence is generally a good idea. You can get somebody from just 
down the road to come on along and help out, that’s one thing. Having electronic access to 
the same data means you don’t have to do that. So I think what you have to do is consider it 
in the context of ways of working in other domains that use electronic means rather than 
physical relocation. So people collaborating on software projects or solving problems in 
modifying spreadsheets, for example. Might be more analogous to the way that we are 
suggesting that people might work in solving these diagnostics problems. Because 
previously they wouldn’t have had access to the same data. Now they can, it opens up the 
opportunity for, as I say, picking up the phone, calling somebody as well as going through 
an automated system of messaging where you can put specific requests in and also point 
them at the right data without them having to fumble about trying to find it. By having a 
system where they can log in and you are referring to the same entities by the same labels 
and it is quite clear what it is you are dealing helps to focus the problem and the resolution 
much more efficiently. So, I think the mechanism that is already in the demonstrator, crude 
though it is. I think is effective at channelling the resources in the right direction to solve the 
right kind of problems. 
Appendix B   Evaluation Interviews 
167 
MF: If you are using the phone, presumably you still want any decisions made through that 
phone call recorded for traceability? 
GH: Again, it comes back to what current processes are. If you have got somebody on the 
ground at an airport that has an indication, from whatever source, that causes them concern 
and they want some back up confirmation. If they call a maintenance engineer at DS&S, or 
whatever, the first problem they have is identifying what assets they are talking about. Once 
you have done that you then got to identify what the data you want them to specifically look 
at. And what the nature of the problem is that you want them to give you an opinion on. So, 
all of these are potential areas of ambiguity in the current system. Plus, how do they access 
that data. It may be that you are asking for historical information. ‘It appear to have this 
problem with this engine now, was there anything that you saw in the past that might give a 
clue as to what may have gone wrong?’. Again that is a fair enough question, so long as you 
get all the labels right, and so on. Once you have done that, for audit purposes you need to 
have some kind of physical record that the conversation has taken place or you’ve had a 
particular recommendation from a particular person. That, I don’t know. Though that’s 
current working practice that I can’t really comment on. What I can say is that the 
demonstrator, the way that it is implemented, does lend itself to solving all those issues. So 
what it is you are talking about, the ambiguity is removed. And what has actually occurred 
is logged. So, that particular issue is removed, as well. 
MF: I think, at one stage we got some criticisms for DS&S about the annotations being 
inside the DAME system and not part of the SDM. Would that lead to difficulties later on? 
GH: We have to bear in mind, this is a demonstrator. It’s not meant to be a final deployed 
commercial solution. The commercial solution, as far as DS&S are concerned, revolves 
around SDM. That’s a business decision that’s been made between DS&S and Rolls-Royce. 
And that’s what we have to live with. What that implies, is that any future solution that we 
are suggesting, based around an integrated environment (we won’t call it a demonstrator 
because it is a fully deployed commercial solution) will have to integrate with the solutions 
that are already agreed and in place. So it will have to be SDM based. What we are talking 
about here is an addition to the already proposed SDM2 tools. Which are the analysis suite 
of tools that sit on the infrastructure that has already been put in place. So, yes the databases 
that we are talking about should already exist and there should be facilities for incorporating 
the kinds of data that we need. Or at least relational links to additional databases that 
contain QUICK data and other engine data. Which may not have a place in the current 
databases but necessarily you could have links to those databases. 
It should be possible to, in fact it is necessary to put all those things in place, so that the 
additional integrated tools that you layer in through a portal will be able to access 
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commercially available systems and will not therefore be at variance with the business 
processes that DS&S are already saying that are mandatory. It is a question of integration, 
and we couldn’t do that with the current demonstrator in its current form. We didn’t have 
the time or we didn’t have the resources to do that. And it was also unnecessary. For an 
EPSRC funded project which is doing basic research with a steer towards an industry 
problems, I think it would have been inappropriate to go down the route of full integration 
with a commercial system like SDM. 
DR: It would have been difficult to release the software, as well. 
GH: Correct. 
DR: OK. I think we have covered a few questions. There is only one left on collaboration 
and this is more to do with not so much the escalation, but the users who are operating in the 
same role in the system. What sort of information would they share between each other and 
what restrictions would there be on sharing? 
GH: Do you mean multiple, say, maintenance engineers? 
DR: Yes. 
GH: At the moment the escalation process restricts the information to a chain of command. 
So , a particular maintenance engineer would escalate to a particular analyst. That’s an 
arbitrary restriction that is placed on the demonstrator. It is a particular implementation of 
an approach that is modifiable, scalable and so on, such that you can have multiple 
maintenance engineers all allocated in the same escalation path. I haven’t experimented 
with that. I don’t know how easy it would be to implement. I am assuming that it is fairly 
trivial to implement. And I don’t not know what the working practice impact of that would 
be. For example, if an engineer escalated that to one of a pair or a multiple number of 
maintenance analysts and said ‘Can any of you guys help me out?’. That’s a more robust 
solution, because it overcomes the possibility that the particular engineer that you are 
escalating it to isn’t available. So obviously you have to take that into consideration. But it 
then opens up the question of what happens when multiple people all want to access the 
same data and all getting involved in the same diagnostic process. Would there potentially 
be any conflict there? Well I presume that there wouldn’t, because what we are talking 
about here is read only access to data sources. So you may have the effect of bandwidth 
limitations, or if people are trying to access the same resources at the same time and they are 
already in use. So the duplication of access to potentially limited resources is an issue. 
So, I don’t think at the moment that the portal has anything built into it that helps to manage 
the process of multiple similarly capable people, or authorised people to access the 
resources at the same time. And it doesn’t help to manage those in a coordinated fashion. 
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But, I think that is really an additional level of complexity which would have been intended 
to be addressed in follow-on work rather than at this stage. I think, at this stage, identifying 
that you have got this escalation path that allows you to have limited access by individuals 
to limited problems, is fine. How you then deal with how you duplicate this up is a separate 
issue. Which I think is an important one, because may well be that if you let loose a whole 
bunch of people all at the same access level, all at the same data, that has a potential for 
creating problems. Which you would hope that the infrastructure, the portal, the workflows 
and so on, would be able to give you handle on and help you with. And at the moment we 
haven’t addressed that issue, the portal doesn’t address that issue. 
MF: After we did the use cases, we talked to you more about security. During the course of 
that, the view that I came up with and I think Howard [Chivers] came up with, is that at the 
maintenance engineer level, maintenance engineers work for particular airlines. They would 
be denied access to other airlines information. So there would be walls between 
maintenance engineers. At a slightly higher level, you would have maintenance analysts 
who looks over a few jobs, and he would be able to see information from across airlines. He 
may not be able to see specific things, but he may be able to see results of diagnoses. He 
may be working on contracts across airlines, so there might be a few of those. And domain 
experts would be able to see more. . 
GH: That’s fine and I think that process works. And it comes down to the attributes that 
each individual user that logs into the system has got and there access privileges. And that is 
feasible for the portal control and I could see how that could be implemented and work. 
What I don’t know and I think because we haven’t tried it is what is the impact of having 
people with access to multiple, or having multiple people with access to the same resource. 
As apposed to an individual having access to multiple resources. The issue that you are 
talking about there is where one maintenance analyst can see multiple engines from multiple 
airlines. 
DR: So, they are controlling the conflict of interest? 
GH: Yes. Well in fact for them it is not really…Well there is a potential for conflict of 
interest but as an analyst they are entitled to see that data. And they are expected to operate 
on it. For them it becomes an issue of ambiguity. Which particular engine are they talking 
about, which one are they dealing with. Because they have multiple engines that they can 
see and refer to. 
I think the other issue. Which is where you have got multiple analysts all having access to 
the same engine data and none of them knowing which one is expected to operate on it. So 
when a request comes through from the maintenance engineer at the airport, an escalation 
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comes through we don’t know which of the maintenance analysts are going to respond, and 
they don’t know which is expected to. 
MF: If you have a set of maintenance analysts who work on the same group of airlines and 
you give them a token. You say that is your job at the moment. If he is on holiday, or 
something, then it goes to somebody else. 
GH: There are ways of working it through. My point is simply that the current 
implementation of the demonstrator, the portal, doesn’t address that issue. 
DR: Is there scope in the future to, not so much that the job is allocated to one person, but 
several maintenance analysts may be working together to solve a particular problem. 
GH: They might do. Again, it depends on there level of expertise. Domain experts 
themselves may be few and far between, thin on the ground. So getting multiple domain 
experts together to collaborate on a problem might be an issue. But analyst , yes there could 
be multiple analysts that get involved. Again, the portal at the moment doesn’t have the 
facility within it, that one analyst for example could escalate it another analyst. You have an 
escalation to domain expert but not really calling the services of another analyst. 
DAME Roles 
DR: So here’s the opportunity to expand on the roles. Are the three defined roles sufficient 
to define access control for collaborations? 
GH: You mean for a full implemented commercial solution or just for the purposes of the 
demonstrator? 
DR: For the full system. 
GH: Probably not. Again, following from Howard and Martyn’s analysis, there is a much 
more detailed investigation of the stakeholders and potential threats to the system. Which 
will necessitate a more detailed and structured approach to annotation of access privileges 
and protection of individual assets. So I suspect that the breakdown that we have currently 
got is not detailed enough in order to provide all of the necessary levels of access restriction, 
that would be necessary in a commercial solution. 
MF: An example would be a Maintenance Engineer that works for a particular airline. So 
the role of that person is particularly important, the actual airline he works for (the 
organisation he works for) is important. Because that determines what can do and what he 
can’t do. At the Maintenance Engineer level there’s other attributes as well. 
GH: My feeling is that, the particular structure that we have adopted in the demonstrator is 
intended to be the final structure for a commercial system. It is intended to demonstrate the 
capabilities of a distributed environment with appropriate access restrictions and a level of 
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collaboration between the different parties. It demonstrated the principle of it. And I think it 
works in that respect, it shows what you can do. It then points to the fact that a more 
detailed analysis is required in order to fully specify what we need for collaborative working 
in a proper commercial system. The outcome of that will enable somebody to specify what 
you need for a full system, including all the roles and access rights and levels of 
collaboration, and so on. Which is a full mixture of the functionality that’s required and the 
level of security that’s required at each level. That I think is feasible. It’s not done currently 
within the demonstrator. The demonstrator merely points the way to how it could be 
implemented. 
DR: This is going back to the last point we were talking about. It is more concentrating on 
access control between roles of the same type again, sharing a process along with sharing 
data.  What restrictions are there be on, say Maintenance Engineers sharing. Martyn already 
said you would put walls between the airlines. And going up to the next level what 
restrictions are there on Maintenance Analysts sharing a process? 
GH: Sharing a process? I don’t think so. In that the processes are deployed appropriately. 
For example, within DS&S, they may well be servicing multiple airlines, with multiple 
different engine types. And they might not all be Rolls-Royce engines, there may be engines 
form different manufacturers, but DS&S nevertheless have the contract on providing the 
diagnostics support for. All the processes that they operate, they would expect be used by 
whoever requires to do so within DS&S. So they are not going to distinguish that a process 
is only for a particular airline and not to be used across airline, or by different analysts. 
MF: Did you mean process? Or did you mean the information about a particular diagnosis? 
DR: Kind of both really. 
MF: I appreciate that you only have one process that you use, probably for Maintenance 
Analyst,Maintenance Engineer, the process or the working process that they using is the 
same. Not across levels, but on a level. Do you mean the actual data, say for instance a 
Maintenance Analyst looking a Singapore Airline and another one looking at… Is that what 
you mean? 
DR: If we go back, I think what you are describing is the process definition. 
GH: To give you an example, if an analyst within DS&S is examining fleet data for a 
particular engine type from an airline. And recognising that there is a potential problem, that 
is occurring and the get to the root, or believe that get to the root of the problem. And 
identifies a danger, a hazard. Then you expect them to translate that into all of the other 
fleets, other airlines that are using that same engine. And again, to follow that up with an 
analysis, a risk analysis, potentially provide advise back to other fleet operators as well, that 
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they may be remedial action required. That is taking information from one specific airline 
and translating it into recommendations for another. They do that because it is the same 
people involved, whether or not the is a process that says you need to do this. Because it is 
the same people involved they will naturally do that. Now , whether you want to automate 
that process so that whenever analyses come up with conclusion that are applicable to an 
engine type then translate that into workflows and recommendations for other airline 
customers that use the same engine type. That is a different matter, but the specific data 
relating to a specific operator would not be divulged to other operators, but it is going 
through the same people. An analyst is aware that there is a problem on a particular 
operators fleet, then extracting what is common information from that, which is it is 
something to do with the HP compressor, and then translating that into analysis of 
somebody else’s airline data, to see whether or not there is an HP compressor problem. And 
if so, informing them of what needs to be done. There is an aliasing there of the information. 
So not telling this fleet operator that somebody else’s fleet has a problem with its engines, 
they are simply providing a recommendation based on there own data. But it is an analysis 
which is inspired, if not the conclusions drawn from somebody else’s data. 
That I believe is a legitimate business process that is conducted behind the scene. What we 
wouldn’t want to do is construct a system that would prevent that from happening. Whether 
or not you would want to construct a system that would help to make that, to automate that 
process is another matter. But you wouldn’t want to prevent it from happening. 
DR: So at the analysts level, if an analyst is working on a particular problem and would 
want another analyst to help with that problem, are there any restrictions in the business. 
GH: Not that I am aware of. I think within DS&S they do not have that kind of Chinese 
wall, that says, these people only deal with these problems, but I may be second guessing 
here. So you can’t take it as verbatim that it is true. But, to the best of my knowledge that 
isn’t done. What they would do is have Chinese walls between customers. So that they 
would be communicating customer information from one customer to another. 
MF: So, essentially DS&S probably have, as far as you know, DS&S have a bunch of 
maintenance analysts who can look across any engine that DS&S might have data for. 
GH: They have a predictive services business and it’s their job to do the backroom analysis 
of health monitoring data. And those people may expertise in particular engine types, they 
may have generic expertise across all engines types. And may well be able to personalise it 
where necessary. But typically you would expect an individual that has expertise of 535-E4 
engines, the RB211’s, to concentrate on doing that. Rather than expect them to do Trent 
500’s or Trent 800’s, or whatever. But nevertheless they can be called in where necessary. 
So it may well be that there is internal demarcation… 
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MF: To match actual domain knowledge. 
GH: And it may also be done by a fleet operator as well. So particular people have 
responsibility for particular fleets. But I don’t think there is anything that explicitly prevents 
them from calling-in assistance from other analysts, as and when necessary, or the 
opportunity arises. 
DR: I assume that’s a similar practice at Rolls-Royce? 
GH: Yes. 
DR: You would be able to look across anybody’s data, but you are not going to reveal 
specifics. 
GH: That’s right. And they do. Dennis looks across pretty much all engine types. Lessons 
that he learns on one he will implicitly transfer, if not explicitly, across to the others. And 
hopefully a system like the one that we have been developing within DAME would provide 
the repository for that kind of knowledge to be encapsulated to be reused more 
automatically. And also by other people. So, Dennis has learnt something and incorporates 
it into the system in such a way that the next Domain Expert that comes along that’s 
expecting to address a different problem for a different customer. They can still make use of 
the knowledge that’s been gained by an exercise that Dennis has done. And it’s really the 
lesson that’s been learnt, the knowledge that been incorporated which is the important 
aspect. The fact that it’s for a particular customer may well be completely aliased out. There 
may be still records that that is were it came from, but that isn’t necessarily made available, 
it doesn’t have to be made available for the next domain expert that wants to use it. 
Workflows 
DR: Now we are looking at processing resources and the workflows that are using the 
resources. So, How should the processing resources be managed securely? 
GH: The simple answer is to do it all in house. We have enough resource, or you make sure 
you have enough resource available to meet peak demand. But because it is all in house, or 
within trusted suppliers (potentially within DS&S) then you don’t have the security 
considerations of where is my data going, where is my algorithm going. I think 
communication over the internet or over a grid can be made secure through encryption. But 
it has to be decrypted somewhere and where it is decrypted and run you have got a potential 
threat to security. Whether or not in the short term we are going to find ourselves in a 
situation where that becomes an unacceptable risk. That’s a different question. I don’t know 
I am not the person that would answer that. But, for the shorter term one resolution to the 
problem is to provide a distributed set of resources with are inside the Rolls-Royce firewall, 
or inside a trusted parties firewall. Now, what that does mean, it still gives you the 
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opportunity to use those resources for other things. So, you don’t have to put in a dedicated 
resources for doing engine diagnostics. What you can do is put in a multi-purpose resource 
which is capable of doing that and other functions within the company as well. And that’s 
really the short term expectation that we will be able to provide addition computed 
resources and storage resources which are intended to be more general purpose. And shared 
among a variety of users. So, that we still get optimal usage, but still have the capacity to be 
able to respond to short term demand. 
MF: I don’t want to keep going on about this dependability and security study. But, one of 
the conclusions out of that, for things like the engine model you would want to keep it in 
house any way. Because you want to keep the algorithms secure. But things like Aura you 
might want to put out onto the grid because the data when it is out there is not really 
understandable. 
GH: The purpose of the security analysis amongst other things is to compartmentalise the 
risks and identify those bits which are amenable to being taken outside to a less secure 
framework. Having done that it gives you the opportunity for saying if you want to have a 
full diagnostics system then these are the parts that have to be maintained securely, these are 
the parts which are less secure. And therefore, it helps you to map out the distribution of 
those resources. The easiest thing is to keep it all within a framework that you have control 
of. But, with the eye to the future of identifying which bits can be farmed outside as and 
where necessary. 
DR: OK, the other issue is obfuscating the operation itself, so you don’t know what the 
algorithm is doing. So that you would be able to farm that out. 
GH: That is a possibility that we raised in one of the meetings at York when talking with 
Howard. That you have the processor is executing instructions which it doesn’t really 
understand, it doesn’t know what they are doing. The net result of the operation appears 
opaque at the outside. So everything is effectively encrypted, from the point of view, the 
data comes in, the algorithm comes in. It is executed on a processor, the results are turned 
round and sent back. And it’s only when it is decrypted at the other end that you can tell 
what it has done. Whether that is feasible, or not I don’t know. I think I had some 
reservations about whether that can actually be done or not. 
MF: I know there is some work at Leeds on that. 
DR: Yes, Erica is working on that. And I am not sure to what level it is secure but the 
operation itself is feasible. 
GH: That will open up a range of possibilities. 
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MF: I think if you had a situation where you have and engine model and you want to run 
hundreds of them. Then you may run out of resources inside. If you get into that situation, 
that’s when you want to start farming things out. But then you have to be really sure that the 
security is okay. 
GH: I think the issue of whether or not you run hundreds and hundreds of engine models 
comes down to opportunity in that historically we’ve come up with the approach that if you 
don’t have that resource, you don’t rely on it. You don’t run hundreds of engine models 
simply for the sake of it because typically that resource isn’t available. So you build your 
processes around not being able to do that. If it becomes an opportunity that could run 
hundreds of engine models, you have then got to consider, well what is the benefit of doing 
so. And what is the cost and risk of doing so. You then look at the cost of farming out those 
models and the risk of doing so on secured machines on the Internet for example. And look 
at the benefit you got from running all those models. And given that the way that the 
business has evolved and we have had to do without that opportunity the question then 
arises ‘are our business models tuned to not needing hundreds of engine models to have 
been run such that the benefit of having that is now much reduced?’ So it would take time 
before you could say, We evolved the process along these lines now that we know this 
opportunity arise what kind would we be able to get. So I can’t say for certain that it is 
something that would become immediately appealing. 
MF: Some people suggested running lots of engine models. I am not sure whether it came 
from a business case, or a desire to have a massive computational problem. 
GH: Well, if you look at something like DS&S’s business model and you look at some of 
the other processes, in particular MEAROS, which is looking at engine [unknown from 
tape?], or modules being required for shop visit replacement. That is something that 
parallelises well, because you have got a probabilistic framework that you need to sample. 
And you need to come up with statistical averages panning out into the future in order to 
determine whether the particular parameters that you are suggesting are the best. That does 
lend itself naturally to be able to find, garner compute resources out there to run each one of 
these models. Again, it comes down to the sensitivity of the data that is in that model, 
whether or not you would want to be running that on somebody else’s machine. But clearly 
there, if you can crack that problem, then this is a good opportunity, because this is the kind 
of thing that DS&S do want to do. They do need to run multiple MEAROS models. They do 
need to have it encapsulated within an optimisation framework. 
DR: OK. This is probably fairly obvious, I just need confirmation answers. What 
restrictions would there be on executing workflows from the different roles? This is a 
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workflow that is available to run and just making sure that the obvious fact that you would 
restrict a particular role. 
GH: You would restrict it. But what would be the down side to either deliberate or 
accidental access to it. There probably isn’t that much. If you run a workflow, it generates 
data and that data sits the system. Now data itself is still access restricted. So, even if 
somebody either deliberately or accidentally ran a workflow that they weren’t entitled to 
that still wouldn’t mean that they would be entitled to look at the results. Because they 
would be secured by other access permissions. It may have an implication in terms of using 
resources, compute resources that you wouldn’t want to happen. So you might consider the 
situation that the system, inadvertently or incorrectly kicked off a workflow that it shouldn’t 
have done because it wasn’t necessary it generates results that really aren’t useful. That’s a 
waste of resources. So that’s one issue. But the second one would be if an individual in the 
system tried to kick off a workflow that they should have had access to, what would be the 
implication of that? Well I said one thing would be a waste of resources, but the second one 
would be if the data that is generated from that is still access controlled then that individual 
still wouldn’t get access to that even though they had access to the workflow. Although it 
would depend on how they’ve managed to get access to the workflow. Whether it’s a 
breakdown in the system somewhere where a privilege has been set or unset incorrectly. Or 
that person has managed to change their own access restrictions so that they can now see 
that workflow, and kick it off. If they have done that, then may also be able to see the 
results. But that I think is a more generic security consideration. That’s an individual that 
has managed to acquire access privileges that they weren’t entitled to. 
DR: Here is one the extends to the workflow advisor and CBR. So, what restrictions would 
there be on sharing workflow definitions? 
GH: Definitions? Can you clarify what you mean by a workflow definition? 
DR: Currently we have the automatic workflow, but you could envisage the results of either 
captured workflows and using workflow advisor and produced a definition. Or somebody 
who has organised the tools in a certain way and produced a definition. So what are the 
restrictions on sharing that definition and possibly how you go about defining access for 
roles to both execute and access. 
GH: I think that there’s an issue there of IPR and knowledge capture. That the workflow 
itself encapsulates the new knowledge. An individual has recognised a new way of doing 
something or there analysis of particular data that is pertinent to that situation, leads them to 
believe that a particular workflow is the right response to that and it turns out to be the case. 
Then they have created new knowledge and that is valuable. And the organisation that has 
done that would want to protect that for their own purposes. So, if that was done within 
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DS&S they would probably expect that other DS&S analysts should have access to that IPR 
and that new workflow. But not other maintenance analysts that might be collaborating 
through the portal from other organisations. Similarly within the Domain Experts. If you 
have one Domain Expert that has created a valuable workflow, then you would expect that 
to be accessible by other Domain Expert from the same organisation. Whether or not you 
would want to allow Maintenance Analyst from a different organisation to also have access 
to that work. Now, that’s a tricky situation. DS&S is not owned by Rolls-Royce, it is only 
part owned. They are a joint venture organisation, a separate body. So we have commercial 
relationships between us. So, it’s not everything that we do that have to get access to and 
vice versa. So, in that sense they may well want to retain IPR on workflows that they create. 
And not make them directly accessible to the domain expert, without some kind of 
collaboration agreement. Because at the moment we have the Domain Experts that have 
access to pretty much everything. So, naturally I think the way that the system is 
implemented at the moment, a workflow that is accessible to an analyst will also be 
accessible to an expert, a domain expert. And if new knowledge is created within the analyst 
domain, they may not necessarily want that to be directly available in an expert without 
some other considerations. You are right, it is not a given that it should be an open process 
along the escalation path, which it currently is at the moment. It may well be that you will 
want to be able to label and protect individual workflows that are not available off the shelf 
within the implementation of the system. So, that if it is something that is created after the 
system has been implemented, you may want to label those with access privileges. 
MF: There would probably be an owner to it, an owner attribute. 
GH: Yes. 
DR: Or maybe projecting into a business agreement that it would be part of a package, and 
that being an attribute. 
GH: Well that’s right, yes. And if the controls were in place, then they could release 
individual assets that they have within the system that are labelled as such, to other trusted 
parties on an access control basis. And that would be subject to external agreement. But, 
nevertheless, that would be implemented within the system. 
MF: If a maintenance Analyst comes up with a workflow that does a particular thing, would 
it be aimed at deciding when maintenance is required or aimed at finding out what the 
diagnosis was? What I am trying to say is, at the Maintenance Analyst level are they more 
interested in the actual good management of maintenance activities and the Domain Expert 
more interested in the diagnosis of unknown faults. Therefore the results of a workflow at 
the Maintenance Analyst level would not be directly of interest to the Domain Expert, is 
what I am trying to say. 
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GH: there is a bit of overlap. The Maintenance Analysts are people with domain knowledge 
as well. There are not just people who turn a handle. There are people who have fairly 
intimate knowledge, in a lot of cases of the gas turbine itself, performance characteristics, 
gas path analysis. 
MF: So, they would be into producing workflows to actually produce a diagnosis. 
GH: Yes. What they would is they would be predominately concerned with capturing 
repeated actions and automating them, automating the analysis. So, that it just speeds up the 
process for the future. If they have got a particular pattern of data they are not sure what it 
implies, then they will go through an investigation process that may or may not involve a 
Domain Expert. They may well be able to do it all in house. But, once they have done that 
and they have verified that there is an approach  that they have adopted that works. They 
will then want to capture that an reuse it. And if that can be automated within the system, 
then the next time that it occurs, they should get a much quicker resolution, involving less of 
their time. Now, primarily the distinction between the Maintenance Analyst and the Domain 
Expert is crudely the distinction between performance analysis and vibration analysis. 
That’s really where the distinction comes, in QUICK and within DAME. In that, the 
Domain Experts are the ones that know in detail about the vibration information and what 
its ramifications are. Whereas the Maintenance Analysts tend to be more concerned with 
performance analysis and that’s the one that gives them the long term information. Now, 
they will be getting some indications from the vibration analysis that QUICK is currently 
capable of delivering, that’s over and above what they have been used to in the past. And 
that will help point them to particular resolutions, and they will want to use that. But, they 
want have the in depth knowledge of where that information came from. That’s the Domain 
Expert area. 
So, when comes to creating workflows and automating a particular analysis and resolution 
they may well be making use of summary information, features, from the vibration data. So, 
it’s primarily their knowledge of dealing with performance issues that will drive the 
workflows that they are creating. The Domain Expert is much more concerned with in-depth 
analysis in the fine detail of the vibration data. And, they, as you say, are not so concerned 
so much about the workflows. They are hands-on. They want to get in at the very fine detail 
level, where it is much more interactive rather than. Well this analysis is done off-line, these 
are the results in summary. The time may come when the systems are intelligent enough that 
they can actually replicate what the Domain Expert is doing in fine detail. And they can do 
it well enough that it isn’t necessary enough to call upon their services. That time hasn’t 
come yet, but you can envisage that it may do in the future. And therefore being able to 
have documented reusable workflows that duplicate what the domain expert has done. Will 
then help other Domain Expert to quickly go through that process without too much manual 
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intervention. So, I think the two workflows are quite different and distinct and there may not 
be a necessity for one to kick off the other. You can imagine that there is still this escalation 
process. You can effectively imagine the situation where the Maintenance Analyst has 
already had the benefit of the automated workflows that they have been creating and still 
wants help from the domain expert, so they still haven’t got the final answer. In which case, 
when the call upon the Domain Expert, the domain expert will be able to see the results the 
benefit of the previous automated workflow, without necessarily knowing what it entailed. 
So they might not have had access to it in any detail, but the see the results and they 
understand why they have been called in to provide their advice. It would probably mean 
that they wouldn’t need to initiate the workflow themselves, because it has already been 
done. 
MF: Is the Domain Expert not too concerned about performance? 
GH: The Domain Expert does know about performance, but all of the knowledge required 
to draw conclusions about performance issues, probably resides in the Maintenance Analyst 
at DS&S. 
MF: So, as far as running the engine model is concerned, who of those two roles would 
actually be interested in running the engine model. 
GH: That’s a good question. 
MF: I’ve always, I thought, that the Maintenance Analyst would maybe run the engine 
model but not in a very interactive way. And the Domain Expert would run it in a very 
interactive way because he understands everything about it. But, that’s probably a wrong 
assumption from what we have just said. 
GH: Again, it comes down to the levels of distinction. In that, I think there are gradations 
with the Maintenance Analyst domain, they are not all the same. Some Maintenance 
Analysts will deal with high level data, high level performance data and not go into too 
much detail. Other Maintenance Analysts may have an inclination to get more in-depth and 
those are the kind of people that might want to run the engine models, to look for specific 
indication in the performance data. Because currently the engine model doesn’t provide 
vibration data. It is just performance analysis. So the people primarily doing performance 
analysis calculations are the Maintenance Analyst. And they are probably the customers for 
the particular service. That isn’t to say that the Domain Expert wouldn’t want todo that or 
need to do that. They may well do, but they will be doing that probably in conjunction with 
other analyses. In particular, looking at QUICK data. So, I that there is a range of 
requirements. 
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MF: Apart from the fact that we have allocated the Domain Expert to Rolls-Royce and the 
Maintenance Analyst to DS&S, around those two there is probably a fuzzy boundary. There 
people in DS&S coming up to Domain Expert. 
GH: DS&S may want to get more experts who are capable of doing in-depth analysis of 
QUICK data. Or they may just want to outsource that back to Rolls-Royce, and that’s the 
business model that they want to stick with. Similarly within Rolls-Royce we’ve got plenty 
of performance experts who could do the role that DS&S do, but don’t at the moment 
because that is a function that DS&S get involved in. But, nevertheless any particular 
problem that comes along that gets escalated to a Domain Expert in Rolls-Royce. They may 
well call upon resources within the company that look at performance issues rather than 
vibration issues. And that will always be the case. So it isn’t that all the performance 
analysis is done with DS&S and all vibration analysis is done within Rolls-Royce. It’s just a 
natural distinction at the moment because that is where the distinction lies. 
DR: That kind of brings up an interesting model. When you said outsourcing the expert you 
could almost outsource the Maintenance Analyst back to DS&S if you have people who can 
fulfil the role. 
GH: That is where the role is currently conducted. Previously before DS&S were formed 
Rolls-Royce were responsible for providing that Maintenance Analyst role to the airlines. 
When we set up the joint venture company the staff that went into DS&S came from Rolls-
Royce. It was those people that had that function within Rolls-Royce that went over to setup 
the new business. But previously, when they were in Rolls-Royce, they still called up the 
services of other people within Rolls-Royce. Now that they are within DS&S, they can still 
do that to an extent. Because we have very good cross linkages between the two 
organisations. But now it is a cross company link rather than an intra-company link. 
DR: This one we have kind of covered, but I will ask it anyway, just in case you can think 
of something else. What restrictions would there be on sharing or collaborating in active 
workflows? Which we have kind of discussed with the exchange of roles. 
GH: Although I said that the workflow itself might contain valuable IPR. And that therefore 
the individual organisations might want to protect it. The likelihood is that if we are 
collaborating at this level of using an integrated tool for virtual organisations. Then, we 
probably may well find ourselves in the situation where we don’t want to restrict access to 
the workflows, that we don’t want to consider them as protected IPR that our partners 
shouldn’t have access to. It is probably the case that it is going to be an open collaborative 
venture. That the workflows may well evolve out of the combined efforts of the partners, 
rather than any one individual. So, yes, if what you are doing is a process that involves 
multiple partners, and the net result of all of that is a captured workflow. Then it is really 
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joint ownership, at that point. That may well be the way that it is seen. And subsequently if 
it is only going to be utilised within that environment then it will be for the benefit of both 
parties anyway. 
MF: It is probably for the overall benefit of both organisations in that respect. You might 
have some open-source workflows within the organisation document. 
GH: It is an interesting question though because the whole idea, the whole opportunity of 
having virtual organisations collaborating together. Sharing data. Sharing development, and 
so on. Does raise the issue of IPR as who owns it. Who created it, where does it reside. 
DR: That actually leads nicely into the next question. I shall throw it in here, not to stop you 
at this point. Who can define new workflows for DAME? 
GH: There has to be an authority maintaining what DAME is. And that will reside with a 
nominated authority. That authority will be the one tasked with maintaining the system 
integrity and augmenting it in terms of functionality. However, who could suggest what 
might be a new appropriate workflow is probably unlimited. That any of the users of the 
system that are currently involved in deriving benefit, using day-to-day or whatever, would 
have the opportunity of interacting with it and creating potentially new workflows that 
could be of value. You still need to evaluate whether it would be useful, and that is a 
separate issue, as well. Somebody has to take the decision, yes, this workflow has been used 
umpteen times and its providing value. Therefore we would like to capture it, and put it in 
our library and even kick it off automatically under the following circumstances, etc. 
Somebody needs to do that evaluation and it may well be the role of the Maintenance 
Analyst primarily that would come to that conclusion. But it is whoever is responsible who 
is the nominated authority for maintaining the integrity of the system that would have to 
decide on whether it gets incorporated and implemented. I think anybody can suggest it. 
MF: But, the automatic workflows that people would run, presumably that would be fairly 
well controlled. Strictly controlled, because you don’t want some half baked stuff getting in. 
GH: Clearly not. 
MF: So that would have to be really well controlled. 
GH: Yes it would. 
MF: I am not saying that the other stuff doesn’t have to be, but… 
GH: Any user of the system can effectively produce a workflow by initiating a set of 
actions that they are entitled to do. But whether there is any net value in it that is worthwhile 
capturing is another matter. If they do that over and over again and every time they do it and 
every time they believe they are getting benefit out of it. Then capturing what is that they 
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have done, documenting it and putting it in as a suggestion to the nominated authority that 
says ‘This is a workflow that I would like to see stored within the system. I don’t have to 
keep on doing it myself I would just like to call upon it. That would be a useful function to 
have. Somebody at some point might take the decision that it needs to be an automated 
workflow because its value is such that we would really want it to be automatically 
executed. And again, that would not be the decision of an individual user. That would have 
to be from whoever is responsible for maintaining all the system. 
Access Control 
DR: Good. OK, How users should login to the portal, I think we have already discussed that 
one. So, how should organisations provide user identities? 
GH: (long pause). Well that I am not sure about. I got a certificate to access the system 
because I knew the person who was capable of providing those certificates. I suppose the 
issue becomes if, say, somebody in DS&S said we need to get a certificate for an individual 
to allow them access to the system. What is the process we should undergo to grant that? 
That I don’t know. I think it comes down to whether we are talking about a commercial 
system or whether we are talking about a demonstrator. 
DR: Really, the commercial system. So, this would encompass all users, those from the 
airline as well. 
GH: Well, they would have to be, as well as a certificating authority within whatever the 
grid system that we are using, there will have to be an authorising mechanism, a nominated 
person, a body, that would have to deal with who is entitled have access to the system and 
how they would verify that. That would I think depend who is considered to be the owner of 
the system. So whoever is the owner, deploying the asset. They would have responsibility 
for delegating access privileges and verifying that it is the right people that are getting them. 
I mean, a process for doing that would have to be drawn up with whoever the security 
representatives are in those organisations. 
DR: Good. Who is responsible for assigning roles to the users? 
GH: Again, I think it would be the same body. The one that would be expected to validate a 
request for access, would also be the one that would validate the role. It would be one and 
the same body. You would expect it to be. You cannot have somebody saying yes we will 
allow another person access to the system, but we will leave it to somebody else to decide 
on what their access privileges are, their role is. It would have to be one and the same body. 
DR: OK, fine. I think this one poses quite a wide scope. How should the roles be defined? 
GH: Within the current portal demonstrator, we have had a stab at it. In that, we have come 
up with three representative roles that demonstrate that a role based approach is feasible and 
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works. In a fully deployed commercial solution. I think there would have to be two things. 
One I think there would have to be a detailed analysis conducted to identify the set of roles 
which is appropriate for the solution. And also you would need a mechanism by which that 
can be changed and augmented. So I think its two things that a required there. One is an 
initial analysis and a specification and an implementation. And on top of that a mechanism 
for changing that. I Because it, the chances are that the role based analysis that you initially 
come up with isn’t the one that is ultimately going to be the most efficient, or the one that 
you need when you put the system into practice. So will you also want a mechanism for 
being able to author it. I think if you have got a mechanism for authoring it, it becomes less 
problematic and less of a concern that you get the initial analysis right. So, if you start, if 
you bootstrap the system with a set roles in there that will allow initial users to access and 
use the system. Then as it evolves and you identified that role set, sorry that set of roles is 
not the most efficient or doesn’t in fact meet all the requirements, then you just modify if. 
And that may mean changing the actual access privileges of the previously identified roles 
or simply adding new roles with different access privileges and functions. Then, so long as 
you have got that mechanism that you can change the roles that are already there, or you can 
augment them with new roles. Then it becomes I think a reasonably straightforward process 
to implement one. 
DR: Good. This is quite a wide question, but I don’t expect too wide an answer. What 
restrictions are there on sharing data and services across organisations? Or in fact, to put it 
the other way round, what scope is they for sharing data and services across the 
organisations? 
GH: Well there are big concerns, obviously. Commercial concerns where we have got 
customer data. As well as, our performance data, the algorithms all of those things are 
address by the security analysis that Martyn and Howard have done. We know the kind of 
scope of the problem that we are dealing with. We also know to what extend we have 
measures for dealing with that, currently in place. Physical security of items, non-disclosure 
agreements with people, electronic access, encryption and so on. All of those things are 
currently physically in place. The problem of the grid is that it provides rapid access to an 
awful lot of resources and confidential data, potentially confidential data. That was 
previously not available. It raises a whole new set of problems. I think that it will, the issues 
will be slowly addressed. There won’t be an immediate, this is it, we now know how to do 
it, and therefore we are going to implement this, this method across all of the access routes. 
I don’t think that will to happen. What will probably happen is that there will be a piecemeal 
approach. In that, access to individual resources, data, information will be made available 
under specific circumstances and under specific mechanisms and they will be tended to be 
done on a one by one basis. So where there is a requirement a necessity for access to that 
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data and information and there is a business case for it, and we have a driver. Then, an 
appropriate mechanism will be found and deployed. The lessons that you learn from that 
may well make it easier to deploy the next dataset, information, resources, etc. But I don’t 
that what they are going to do is withhold all of them until they’ve got a universal solution 
that is going to work for anything. I think that what they will do is on a case by case 
business basis they will find a mechanism for deploying access and learn from that for the 
next resource and so on. Until eventually, evolving out of that will become a generic 
solution, that will then be available for all. I think it will happen that way round. I mean, we 
have already seen during the lifetime of the project that we have delivered datasets on CDs, 
we have provided modified engine models. We have provided access over the internet and 
so on. Each one of these is just an evolving set, they not a universal solution. But they are a 
pragmatic response to an individual problem and I believe that’s what we will see more of. 
DR: Excellent. OK, that was my last question. I think that to summarise. I have got a very 
good overview, and from when I interviewed Charlie last week, and this has given me a 
view from Rolls-Royce perspective. It is extremely useful in validating my model. So, my 
next step is using the information… 
Any further comments you wish to add? 
GH: I suspect that quite a few of the issues that we have raised are going to be addressed 
within Broaden. Because we will to be talking about deploying a system along the lines of 
an internal, or close collaboration with us and DS&S, type model. Nevertheless there will be 
a range of roles and accesses to be required to be defined within that. And so, some of the 
questions that have been raised and the possible solutions that we have discussed we 
possibly see the light of day in the next few years. 
DR: Thank-you very much, it has been very useful. 
